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The fundamental argument of this dissertation is that migrant rights are central to understanding 
the politics of immigration: by defining what migrants can or cannot do in the receiving state, the 
bundle of rights granted to migrants conditions the effect that migrants have on domestic groups’ 
interests and therefore which societal groups will favor or oppose immigration liberalization. 
Increasing migrant rights increases the market, fiscal, and cultural costs of immigration to the 
right, but decreases the market costs and generates political and cultural benefits to the left. As a 
result, migrant rights condition preferences over immigration – such that the right (left) should 
favor (oppose) the admission of migrants with few rights and oppose (favor) the admission of 
migrants with expansive rights – and immigration policy outcomes – such that immigration 
reform will focus on increasing the admission of migrants with a limited (broad) set of rights 
when the right (left) is in government. These policy outcomes will vary in predictable ways 
under divided government and when policymakers are constrained with respect to the provision 
of migrant rights. 
In the first three chapters, I present the puzzle that motivates my project, my critique of 
the extant literature, my conceptualization of migrant rights as defining societal membership, and 
the theoretical framework that links migrant rights, societal interests, and immigration policy 
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outcomes. In the following four chapters, I test the expectations of the theoretical chapter in the 
United States and across the European Union. The first two empirical chapters consider the 
policy preferences of political actors and immigration policy outcomes in the United States. The 
second two empirical chapters do so across the European Union. In the concluding chapter, I 
situate the results of the empirical analysis in the contemporary context, highlight some of the 
implications for scholarship in both political economy and immigration politics, and consider the 
compatibility of extending and withholding rights in a liberal democratic society. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION: WHO’S AFRAID OF IMMIGRATION? 
Across the advanced industrial democracies few policy debates are as divisive and laced with 
vitriol as those over immigration. The charges against immigrants are numerous. For many, 
immigrant labor displaces domestic labor. In 2004, for example, former United States 
Representative Elton Gallegly (R-CA) claimed “wages across the board are depressed by the 
overwhelming influx of cheap and illegal labor.” Moreover, as a part of its 2015 electoral 
campaign, the United Kingdom Independence Party declared “British workers are hit hard by 
unlimited cheap labor.” For others on either side of the Atlantic fiscal burdens incurred as a 
result of “welfare tourism” and “anchor babies” are unacceptably costly. For others still, the 
cultural effects of immigration are sources of angst. In 2007, for instance, Dutch politician Geert 
Wilders bemoaned the “Islamification” of Europe. In that same year, American pundit Bill 
O’Reilly lamented that immigration liberalization is a strategy employed by those who “hate 
America […] because it’s run primarily by white, Christian men” in order “to change the 
complexion […] of America.” 
 Far from an idiosyncratic feature of popular rhetoric, scholarship remains divided over 
the causal role of market, fiscal, and cultural interests in the politics of immigration. This debate 
remains at an impasse, with each explanation providing a robust account of some aspects of 
immigration politics while failing to provide traction on others. The account proffered in this 
dissertation breaks this impasse by providing a generalizable theory of the conditions under 
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which each of these factors affects societal interests with respect to immigration and the related 
politics of immigration. 
By teasing out the role of market, fiscal, and cultural interests, we can begin to make 
sense of the varieties of immigration policies observed across the globe. What determines cross-
national, temporal, and inter-program variation in immigration policy restrictiveness? Why, for 
example, do some states, such as Germany following World War II, actively pursue short-term 
migrant labor but enact restrictive resident and naturalization programs while other states, such 
as Finland and Ireland opt for the opposite policy mix? This is not simply a question of trade-offs 
between policy alternatives. Some states, including the United States, make extensive use of both 
temporary and permanent migration programs, while others still, such as Austria and 
Switzerland, limit both. 
The fundamental argument of this dissertation is that migrant rights are central to 
understanding the politics of immigration: by defining what migrants can or cannot do in the 
receiving state, the bundle of rights granted to migrants conditions the effect that migrants have 
on domestic groups’ interests and therefore which societal groups will favor immigration 
liberalization. I argue that much of the politics underlying immigration policy can be understood 
using a standard left-right ideological dimension along which the political left represents the 
interests of workers in the market, supports the welfare state as a means to redistribute income 
and risk, and promotes cultural diversity and change while the right represents the interests of 
employers, seeks to reduce the size and scope of the welfare state, and strives to preserve 
traditional culture. Increasing migrant rights increases the market, fiscal, and cultural costs of 
immigration to the right, but decreases the market costs and generates political and cultural 
benefits to the left. As a result, migrant rights condition preferences over immigration – such that 
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the right (left) should favor (oppose) the admission of migrants with few rights and oppose 
(favor) the admission of migrants with expansive rights – and immigration policy outcomes – 
such that immigration reform will focus on increasing the admission of migrants with a limited 
(broad) set of rights when the right (left) is in government. These policy outcomes will vary in 
predictable ways under divided government and when policymakers are constrained with respect 
to the provision of migrant rights. 
Parties are central to this account of migrant rights, societal interests, and immigration 
policy outcomes. As agents of interest articulation and aggregation (Almond and Powell 1966), 
parties represent and promote their constituents’ interests, albeit imperfectly. If, as I argue, 
migrant rights condition societal interests over migrant admissions, in order to adequately 
represent their constituents, party positions over migrant admissions will similarly vary with 
migrant rights. 
Parties also feature in this account by virtue of their governing function (e.g., Almond 
and Powell 1966). Indeed, during their tenure in government, parties play a crucial role in the 
policy-making process (Schmidt 1996). While the policy-making ability of governing parties will 
vary by institutional configuration – with those in predominantly majoritarian systems facing 
fewer obstacles than those in predominantly consociational systems – parties holding power will 
be more likely to secure their preferred policy outcome than will opposition parties. This is not to 
suggest that the government is the only influential actor in shaping policy outcomes, but more 
modestly that the government’s effect is both significant and reflective of its constituents’ 
interests. 
To better understand the observed variation in immigration policy outcomes, I follow the 
standard approach in political economy research (Rogowski 1987, 1989; Frieden 1991, 1999; 
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Lake 2009). This involves first identifying the policy preferences of interested actors and then 
showing how these preferences aggregate through strategic interaction within a particular 
institutional environment to determine policy outcomes. I use both micro-level and macro-level 
empirical analyses to better understand the politics surrounding immigration policy. In the 
micro-level analysis, the goal is to identify immigration policy preferences of interested actors by 
manipulating the types of policies over which these actors have an opportunity to express either 
support or opposition. Specifically, I examine whether and how political elites’ preferences over 
immigration vary as a function of migrant rights. The objective driving the macro-level analysis 
is to explain immigration policy outcomes. This requires either an institutionally grounded 
aggregation of preferences or focus on powerful actors. In this case, I consider how variation in 
elite preferences – observed in the micro-level analysis – affects the immigration policies 
produced by in a given state at a given time. 
To better understand the difference between the micro-level and macro-level empirics, 
consider the following example from the American case. The micro-level analysis might identify 
that individual members of the Democratic Party are more likely to support liberalizing the rules 
that govern the admission permanent residents and restricting those governing the admission of 
guest workers. This result provides an important part of the micro-foundation for understanding 
the politics of immigration policy in the United States, but taken alone this finding tells us 
nothing about whether the United States is more or less likely to liberalize its permanent 
residency programs or restrict its guest worker programs. To explain this sort of immigration 
policy outcome we need to know whether the Democrats have a majority in the houses of 
Congress or perhaps whether a Democrat controls the Presidency. 
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1.1 THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION 
The extant literature identifies three broad sets of interests that affect immigration preferences 
and policy outcomes: cultural interests, economic self-interest, and security. In seeking to 
understand these purported sources of immigration preferences and policies, scholars have 
studied the effects of cultural, economic, and security variables at the individual, elite, policy, 
and state levels. The following enumeration of existing work examining the sources of 
immigration preferences and policy outcomes will make reference to works at each of these 
levels jointly. While I do not deal explicitly with the individual level in this project, inclusion of 
individual-level analysis is important because of elites’ representative function in the advanced 
industrial democracies. Although individuals and their representatives may at times exhibit 
different preferences – and irrespective of whether such differences are attributable to a 
principal-agent problem or to representatives acting in their constituents’ best interests rather 
than a particular mandate (e.g., Pitkin 1967) – this literature provides important information 
about societal cleavages over immigration. 
Cultural – or nativist – explanations argue that immigration preferences are determined 
by conceptions of “self” and “other” (Bauer et al. 2000; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Chandler and 
Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010; Fetzer 2000; Gang et al. 2002; Lahav 2004; Leblang et al. 
2009; McLaren 2003). This body of literature typically assumes that immigration preferences are 
shaped by public perceptions of racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other cultural differences 
between the receiving state’s population and would-be migrants. Cultural arguments differ in the 
purported source of group identity, and these sources vary from ethnic nationalism, to the 
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institutionalized definition of group membership (e.g., citizenship), to societal heterogeneity, to 
racism. Ultimately, however, these explanations assert that domestic group interests with respect 
to immigration are shaped by the (actual or perceived) effect of immigration on the receiving 
state’s culture and society. 
Explanations predicated on economic self-interest constitute the primary rival 
explanation to cultural arguments. Common to the literature linking economic self-interest to the 
politics of immigration is the assertion that immigration cleavages form according to which 
groups will gain and/or lose economically from liberalized or restrictive immigration policies. 
Among this body of literature, scholars identify two primary sources of economic gains and 
losses from immigrants (Borjas 1999; Simon 1989). The first considers the impact that migrants 
have on the receiving state’s market (Briggs 1984, 2001; Kessler 2001; Peters 2011; Mayda 
2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Timmer and Williamson 1998; Facchini and Steinhardt 2011), 
while the second considers the fiscal impact of migrants (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Gimpel and 
Edwards 1999; Hanson 2005; Hanson et al. 2007; Hatton and Williamson 2005; Money 1999). 
The first, which Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) identify as the labor market competition 
model, includes a variety of explanations bound by a shared general argument: by changing the 
labor pool, migrants have a distinct impact on the earning potential of domestic groups, and in 
rational anticipation of that impact, affected or potentially affected domestic groups pursue 
policies that maximize or protect their earning potential. Yet this shared general argument masks 
significant variations in these approaches. The most prolific variation of the market competition 
model focuses on labor’s reaction to a potential increase in the supply of labor, which is expected 
to decrease wages (Briggs 1984, 2001; Kessler 2001; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; 
Timmer and Williamson 1998; Facchini and Steinhardt 2011). Immigration increases a country’s 
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supply of labor, which, in turn, decreases the price and demand for labor. Laborers therefore 
have less money, less opportunity for self-betterment, and less power. Yet the seemingly obvious 
assertion that labor, and particularly organized labor, will oppose increased immigration is 
challenged by recent research indicating that under certain conditions organized labor acts in 
support of apparently migrant-friendly policies (Caviedes 2010a, 2010b; Haus 1995, 2002; Watts 
2002). 
The second variant of the market competition model argues that owners of capital and 
their representatives will pursue immigration policy liberalization in order to increase returns on 
investment through decreased costs in terms of wages. This is a logical extension of the previous 
argument that labor and its representatives will oppose liberal immigration policies in that both 
consider the role of factor- or class-based interests. More radical variants of this argument posit 
that immigration is a tool employed by capitalists to structure class relations. For some, the 
introduction of foreign laborers serves as a basis of differentiation between the capitalists and the 
proletariat, with migrant labor constituting a lower class than domestic labor (Bovenkerk et al. 
1991). For others, immigration is intended to foster intra-class divisions (Freeman 1978). If the 
proletariat is to rise up against the capitalists, it must be able to unite and overcome internal 
divisions. Internal divisions, in turn, are more difficult to resolve when confronted with linguistic 
and cultural differences. Immigration, according to this literature, serves as a mechanism 
employed by capitalists to quell the impending working-class revolt. 
A final variant of the market competition model takes a more holistic view of the market 
(Peters 2011, 2014). Relying on Mundell’s (1957) argument about the substitutability of trade 
and factor mobility, this scholarship builds upon the international trade and, to a lesser extent, 
capital literature and argues that immigration policy is a reaction to the impact that trade policies 
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have on the domestic market (Peters 2011). Specifically, because trade protection in labor-scarce 
states stimulates domestic production of labor-intensive goods,1 the domestic price for labor will 
rise with the increasing demand unless there is a commensurate rise in the supply of labor. As 
such, capital interests in labor-scarce states can offset the costs associated with increased demand 
under a fixed labor pool by pursuing open immigration policies.   
The second set of explanations based upon economic self-interest, which Hainmueller 
and Hiscox (2010) identify as the fiscal burdens model, holds that domestic groups pursue 
immigration restrictions in order to forego additional burdens on the welfare state and other 
public services (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Hanson 2005; Hanson et 
al. 2007; Hatton and Williamson 2005; Money 1999; Zimmerman and Tumlin 1999). For this 
argument to hold, immigrants must be net-recipients of public services, a proposition that 
receives significant support in the short-run (Borjas 1999; Fix and Passel 2002; Hanson 2005), 
but receives less support in the long-run (Fix et al. 1994; Krugman and Obstfeld 2000; Smith and 
Edmonston 1997). In a recent survey experiment, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) fail to find 
evidence in support of either the fiscal burdens model or the labor market competition model. 
The final body of literature posits that security concerns inform immigration policy 
preferences, and largely – although not exclusively – draw on realist theories in international 
relations. According to these approaches immigration policies are drafted in order to maximize 
the state’s security and/or power.  These policies are the product of the state’s rational self-
interest as viewed through the lens of the anarchic, self-help international system (Meyers 2000).  
For some, migration can be viewed as a variant of the security dilemma (Alexseev and Hofstetter 
                                                 
1 Relative to the production of labor-intensive goods in labor-scarce states under free trade, which struggle to 
compete with labor-intensive goods from labor-abundant states in terms of price. 
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2006). Classically use to define situations in which actions intended to increase state security 
result in a decrease in state security (Jervis 1978), an extensive body of literature has applied the 
security dilemma to inter-ethnic group relations (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999; Van Evera 
1995). The security dilemma explains group preferences vis-à-vis immigration as a reaction to 
“perceived […] “borderlessness” and, hence, of declining state sovereignty and government 
authority,” fear of misperception of migrants intentions, and ethnic and economic tensions 
between the domestic and migrant population (Alexseev and Hofstetter 2006, 4). 
Others argue that immigration policies are a matter of state sovereignty and, therefore, 
survival (Weiner 1985).  If a state abnegates its right to control immigration (and emigration for 
that matter) a large influx of individuals from one “country could peacefully invade another 
[country] through colonization” (Weiner 1985, 443).  Finally, some scholars have demonstrated 
that security crises, such as the September 11th attacks on the United States, significantly impact 
societal willingness to accept migrants (Branton et al. 2011). In the security framework, 
therefore, state survival and power and domestic security serve as motivations for immigration 
policies. While the role of security concerns in immigration policy-making is not the focus of 
this dissertation, this literature is included here to provide an accurate and, in so far as is 
possible, complete review of the literature. 
Most existing work implicitly assumes that societal cleavages over immigration are the 
same irrespective of the type of policy under consideration. That is, for instance, if we accept the 
labor market competition model,2 labor and its representatives should equally oppose the 
liberalization of all immigration policies while employers and their representatives should 
                                                 
2 While I use the labor market competition model as an example here, the same point could have been made using 
any of the competing explanations outlined above. 
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equally favor the liberalization of all immigration policies. On the basis of this assumption, the 
extant literature treats migrant groups as homogeneous and immigration preferences as static 
and, as a result, can neither explain some commonplace observations about the politics of 
immigration nor provide sufficient analytic leverage on the policy-making process. I develop an 
argument that reconciles these literatures by demonstrating the importance of migrant rights in 
shaping both migrant impact and, as a result, societal interests. In so doing, I untie the Gordian 
Knot, developing an account of the politics of immigration that has a nuanced understanding of 
the salient differences among groups of otherwise similar migrants and that treats the formation 
and alignment of societal preferences as a dynamic process. The result is an explanation of 
immigration politics that integrates both economic and cultural accounts, and one that better 
explains the politics of immigration than either does alone. 
Assuming a stable cleavage structure is only a useful assumption if at least one of two 
conditions holds. The first condition is the uniformity of immigration policies, which masks the 
significant variety of such policies found not only across the advanced industrial world, but also 
within a given state. These policies differ most fundamentally according to the bundle of rights 
granted to migrants and according to admissions criteria (Ruhs 2013, 55). The second condition 
is that all groups of migrants admitted have an equivalent impact on a particular domestic group, 
irrespective of the policy under which migrants are admitted. The degree to which this second 
condition holds is a function of domestic institutional arrangements, regime type, and – most 
importantly for present purposes – the types of immigration policies that exist in the receiving 
society. The vast majority of work that differentiates between immigration policies does so on 
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the basis of admissions criteria, focusing almost universally on the types of migrants admitted.3 
Yet such an approach cannot explain why a given domestic group, such as labor, and its 
representatives may simultaneously oppose and support liberalized admissions for the same 
group of migrants, say low-skilled labor, to be admitted under different immigration programs. 
Classifying immigration programs by their second major point of variation – migrant rights – can 
provide the analytical precision to understand the conditions under which the same domestic 
interest group can hold opposing preferences over the admission of the same group of migrants. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by Ruhs (2013), such a classification is generalizable across 
countries.  
This is not the first work to highlight the interaction between migrant rights and 
immigration control policies (Ruhs and Martin 2008; Ruhs 2013; Tichenor 2002). In his 
independent and co-authored work, Ruhs (Ruhs and Martin 2008; Ruhs 2013) posits that in high-
income states, there is a trade-off between migrant rights and the openness of labor migration 
policies. The greater the rights extended to migrant workers, the fewer migrant workers states are 
willing to admit, and this relationship is attenuated with increasing migrant skills. Using an 
approach familiar to students of international relations, Ruhs (2013) treats states as autonomous 
actors pursing the national interest (e.g., Krasner 1978). In this account, the state is the pivotal 
interested actor. State preferences over immigration policy are defined by the national interest, 
which is a function of market, fiscal, cultural, and security concerns, and the relative importance 
of each component varies across states and over time. Because of these oftentimes-competing 
                                                 
3 For instance, whether admitted migrants are low-skilled or high-skilled or whether migrants are admitted for 
family reunification, employment, or humanitarian reasons. 
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components of the national interest, states do not have total freedom over immigration 
policymaking, but rather face choice under constraints. 
In his examination of immigration politics throughout American history, Tichenor (2002) 
presents a rich historical-institutionalist account of American immigration policy. He argues that 
immigration policy outcomes across American history have been the result of changes and stasis 
in the domestic institutional structure and the effect of these institutions and prior immigration 
policies on interest group powers and preferences, left-right coalitions made possible at various 
junctures by shared positions over rights and admissions, the narrative of immigration and 
immigrants produced by experts, and exogenous shocks produced by international crises.  Most 
important for present purposes is his treatment of how positions over migrant rights and 
admissions have shaped the immigration policy-making process. In addressing this relationship, 
Tichenor suggests that an actor’s “immigration orientation” can be mapped on a two-dimensional 
space according to that actor’s preferences over whether migrant admissions should be expanded 
or restricted and whether migrant rights should be expanded or restricted (Tichenor 2002, 36). 
His two-dimensional model yields four ideal types of immigration orientation in which 
“cosmopolitans” pursue both expanded migrant admissions and expanded migrant rights, “free-
market expansionists” pursue expanded migrant admissions and restricted migrant rights, 
“nationalist egalitarians”4 pursue restricted migrant admissions but expanded rights for those 
admitted, and “classic exclusionists”5 pursue restrictions on both rights and admissions. The 
importance of this typology for Tichenor’s purposes is to demonstrate the varying ideological 
                                                 
4 Which he alternatively calls “economic protectionists” (e.g., Tichenor 2002, 8) 
5 Which he alternatively calls “cultural exclusionists” (e.g., Tichenor 2002, 8)  
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commitments that have made cross-partisan coalitions frequent and, often successful, advocates 
for immigration policy reform in the United States. 
There are several important and related differences between these three accounts6 of the 
relationship between migrant rights and migrant admissions. Most fundamentally, these works 
differ in their purpose. Taken together, the works of Tichenor and Ruhs demonstrate that the 
literature on rights and admissions is currently one of extremes. Where Tichenor privileges 
explanatory power over generalizability, Ruhs does the opposite. The results of each work are 
impressive and consistent with their respective goals. While a trade-off will always exist between 
pursuing these goals, however, social scientists should strive in so far as is possible to maximize 
both generalizability and explanatory power. In contrast to Tichenor, this work presents a 
generalizable explanation of how migrant rights affect societal group preferences over migrant 
admissions. In contrast to Ruhs, this work opens the black box of the state, uncovering the 
mechanisms by which migrant rights shape the “national interest” with respect to migrant 
admissions. 
A second point of difference, and one that is directly related to the purpose of each work, 
is in their account of the significant actors in immigration policy making. While all three works 
share the assumption that the state is not merely a neutral arbiter for societal interests, the works 
differ on the primacy of various actors. For Ruhs, the state is the most important actor; he treats 
states as if they have their own interests that are distinctive of the interests of domestic groups. 
As he correctly asserts, this is common practice in third image approaches to international 
relations. This “state as actor” model is particularly useful when one wishes to understand how 
                                                 
6 That is Ruhs (2013), Tichenor (2002), and this dissertation. 
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international relations and the international system affect state actions. That is, by bracketing 
discussions of domestic decision-making, we can paint a clearer picture of the international and 
systemic mechanisms affecting an outcome.7 The utility of the state as actor approach is the 
subject of a broad and contentious body of literature, and it would be impossible to do justice to 
that debate here. It is clear, however, that black boxing the processes by which states come to 
define their interests and formulate policies provides very little utility in furthering our 
understanding of how and under what conditions states choose to balance the theorized trade-
offs. Indeed, without considering domestic mechanics, it is impossible to understand why such a 
trade-off even exists, never mind when states choose to extend rights as opposed to increase 
openness. Put another way, the state as actor approach greatly increases our ability to generalize 
across states, but oftentimes does so at the expense of explanatory power. 
Familiar to students of comparative and American politics, Tichenor follows in the 
tradition established by E.E. Schattschneider (1960) and treats interest groups, politicians, and 
activists as important actors working within shifting institutional contexts that privilege some 
societal groups over others. Relatedly, parties and representatives constitute the central actors in 
this dissertation. Working in a party as agent framework, I maintain that parties and, in more 
individualistic systems, representatives promote the interests of particular societal groups. That 
is, in contrast to Ruhs, this dissertation focuses on political elites, and their partisan interests, as 
the central actors in forging the national immigration policy. In contrast to Tichenor, I examine 
                                                 
7 More tangentially, Ruhs’s decision to treat states as having their own interests that are more than the outcome of 
bargaining between domestic groups is thus useful if he is interested in modeling international dynamics. He later, 
however, excludes “internationally negotiated” immigration programs, among others (Ruhs 2013, 57), which 
includes “intra-company transferees” (covered under GATS Mode 4) and migrant labor covered under regional trade 
agreements (e.g., NAFTA visas and intra-EU migration). This is quite clearly logically inconsistent with the 
appropriate use of the state as actor model. That is, if the state as actor model is useful for understanding 
international dynamics, then excluding internationally negotiated immigration programs is inappropriate. 
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political elites as conduits for the interests of domestic groups and focus less on the independent 
influence of these groups.  
A third point of difference among these three works is in the ascribed source of 
immigration interests. For Ruhs, states are interested in obtaining the outcome that most closely 
matches the national interest (utility maximization), which is driven by some varying and 
contingent combination of market, fiscal, societal, and security concerns. While consistent with 
his purpose and approach, as discussed above, this is symptomatic of the familiar concern that 
what he gains in generalizability he also loses in explanatory power. In Tichenor’s account, 
immigration preferences are the outcome of domestic group interests, but these group interests 
(in addition to their ability to affects immigration policy outcomes) are contingent on the prior 
immigration regime and changing national institutional and party system, among others. As such, 
groups with a nationalist egalitarian immigration orientation in one period might, as a result of 
changing institutional and immigration conditions, be cosmopolitans in later periods (as was the 
case with organized labor in the United States over the course of the 20th Century). This suggests 
that immigration interests are, to some extent, ephemeral and contextual rather than being rooted 
in a more fundamental set of interests. Indeed, the importance of institutional context is the crux 
of his argument: shifting political contexts shape policy interests and outcomes. 
In this dissertation, by contrast, immigration preferences are driven by more fundamental 
interests, which are rooted in a group’s general economic and cultural interests. This is not to 
suggest that immigration preferences do not change or even that political context plays no role in 
this process. On the contrary, I hope to provide a systematic explanation – grounded in migrant 
rights and fundamental group interests – of the conditions under which group preferences over 
immigration change. 
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The final and most substantively important difference, and one that I expect will elucidate 
the previous point, rests in the various accounts of the relationship between migrant rights and 
migrant admissions proffered in these works. In Ruhs’s account, the relationship between rights 
and admissions exists at the level of policy outcomes. Specifically, increasing admissions makes 
the costs of admissions higher because of the costs (fiscal, market, societal, and security) 
associated with extending rights to a larger pool of people; the optimal level of admissions is 
contingent on the number of inevitably costly (on many metrics) rights that states might extend 
to migrants. That is, in pursuit of the national interest, states face a trade-off between rights and 
admissions. As a result, with respect to policy outcomes, there exists an inverse relationship 
between the provision of rights and the level of admissions. 
For Tichenor, the relationship between rights and admissions exists at the level of group 
preferences over immigration. In fact, “immigration orientation” is defined as a function of a 
group’s preferences over rights expansion or restriction and admissions expansion or restriction, 
and it is possible for a given group to prefer any combination of policies along the rights and 
admissions dimensions of immigration policy preferences. As a result, Tichenor’s account 
implies an orthogonal relationship between preferences over rights and admissions. 
My account of the relationship between rights and admissions differs from both of these 
previous accounts in that preferences over admissions levels are conditional on rights. In contrast 
to Tichenor, I argue that individuals and groups have general interests with respect to policies 
that affect the market, fiscal arrangements, and socio-cultural composition, among others, and 
that these policy interests are driven by fundamental economic and cultural interests. Yet we 
cannot simply extrapolate preferences over admissions from these fundamental interests; indeed, 
this is where many accounts of immigration policy preferences break down.  Rather, I argue that 
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variations in migrant rights condition whether and how migrant admissions affect domestic 
groups and, as a result, rights shape group preferences over the level of admissions. As I shall 
demonstrate, variations in rights activate different sets of societal interests; under extremely 
limited rights, for instance, migrants will have an extremely limited effect on the receiving 
state’s culture and, as a result, cultural interests are unlikely to become salient. Thus, my 
argument is conditional in the sense that variations in the bundles of rights granted to migrants 
conditions domestic group preferences over admissions. 
Yet my contention about the relationship between rights and admissions levels is 
conditional in a second sense. In contrast to Ruhs, I argue that the relationship between rights 
and levels of admission (e.g., whether that relationship is inverse or positive) is conditional on 
these deeper interests. Specifically, for some domestic groups the relationship between rights and 
admissions is negative – increasing rights will yield preferences for decreasing admissions – but 
for others the relationship is positive – increasing rights will yield preferences for increasing 
admissions – and the sign of the relationship depends upon more fundamental economic, 
political, and cultural interests. Herein lies another challenge with the state as actor approach: the 
assertion of a single national interest is optimistic at best. Indeed, at any given time various 
societal groups are likely to have competing definitions of the national interest. We have long 
understood that the state is not simply a neutral actor, but rather is one that privileges some 
interests over others (Schattschneider 1960). The ideological composition of those at the helm of 
the state will therefore have an important effect on not only the definition of the national interest, 
but also the policies designed to pursue that interest.  
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1.2 SCOPE: IMMIGRATION CONTROL POLICIES 
The distinction between various types of immigration policies has long been recognized 
(Freeman 2006; Geddes 2003; Hammar 1985), though work harnessing these distinctions for 
expository purposes is rare (but see: Freeman 2006; Ruhs 2013). Where these distinctions are 
made, the programs are generally differentiated according to whether migrants are admitted to 
pursue employment, for the purpose of family reunification, or for humanitarian purposes. As a 
significant problem in the extant literature is its failure to differentiate between various types of 
immigration related policies, it is important to outline what immigration policy is – as well as 
what it is not – before trying to understand the politics of immigration policy formation. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I am interested in the sub-set of immigration related 
policies that govern the admission of legal voluntary migrants: immigration control policies. As a 
general category, admissions policies consist of the myriad of policy instruments that states use 
to govern non-citizens’ access to their territory. Immigration control policy is a subset of 
admissions policies that governs the flow of consenting migrants, and govern the admission of 
economic migrants as well as migrants seeking entry for the purpose of family reunification. 
These policies include a variety of programs, which can be distinguished as a function of migrant 
rights and will be discussed at length in the next chapter. Immigration control policies may set 
categorical limits (such as the United States’ H-1B cap) or ethnic, racial, or sending state quotas 
(as in the now-defunct “White Australia” and “National Origins” programs in Australia and the 
United States, respectively), and define “acceptable” immigrants (as in the Canadian “points 
system”), among others. In the remainder of this section, I outline what immigration control 
policy is not: immigrant policies, forced migrants, and citizenship policy. 
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Immigrant policies logically follow immigration control policies, and specify the rights 
and obligations of foreign nationals once admitted into the host state. Such policies may limit a 
foreign national’s ability to change employment (either at the employer level or the industry 
level), define foreign nationals’ abilities to participate in the political process, specify foreign 
nationals’ abilities to travel domestically and/or internationally, prohibit or obligate foreign 
national participation in collective bargaining agreements, and determine the extent to which 
foreign nationals may retain their distinctive culture or must assimilate into the receiving state’s 
culture. Although immigrant policies are not the dependent variable in the dissertation, these 
policies are an important part of the theoretical story. Indeed, immigrant policies are significant 
explanatory variables insofar as immigrant policies determine many of the rights of foreign 
nationals in the receiving state. Specifically, because immigrant policies define the rights and 
obligations of foreign nationals admitted to the receiving state, these policies shape which 
domestic groups will benefit – and which will be hurt – by an increase in migrant admissions 
and, in so doing, shape the cleavages that form over immigration control policies. 
As the emphasis on voluntary migrants suggests, this dissertation will neither address 
questions of trafficking in human beings, nor questions of refugee and asylum admissions. 
Trafficking in human beings, or human trafficking, is a form of forced migration that occurs 
when the migrant is either coerced or deceived in to crossing international borders and is often 
forced in to exploitative occupations upon arrival. In addition, because trafficked human beings 
are victims of transnational crime, these individuals are not generally the subject of traditional 
admissions debates.  
Refugees and asylum seekers constitute a second form of forced migration, in which 
individuals flee persecution in their home country. While acceptance of these migrants 
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constitutes a subset of admissions policies, refugee and asylum programs differ significantly 
from voluntary migration programs. While states retain the right to restrict the entry of voluntary 
migrants, international treaty law limits sovereign discretion over the admission of refugees and 
asylum seekers. Because of states’ international commitments to refugees and asylum seekers, 
the admission of refugees and asylum seekers will have an exogenous impact on immigration 
control policies, but the reverse should not also be true. 
Citizenship policies constitute the final category of immigration related policies and 
determine the basis for citizenship claims at the time of birth. Typically classified according to 
jus sanguinis (citizenship by descent), jus soli (birthright citizenship), and mixed regimes (which 
include elements of descent and birthright citizenship but stop short of extending full jus soli), 
citizenship policy is distinct from questions of immigration control policy, including 
naturalization policies. Theoretically citizenship policies provide an excellent metric for 
ascertaining a state’s a priori acceptance of societal heterogeneity, with jus sanguinis states 
defining membership in the national community according to ethno-national ties and jus soli 
states defining membership in the national community according to civic nationalism. 
Empirically the assertion that citizenship policies are distinct from immigration control policies 
is supported as increasingly restrictive citizenship policies8 (Bertocchi and Strozzi 2010) and 
increasingly restrictive immigration control policies9 are correlated only at approximately 
0.277.10 
                                                 
8 With the least restrictive being full jus soli and jus sanguinis, moderately restrictive being jus sanguinis with 
elements of jus soli, and the most restrictive being pure jus sanguinis.  
9 Operationalized as the number of years of residency required for naturalization (my own coding from the United 
States’ Office of Personnel Management’s 2001 document on “Citizenship Laws of the World” and national legal 
codes). This is a more detailed operationalization than that provided by Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010), who lose 
significant details of naturalization restrictions by coding residency requirements as follows: 
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1.3 CASE SELECTION 
In this dissertation, I focus on two cases, the United States and the European Union and its 
member states. As the world’s two most common migrant destinations, these cases are important 
in their own right. Between 2000 and 2005, the United States was the top migrant-receiving state 
in the world, receiving almost seven million migrants, a figure accounting for approximately 
16.5% of all migrants in that period. During this same time span, four European states – Spain, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, and France – were among the top ten receiving states and the EU1511 
jointly received almost ten million migrants, or approximately 23.5% of all global migrants, 
more than eight and a half million of which were from outside of the EU15. Certainly the 
admissions policies enacted by these states have a significant impact not only on those seeking to 
migrate to these states, but also on global migration patterns. 
In addition to their intrinsic significance, these cases provide an important opportunity to 
examine the role that migrant rights play in shaping the politics of immigration. In the United 
States, policymakers have a significant degree of latitude over migrant admissions and crucially 
over migrant rights, as it is possible to grant migrants the right to enter and work while 
simultaneously withholding broader rights. That is, policy makers in the United States may 
choose to expand or restrict the admission of migrants under programs that offer varying bundles 
                                                                                                                                                             
• Less than 4 years 
• 5 years 
• 6 to 14 years 
• More than 14 years. 
Bertocchi and Strozzi provide no justification for the cut-points selected. 
10 When using Bertocchi and Strozzi’s ordinal scale, this correlation increases to 0.33. 
11 EU 15 refers collectively to the first 15 member states of the European Union: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. 
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of rights. If rights do indeed condition preferences over immigration, then in the United States 
we should observe different groups advocating increased admissions under some programs and 
opposing increased admissions under other programs. Moreover, this latitude provides the 
opportunity for flexible policy-making coalitions that cross partisan lines. 
In the European case, however, it is increasingly difficult to make this trade-off between 
admissions and rights. While this is most correct in the case of intra-EU migrants, it has become 
increasingly true of third-country nationals (TCNs). Among the EU’s Migration Directives, a 
2004 Regulation (EC No. 883/2004) requires that certain TCNs be granted equal access with EU 
citizens to many public services. That is, policy makers in the EU member states can only affect 
the admissions levels of those excluded from the free movement of labor regime, thus limiting 
the set of possible policy-making coalitions. As a result of these differences in discretion over 
migrant rights, the cleavages and coalitions that form in the European Union member states 
should differ from those that form in the United States, which should in turn have a significant 
effect on immigration policy outcomes. That is, because rights do not vary as significantly in the 
European Union as they do in the United States, pro- and anti-immigration coalitions should 
reflect these differences. The relatively limited variation observed across the European Union 
member states has posed a significant challenge for scholars as it has impeded the formation of 
explanations that generalize beyond the European context. My account of the role of rights in the 
politics of immigration not only provides such a generalizable explanation, but also makes clear 
why there is greater variation in the United States than there is in Europe. 
There are two empirical chapters for each case. In the first, I examine how variations in 
migrant rights affect partisan support for admissions liberalization. In the second, I examine how 
migrant rights and government partisanship affect immigration policy outcomes. At the most 
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basic level, the connections between the cleavages and outcomes chapters demonstrate whether 
and how the interests observed in the cleavages chapters aggregate under particular sets of 
constraints to produce policy outcomes. Perhaps more important are the insights that we can 
glean from the cross-case connections, which will demonstrate how the ability to expand or limit 
the pool of migrants with access to various rights affects both policy preferences and outcomes. 
1.3.1 Plan of the Dissertation 
I begin this examination of the effect of migrant rights on the politics of immigration with two 
conceptual and theoretical chapters that lay the foundations for the remainder of the dissertation. 
In Chapter 2, I consider the relationship between rights and societal membership. While the 
majority of empirical work on immigration differentiates between citizens (members) and 
foreigners (strangers), I demonstrate that there are varying degrees of societal membership 
between members and strangers and that these can be distinguished most fundamentally by the 
bundle of rights granted to newcomers. This conceptualization is critical to the remainder of the 
dissertation for two reasons. First, it provides a metric for making systematic comparisons across 
countries, time, and policies. Second, if rights condition the effect that migrants can have on 
society, support and opposition to immigration should vary as a function of these rights. 
Chapter 3 presents a theory of immigration policy preferences and outcomes that is based 
upon migrant rights, societal interests, and institutional configuration. The competing 
explanations for immigration policy preferences and outcomes rely on differing assumptions 
about the effect of migrants. While economic explanations assume that migrants shape the 
domestic market, cultural explanations assume that migrants have a broader effect on the 
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receiving society. I reconcile these competing explanations by treating migrant impact as a 
variable rather than an assumption. By defining what a foreign national may do in the receiving 
state, rights condition the effect that migrants have on the receiving society and therefore which 
societal groups and their representatives will favor immigration liberalization. Where migrants 
are granted a limited bundle of rights – admitted for a short duration of stay, under industry or 
employer specific work authorization, lacking access to social services, and remaining on the 
fringes of society – migrants will primarily impact the receiving state’s market. Because these 
limited rights increase the pool of labor while granting employers flexibility over employment 
decisions, minimize migrant effect on public expenditure, and limit migrant cultural impact, I 
argue that the right (left) will support (oppose) increasing migrant admissions under such 
programs. Where, by contrast, migrants are granted an expansive bundle of rights – admitted for 
longer-term durations, permitted to change jobs at will, granted access to public services, and 
even a pathway to citizenship – migrants impact the receiving society in addition to the market. 
Because these rights diminish employers’ power over migrant labor, increase public expenditure, 
and increase cultural diversity, I argue that the right (left) should oppose (support) increasing 
migrant admissions under such programs. Moreover, we should expect economic (cultural) 
explanations to better explain the politics of programs governing the admission of migrants 
granted a limited (expansive) bundle of rights. Immigration policy outcomes will crucially 
depend upon the bundle of rights granted to migrants, the partisan composition of governing 
institutions, and the domestic institutional environment. 
I begin the empirical analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 with the world’s largest migrant 
receiving state: the United States. Chapter 4 considers elite preferences over various immigration 
policies by examining legislative voting patterns on immigration-related roll call votes. I classify 
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roll call votes from the United States Senate by the type of immigration policy under 
consideration. As expected, I find that support for immigration liberalization varies as a function 
of the type of immigration program under consideration. Most importantly, I find that legislator 
ideology remains significant across the different types of immigration, but that the direction of 
the effect changes, with increasingly conservative Senators being increasingly likely to support 
admissions liberalization for immigrants admitted with few rights but decreasingly likely to 
support admissions liberalization for immigrants admitted with expansive rights. 
How do these preferences aggregate in the American institutional context? In Chapter 5, I 
create regime liberalization variables for the three key types of immigration policy: permanent 
residents, temporary residents, and guest workers. Using a discrete-time hazard model, I evaluate 
the effects of median legislator economic and cultural ideology, as well as the partisanship of the 
President. These results also indicate that policy type – defined by rights – affects policy 
outcomes. As the median member of Congress becomes increasingly rightist, the probability of 
liberalization decreases for programs that grant migrants an extensive bundle of rights, but 
increases for programs that limit migrant rights. 
Turning to Europe in Chapters 6 and 7, I demonstrate that these results are generalizable 
across the advanced industrial world. In Chapter 6, I examine elite preferences over immigration 
in Europe. In contrast to the American case, where representatives have significant latitude over 
their policy positions and voting behavior, European politics is characterized by significantly 
greater party discipline. As a result, I examine party positions over the various ways in which 
migrants can affect the receiving state – a more direct test of group interests – using data from 
the Euro Manifesto Project (Braun et al. 2010; Schmitt and Wüst 2012). Here I again find 
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differences across different bundles of rights, with the effect of partisanship differing before and 
after the obligation to extend significant rights to third country nationals. 
In Chapter 7, I examine whether these preferences are reflected in immigration policy 
outcomes across the European Union. Following EU enlargement, citizens of new member states 
residing across the EU are granted expansive rights commensurate with their status as EU 
citizens. Yet existing member states are permitted to restrict labor market access for up to seven 
years following accession through “transitional arrangements.” I estimate the effects of 
institutions and government partisanship on decisions to voluntarily liberalize labor market 
access using a discrete time hazard model. As is expected of policies governing the admission of 
migrants with a significant bundle of rights, I find that increasingly rightist governments are 
decreasingly likely to liberalize transitional arrangements voluntarily.  
In a brief concluding chapter, I synthesize the results of the empirical chapters and reflect 
upon the ways in which the extension of migrant rights affects domestic groups’ willingness to 
admit migrants. I situate these findings within the contemporary debates on immigration policy, 
particularly in the United States and the European Union. Additionally, I question the 
compatibility of liberal democracy and the practice of liberalizing immigration admissions only 
to withhold rights. 
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2.0  MIGRANT RIGHTS AND SOCIETAL MEMBERSHIP 
There exists an imperfect relationship between country of citizenship and country of residence. 
In most – if not all – states, non-citizens live among citizens, choosing to be subject to the laws 
of a foreign government. Yet to define all non-citizens as strangers – or non-members – betrays 
the great variety of groups that exist between members and strangers. I posit that the rights 
granted to the various groups that exist between members and strangers signify and frequently 
reinforce the difference between these groups of individuals. Indeed, this variation in rights 
constitutes the primary difference between groups of migrants admitted under various 
immigration control policies. In this chapter, I demonstrate that there are varying degrees of 
societal membership between members and strangers and that these can be distinguished most 
fundamentally by the bundle of rights granted to newcomers. This conceptualization is critical to 
the remainder of the dissertation for two reasons. First, it provides a metric for making 
systematic comparisons across countries, time, and policies. Second, if rights condition the effect 
that migrants can have on society, support and opposition to immigration should vary as a 
function of these rights. 
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2.1 A THEORY OF RIGHTS AND SOCIETAL MEMBERSHIP 
We can understand societal membership groups as a continuum, with the excluded and citizens 
constituting the opposing poles (Figure 1). With each category of membership, we observe an 
increasing level of societal integration and acceptance, with excluded persons completely lacking 
membership and citizenship being conferred upon full members. In what follows, I demonstrate 
that variations in societal membership can be understood in terms of the rights given to the 
individual members of a particular group. This is not to suggest that variations in bundles of 
rights exclusively define societal membership, but rather that these rights are a useful and under-
utilized indicator of the degree to which a receiving society accepts a foreign-born individual as 
a member of that society. 
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Figure 1. Continuum of Societal Membership Groups 
 
Why do rights matter for societal membership? As some persuasively argue, societal 
membership is a function of the degree to which the foreign-born individual has integrated into 
the receiving society (Carens 2000). Surely an individual who has lived in the receiving state for 
20 years, has married a natural born citizen, is a parent to citizens, and is an active member of his 
or her community is an almost full, if not full, member of society. From a social justice 
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perspective, one would be remiss to suggest that this individual should not be considered a full 
member of society. Indeed, such an individual ought to be a full member of society. 
Problematically, however, this is merely one side of the empirical reality. If we consider societal 
membership as the relationship between the foreign-born individual and the receiving society (as 
I do), then societal membership must be measured not only by the demand side – how well the 
foreign-born individual has integrated into the receiving society – but also by the supply side – 
the degree to which the receiving society accepts the foreign-born individual as a member. As 
Walzer argues: “The primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some 
human community” (Walzer 1983, 31). Thus, societal membership requires that both the foreign-
born individual and the receiving society agree that the foreign-born individual is, at least in part, 
a member of the receiving society. 
Societal membership is notoriously difficult to capture. First, there are significant 
schisms in how scholars understand foreign-born individuals’ abilities to integrate into a 
receiving society. Communitarian scholars, for instance, contend that ascriptive characteristics – 
such as ethnicity, language, culture, and bloodlines – condition foreign-born individuals’ abilities 
to become a part of a society (Miller 1988; Taylor 1993, 1997; Walzer 1981, 1983). Liberal 
scholars,12 by contrast, assume that foreign-born individuals can become a part of the receiving 
society through participation in that society and through shared values (Carens 1987, 2000; 
Dummett 1992; Dummett 2001). Undergirding these different approaches to societal 
                                                 
12 In this context I use “liberal” to denote liberal democratic theorists whose arguments rest on the moral equality of 
individuals, the freedom owed to such individuals, and the obligation to treat such individuals with impartiality. 
Though the terms are related, I neither mean to signify economic liberals (e.g., Adam Smith) nor the liberalism of 
international relations scholarship. 
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membership are different conceptualizations of the nation, with the former based on ethnic 
nationalism and the latter predicated on civic nationalism. 
Second, it is not clear how we “know” societal membership when we observe it. For 
communitarians, the answer is clear: a foreign-born individual who is of the same ethnic group 
(or some other ascriptive category) as the majority in the receiving state is a member of society 
upon admittance. Imagine, for instance, a Jewish American immigrating to Israel. By 
communitarian standards, that individual is a part of Israeli society on day one or shortly 
thereafter. There is a clear difference, however, between how that individual relates to the rest of 
Israeli society on day one as opposed to following ten years of residence. After ten years, that 
individual will understand the cultural norms that are particular to Israel specifically but not to 
the Jewish community more generally. The communitarians’ ascriptive understanding of societal 
membership cannot adequately capture this difference. For liberals, by contrast, societal 
membership is a function of interpersonal relationships, comprehension of societal norms, shared 
values, and participation in a shared community. While this better reflects the reality of societal 
membership than the communitarian understanding does, there are few (if any) concrete and 
consistently observable indicators of an individual’s degree of societal membership. 
What should be clear from the preceding paragraphs is that existing conceptions of 
societal membership are insufficient in specifying how we know societal membership when we 
observe it. Thus, rather than focusing on the demand side of societal membership, I propose 
focusing on the supply side of societal membership. If, as Walzer (1983) contends, membership 
requires that existing members extend membership to newcomers, then we cannot understand 
societal membership absent some metric of how the members of the receiving society view the 
place of foreign-born individuals in their society. The key contention of this chapter is that 
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existing members of receiving societies signify their willingness to accept foreign-born 
individuals as members of their society by extending various bundles of rights to these 
individuals. Where the rights extended to foreign-born individuals are limited, the receiving 
society is curtailing these individuals’ ability to legally impact the receiving society. As these 
rights increase, so does the foreign-born individual’s latitude to impact society. This conception 
of rights as indicative of societal membership thus suggests that full societal membership is only 
attained when the existing members of the receiving society entrust the foreign-born individual 
with the ability to fully participate in the economic, social, and political destiny of the 
community. 
A supply-side oriented conception of societal membership has the added advantage of 
accounting for demand-side factors in so far as foreign-born individuals must at least nominally 
apply to become members at each level of rights. That is, a foreign-born individual must apply 
for citizenship before the rights associated with this level of membership are granted to that 
individual.13 We thus observe a two-stage process where in the first (demand) stage, a foreign-
born individual decides whether to request a particular bundle of rights, a process that likely 
includes consideration of whether the individual believes that he or she is sufficiently integrated 
into society to expend the resources necessary to make such a request.14 In the second (supply) 
stage, existing members of the society or, more typically, their representatives evaluate the 
                                                 
13 In practice, of course, foreign nationals applying for various visas may be applying for multiple bundles of rights 
with a single application. For instance, a foreign national applying for an immigrant visa to the United States from 
abroad on the basis of family reunification is simultaneously requesting the rights to enter, reside, work, accept 
employment at will, and – after a finite duration of stay – access social provisions. The conceptualization outlined in 
this chapter does not preclude this, but rather separates out each set of rights for expository purposes. 
14 These application processes are typically costly in terms of money and time. 
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foreign-born individual’s request for that particular bundle of rights according to the criteria set 
by society for new members.  
I identify five categories of rights that societies may extend to or withhold from foreign-
born individuals: entry, work, economic, social (including indefinite residency), and political. In 
the Western democracies, these rights are generally granted sequentially. As a result, it is rare, 
for instance, that an individual is granted political rights but excluded from economic rights. A 
careful reader will note that this sequence contradicts T.H. Marshall’s canonical model of the 
development of citizenship, in which the political rights associated with citizenship are 
established prior to social rights (Marshall [1950] 1992). Scholars of immigration have 
understood for some time that the practice of modern polities with respect to the sequence of 
extending rights to newcomers differs from Marshall’s account of the expansion of rights 
associated with the institution of citizenship (most importantly Brubaker 1989; Soysal 1994). 
There is nothing contradictory about these competing sequences, as these bodies of scholarship 
explain different phenomena. Marshall sought to explain the development of citizenship as an 
institution, the evolution of the relationship between the state and its existing population. This 
account, and the related works noted above, seeks to describe the development of societal 
membership, the evolution of the relationship between the state and its existing population, on 
the one hand, and newcomers, on the other. 
In the next section, I will discuss each of the six membership groups to which foreign-
born individuals may belong. In so doing, I will demonstrate how the various bundles of rights 
granted to each of these groups helps us to better understand societal membership. 
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2.2 WHO EXISTS? FROM STRANGERS TO MEMBERS 
As outlined in Figure 1, above, there are six ideal types of societal membership that define the 
continuum from stranger to member: excluded persons, visitors, guest workers, temporary 
residents, permanent residents, and citizens. Each of these categories of membership is defined 
by a particular bundle of rights, which is presented in Table 1 and discussed in greater detail in 
the remainder of this section. 
 
Table 1. Rights and Societal Membership 
 
 Rights 
Membership Group Entry Work Economic Social Political 
      
Excluded 
  
No No No No No 
Visitors 
  
Yes No No No No 
Guest Workers 
  
Yes Yes No No No 
Temporary Residents 
  
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Permanent Residents 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Citizens Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
The excluded are those who lack the right to enter the receiving state. Absent the right to 
enter, these individuals are clearly not privy to the higher-order rights considered in this typology 
of societal membership. For innumerable possible reasons, individuals and groups that populate 
“excludable classes” lists have been deemed to be so at odds with the goals and values of the 
receiving state that even allowing them onto domestic soil would threaten the receiving society. 
In some cases, states withhold the right to enter from all individuals from a particular receiving 
state. For instance, the United Arab Emirates and North Korea categorically deny entry to Israeli 
and South Korean citizens, respectively. In other cases, states withhold the right to enter from all 
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individuals that share a particular characteristic, such as the United States’ 22-year ban on 
admission for individuals with HIV/AIDS. In yet other cases, states may withhold the right to 
enter on an individual basis, as was the case when the Norwegian government banned rapper 
Snoop Dogg from admission after he received a fine for drug possession on a previous visit. As 
these anecdotes indicate, the right to enter may be withheld from groups of individuals or on an 
individual basis, but the right to enter is indicative of an assessment that admission would 
threaten the receiving society because of the foreign-born individual’s religion, ideology, 
potential effect on public health, or disregard for domestic laws, among others. 
Visitors are those who have received the right to enter, but neither have the right to work 
for a firm in the receiving state, nor have broader economic, social, or political rights. Visitors 
consist of those who may enter a receiving state for vacation or on business (as representatives of 
businesses in their home state) on a short-term basis (typically not to exceed 90 days). These 
individuals are not in any sense members of the receiving society. They do not set up domicile or 
educate their children in the receiving state. Because the receiving society does not consider the 
individual to pose a threat to their society, however, the individual is welcomed for a temporary 
period of time, on the condition that he or she will return to his or her home state after that period 
of time. Ultimately, the foreign-born individual’s source of productive activities and locus of 
social relations are expected to remain in his or her home state. The receiving society owes very 
little to these non-members, and any obligations are typically limited to hospitality and human 
rights. 
Guest workers are foreign-born individuals who have received the right to enter and to 
work for a firm in the receiving state, but have not been granted broader economic, social, or 
political rights. Guest workers differ from visitors in that their primary source of productive 
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activity occurs in the receiving state. These individuals are employed by firms in the receiving 
state and have the right to work in that state for the duration of their employment. Yet guest 
workers remain apart from the majority of the receiving society, frequently being housed in on-
site dormitories and interacting predominantly with other guest workers. In addition, guest 
workers’ families frequently remain in the sending state, a factor that facilitates strong ties with 
the sending state. In fact, the right to work for a firm in the receiving state is an exceptionally 
limited right. In the United States, for instance, H-2A and H-2B approvals – which govern the 
admission of temporary agricultural and nonagricultural workers, respectively – are granted to 
the hiring firm, rather than to the foreign national. While the government vets the employees for 
admission, their lawful duration of stay is at the whim of the hiring firm, as termination of 
employment also renders the foreign national’s presence unlawful. Guest workers remain on the 
fringes of the receiving society. At this level of rights, foreign-born individuals are treated as a 
commodity rather than as people. They are allowed into society in order to fill a particular need, 
and required to leave once that need has been satiated. 
Temporary residents are foreign-born individuals who have received the right to enter, 
to work for a firm in the receiving state, and to exercise broader economic rights (most notably to 
change employers), but who have neither been extended social nor political rights. In contrast to 
guest workers, temporary residents’ dependent family members typically accompany the 
temporary resident to the receiving state for his or her duration of stay. Temporary residents live, 
work, and socialize at will in the receiving state. The primary difference between guest workers 
and temporary residents lies in temporary residents’ broader economic rights. In the United 
States, for instance, temporary resident approvals are granted to the foreign-born individual, and 
are generally granted according to merit (education and experience). He or she is free to seek 
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alternative employment in the receiving state insofar as the job accepted would require the same 
visa category. It is at the level of temporary residents that foreign-born individuals have the 
latitude to truly integrate into society. These individuals set up homes and educate their children 
in the receiving state for their duration of stay. Temporary resident status is a function of what 
the foreign-born individual can add to society, and whether the receiving society will allow the 
individual to affect the economic fortunes of the receiving state. Ultimately, however, their 
lawful presence is conditional on maintaining gainful employment. At this level of rights, 
foreign-born individuals are treated as factors of production. They are granted admission in order 
to meet the demand for their labor, whether high skilled or low skilled. 
Permanent residents are foreign-born individuals who have received all but political 
rights in the receiving society. For these individuals, lawful presence is not a function of gainful 
employment. Rather, these individuals have attained sufficient societal membership such that 
they have attained the right to stay in the receiving state indefinitely, irrespective of economic 
status. At this level of societal membership, individuals and their dependents have access to 
many of the social rights that are granted to citizens, such as in state tuition for post-secondary 
education and unemployment insurance. With the extension of social rights, the receiving society 
indicates that the foreign-born individual has attained a sufficient level of societal membership to 
be treated as any natural-born member of society, except in his or her ability to participate in the 
national governance of the receiving state; a privilege reserved for full members. At this level of 
rights, foreign-born individuals are treated as people, who have needs and wants outside of their 
capacity as labor. 
Citizens constitute the final category of societal membership. Whether naturalized or 
natural born, citizens are full members of society and have been granted each of the five possible 
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bundles of rights. As noted above, citizens are distinguished from permanent residents insofar as 
citizens have the right to participate in the national political process, thereby affecting the 
governance of society. Citizens and their representatives decide to whom societal membership 
shall be granted. 
These ideal-type categories of societal membership should not be understood as static. 
Indeed, it is possible for individuals to begin as visitors, but become citizens over time. That is, 
someone with the right to enter may later be granted a work permit and, with the passage of time, 
social and political rights. Moreover, an individual’s movement between these categories need 
not be unidirectional. For instance, a temporary resident may choose to return home and give up 
his or her economic rights in the receiving state, thus rendering him or her a visitor on return 
trips to the receiving state. Alternatively, the receiving state may revoke the rights of a 
permanent resident and bar his or her future entry into that state, rendering him or her among the 
excluded. Finally, a given individual need not necessarily be categorized at each of these levels 
of membership at various times in his or her life. For example, an American citizen living in 
France may marry a French citizen who has the right to enter the United States. Should the 
couple choose to live in the United States, the French citizen, who was previously a visitor, can 
“skip” guest worker and temporary resident status, immediately becoming a permanent resident15 
because of his or her relationship with an American citizen. 
                                                 
15 More specifically, the French (or any nationality) spouse of an American citizen will obtain “conditional 
permanent residence” for the first two years of the marriage, and can apply to have the conditions waived after that 
period should the couple demonstrate that the marriage is/was not fraudulent.  
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2.3 WHO IS NOT INCLUDED? 
The undocumented as well as refugees and asylum seekers are conspicuously absent from the 
preceding typology. Most superficially, this omission is simply a function of the scope of this 
project, which seeks to understand preferences over and variation in the policies governing 
voluntary, regular migration. Yet further consideration of these migrant categories suggests 
additional reasons to exclude these groups from such a typology. The undocumented present an 
interesting case when considering societal membership, as members of this group include 
individuals who have willfully entered the receiving state in pursuit of economic gain or criminal 
enterprise as well as individuals brought to the receiving state as a child by their parents who 
have, by all other measures, grown up as “normal” members of the receiving society. While 
these are clearly not the only types of individuals that constitute the undocumented, the extremity 
of the types indicates that it is impossible to include all undocumented within a single category 
of membership. 
If the undocumented had remained in the sending state, these individuals would be 
distributed among the excluded and visitor types outlined above. Some of the undocumented 
were even guest workers or temporary residents at one stage, but have overstayed their lawful 
duration of admission. According to some, the mere fact of undocumented status means that 
these individuals should be expelled and barred from future entry. For others, however, 
undocumented status is an insufficient indicator of an individual’s societal membership. 
Regularization programs, such as the 1986 IRCA in the United States and the proposed US 
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, are attempts to account for 
this within-group variation: lawful status alone is insufficient to capture societal membership. 
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Yet this does not change the fact that societal membership must be 1) desired by the foreign-born 
individual and 2) distributed by existing members of the society. For many undocumented, 
existing members of the society are unwilling to accept them (the undocumented) as members. 
Forced migrants – refugees and asylum seekers – pose a different problem of 
classification. Where the undocumented have often met the demand-side criteria but not the 
supply-side criteria for societal membership, forced migrants are frequently granted significant 
rights but have not (at least initially) sufficiently integrated into society to demand such rights. 
The extreme plight of refugees and asylum seekers dictates that potential receiving states 
consider these foreign born individuals’ needs for the rights of membership over their level of 
integration  
2.4 MEMBERSHIP, RIGHTS, AND REGIME TYPES 
Regime type presents an additional level of complexity to the preceding typology of societal 
membership. Specifically, not all of these categories of membership exist in all regime types as 
the curtailment of rights is generally unacceptable in democratic societies and non-democracies 
generally curtail the rights of the vast majority of subjects. In this section, I will briefly address 
how regime type limits the categories of membership that exist in a given society. 
Democratic regimes are constrained in their abilities to admit guest workers. This is 
because the logic of democratic governance is based upon the moral equality of individuals and 
the freedom owed to such individuals. The result is that democratic governments are obliged to 
provide individuals within their territory with a minimum standard of rights, irrespective of 
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membership. Guest worker programs run contrary to this logic, as guest workers routinely lack 
rights that are considered obligatory by democratic standards. As Walzer notes, guest workers 
enjoy the same bundle of rights as visitors (or tourists in his verbiage), except for the right to 
work for the company that they are in contract with (Walzer 1983, 59). 
To make this more concrete, consider the United States’ H-2A and H-2B programs. In 
these modern-day guest-worker programs, approvals are granted to the American company in 
need of foreign labor rather than to the foreign national filling that labor need. The only “rights” 
that these workers have – beyond those of tourists – are to live in the United States and work for 
the employing company until the end of the contract or the worker is no longer employed by the 
petitioner, whichever comes first. Because of the asymmetric relationship between employers 
and foreign labor, foreign laborers routinely fail to report abuses of labor laws and violations of 
employment contracts. The result is a class of laborers who exist at the fringes of society, with 
little opportunity to become members of that society. 
Walzer extends this discussion to all foreign nationals who live in the receiving state, but 
lack the opportunity to become citizens (e.g., those subsumed in my guest worker and temporary 
resident types16). Walzer likens these individuals to live-in servants who are subject to the rules 
of the household, but who can never fully become member of the family (Walzer 1983, 52-53). 
He contends that admitting individuals without the opportunity to become full members of the 
                                                 
16 The United States requires that most temporary residents prove that they do not intend to become permanent 
residents. In so doing, temporary residents forego the path to citizenship that is afforded to those who become 
permanent residents. However, two subsets of temporary resident status holders – specialty occupation workers (H-
1B) and intercompany transferees (L-1A and L-1B) – are subject to the “doctrine of dual intent,” meaning that they 
do not have to prove that they do not intend to pursue permanent residence, meaning that they do have a path to 
citizenship. There is therefore an imperfect overlap between the set of individuals included in my guest worker and 
temporary resident categories and those who Walzer refers to as having no opportunity to become a member. This is 
unproblematic for present purposes, as the primary intent of temporary residents is understood to be temporary in 
nature, and those who are covered by dual intent must go through an additional application process in order to 
become a permanent resident, thus securing their path to citizenship.  
  
41 
receiving society is inconsistent with the norms of democracy, as these individuals will become 
perpetual subjects. If the above assertions – that guest worker programs specifically and 
admission without the opportunity to become full members of society more generally are 
inconsistent with democratic norms – are correct, then we ought to observe fewer guest worker 
and temporary resident programs in democratic states. In addition, we ought to observe a higher 
naturalization rate among those admitted to democratic states than among those admitted to non-
democratic states. This is not to suggest that democracies neither admit guest workers nor 
migrants lacking a path to citizenship, but rather that these programs will be marginal, and kept 
out of view of the general public. This is more so the case with guest-worker programs, as the 
virtually complete lack of rights is rather clearly inconsistent with democratic norms and 
practices.  
In contrast to democratic states, which are constrained in their abilities to limit rights 
granted to migrants, non-democracies are limited in their abilities to extend rights. Indeed, it is 
implausible for foreign-born individuals to become full members of non-democratic societies 
because true citizens rarely exist in these states. In addition, it is highly unlikely that we will 
observe residents in non-democratic states. While there is evidence that non-democracies do 
provide some social protection to their subjects (Rudra and Haggard 2005), it is unlikely that 
these social rights will be extended to the foreign born. 
Moreover, Bearce and Laks Hutnick (2011) argue that immigration is used as a method 
of increasing goods that can be redistributed to the selectorate in order to appease demand for 
democratization. In light of their evidence, it is unlikely that states would then redistribute to 
migrants. Specifically, migrants are to be a source of capital used to provide benefits to key 
groups in society, and the state’s ability to quash calls for popular sovereignty requires 
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maximizing the benefits provided to key groups, which can be done by increasing the amount 
available for redistribution and keeping the benefits-receiving group as small as possible. By 
limiting the rights of foreign-born individuals and by limiting these individuals’ contact with the 
wider society, rulers in non-democratic states will be better able to maintain power. Thus, in non-
democracies, we ought to observe more guest worker and temporary resident programs, and very 
few permanent residency and citizenship programs. 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
In this chapter I have sketched a typology of societal membership in which levels or degrees of 
societal membership are defined by the bundle of rights granted to individuals. The greater the 
rights, the greater level of societal membership attained by and, importantly, granted to the 
foreign-born individual in question. The question of degree of societal membership is important 
in its own right. This typology is also instrumental to the remainder of the dissertation. As I will 
argue in the next chapter, the bundle of rights granted to migrants conditions the effect that 
migrants have on the receiving society thereby conditioning which groups of members – citizens 
– will benefit from increased migrant admission. Understanding immigration policy outcomes 
therefore requires that we identify which groups of migrants will impact which societal groups, 
how this impact shapes societal group interests, and how these societal groups’ interests affect 
immigration policy outcomes. 
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3.0  MIGRANT RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION 
Often treated as competing explanations for immigration preference cleavages and policy 
outcomes, I argue that cultural and economic explanations are instead complementary. That is, 
rather than asking whether cultural or economic approaches provide a better explanation of 
immigration preferences and policy outcomes, I seek to understand the conditions under which 
cultural and economic interests explain these preferences and policy outcomes.  
Implicit in the extant literature is an assumption about the role of migrants in the 
receiving state. While cultural explanations implicitly assume that migrants have a significant 
impact on domestic society, economic scholarship generally limits migrants’ impact to the realm 
of the domestic economy. In many ways, both of these assumptions are correct, and yet they are 
contradictory. That is, migrants cannot simultaneously impact the domestic society and impact 
only the domestic market. Reconciling these contradictory assumptions requires a theory 
outlining the conditions under which each of these assumptions holds. In this chapter, I present 
such a theory, arguing that the bundle of rights extended to migrants conditions the effect that 
migrants have on the receiving society. 
I present this argument in three stages. The first stage uses the literature on political 
cleavages and partisan representation in western democracies to elucidate my initial assumptions 
about the foundational sets of interests that exist in these societies and how these interests are 
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represented in partisan politics. In the second stage, I argue that both economic and cultural 
interests drive societal preferences over immigration policy. Because the bundle of rights granted 
to migrants shapes the effect that migrants have on the receiving society, however, societal group 
support or opposition to liberalized admissions policies will vary as a function of these rights. 
Specifically, increasing migrant rights increases the market, fiscal, and cultural costs of 
immigration to the right, but decreases the market costs and generates political and cultural 
benefits to the left. As a result, migrant rights condition preferences over immigration such that 
the right (left) should favor (oppose) the admission of migrants with few rights and oppose 
(favor) the admission of migrants with expansive rights. In the third stage, I argue that the 
interests of the governing elite and of those they represent will have a significant effect on 
immigration policy outcomes such that immigration reform will focus on increasing the 
admission of migrants with a limited (broad) set of rights when the right (left) is in government. 
These policy outcomes will vary in predictable ways under divided government and when 
policymakers are constrained with respect to the provision of migrant rights.  
3.1 SOCIETAL INTERESTS AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 
Since at least the end of World War II, political conflict in Western Europe and in the United 
States has primarily formed along a single ideological dimension (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; 
Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mair 1997; Poole and Rosenthal 2007). In addition to this predominant 
left-right ideological dimension, a second ideological dimension has described political conflict 
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across Western Europe and in the United States at intermittent periods in history and over 
various issues. 
The predominant ideological dimension across the Western world most clearly falls along 
the classic left-right spectrum, on which the left represents the interests of labor, supports the 
welfare state as a means to redistribute income and risk, and promotes cultural diversity and 
change while the right represents the interests of employers, seeks to reduce the size and scope of 
the welfare state, and strives to preserve traditional culture. That is, in Western Europe, the first 
ideological dimension is consistent with the issues that typically distinguish social democratic 
parties and their typical coalition partners from Christian democratic and conservative parties 
and their typical coalition partners, while in the United States, the first ideological dimension is 
consistent with the issues that traditionally distinguish Democrats from Republicans. More 
concretely, among the advanced industrial democracies, leftists are more likely to represent the 
interests of labor, support social spending, and favor culturally progressive policies. By contrast, 
rightists are more likely to represent business interests, oppose social spending, and favor 
culturally traditional policies. This, it seems, maps rather cleanly on to the platforms of typical 
center left and center right parties in Western Europe and in the United States.  
This is not to suggest that the second dimension is unimportant. Often referred to as the 
authoritarian-libertarian dimension (Flanagan 1979, 1982a, 1982b; Flanagan and Lee 2003), this 
second dimension maps the degree to which groups wish to maintain17 
(authoritarians/traditionals) or overthrow (libertarians/progressives) the societal status quo. The 
authoritarian-libertarian spectrum is thus one on which authoritarians promote maintenance of 
                                                 
17 Or, in some cases, even return to the status quo anti, where they believe that their position has already been 
threatened. 
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traditional cultural values and respect for traditional authority, while libertarians pursue 
individual freedom and cultural pluralism. The clearest manifestation of this conflict is the rise of 
extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe that focus on national independence from the 
European Union, law and order, decreasing immigration, extreme assimilation programs, and 
national security. In the United States, this conflict is most clearly evidenced by the so-called 
“culture wars,” which pits social conservatives against social progressives on issues such as 
abortion, same-sex marriage, gun control, and capital punishment. 
In a survey of advanced industrial democracies, Flanagan and Lee (2003) have found 
attitudes on the left-right dimension to be largely orthogonal to those on the authoritarian-
libertarian dimension. The expansion of the individual-level political space beyond the 
traditional left-right dimension has generally been accepted by scholars studying the politics of 
Western Europe (Middendorp 1991; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 
2009), yet there exists significant debate over whether and how this change has manifested in 
partisan representation of these interests. While some suggest that parties have adjusted to 
individual-level preference cleavages by filling vacant niches in this two-dimensional policy 
preference space (Kriesi et al. 2008), others contend that party politics continues to coalesce 
along a single, predominant dimension (Oppenhuis 1995; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Van 
der Eijk et al. 1999; Kitschelt 2004; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). 
As is often the case, however, reality is likely somewhere between these two positions; 
the manner in which parties and their members respond to the expansion of societal interests 
onto a two-dimensional space is likely a function of cross-national institutional, party-system, 
and even party-level differences. In systems in which party members are relatively less 
constrained by their party, such as the United States, second dimension issues are those that 
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divide the party internally. Except under extreme circumstances, such as the early 20th Century 
schism between northern and southern Democrats, these second dimension divisions are unlikely 
to precipitate changes in the party system. As a result, individual representatives, rather than 
parties more generally, are likely to respond to changes in the individual-level ideological space. 
As the incentives for members to conform to party interests – such as those identified by Carey 
and Shugart (1995) – increase, however, second dimension issues should be increasingly likely 
to yield changes in the party system. The current wave of Conservative Party defections to the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) appears to be a manifestation of this phenomenon, 
with second dimension issues – primary among which being European Union membership – 
threatening to put asunder the Tory and Whig fractions within the Conservative Party.  
As the preceding discussion suggests, political divisions in the countries under 
examination stem from differing economic (both market and fiscal) and cultural interests. While 
market, fiscal, and cultural interests have generally coalesced along a single ideological 
dimension in the post-World War II era, some cultural issues have yielded divisions within the 
electorate, if not within parties. As I shall argue below, societal preferences over immigration 
stem from these more fundamental market, fiscal, and cultural interests and, as a result, partisan 
preferences over immigration should reflect those of their constituents. 
3.2 SOCIETAL INTERESTS AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 
In order to examine societal preferences over immigration policy, I begin by outlining the 
anticipated effects of immigration on the receiving society and the societal preference cleavages 
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that emerge over these anticipated effects. Throughout, I show how variations in the bundles of 
rights granted to migrants condition migrants’ ability to affect the receiving society and the effect 
this has on domestic groups’ preference over immigration. 
3.2.1 Migrants and the Market 
Do market interests affect preferences over immigration? There is a significant body of 
economic literature detailing the effect of international migration on the receiving state’s market. 
While some variation in prediction exists between economic models, the consensus is that 
international migration benefits abundant factors in the receiving state and hurts scarce factors in 
the receiving state (see Rogowski 2006 for a comprehensive review).18 In labor-scarce states, 
such as those examined in this project, this implies that a class-based preference cleavage will 
emerge, pitting pro-immigration employers against anti-immigration labor. 
As Hiscox (2001, 2002) has shown in international trade, increasing factor specificity – 
which results in decreasing ability to move between sectors – will result in gains and losses being 
distributed as a function of sector of employment and/or investment. The result is that where 
factors are sufficiently general that they can be moved costlessly, or at least sufficiently so, 
across sectors, interests should be homogenous across factor group. Where, by contrast, it is 
costly to repurpose a factor across sectors, interests should align according to sector of 
employment and/or investment. 
                                                 
18 An important deviation to this consensus suggests that abundant factors and scarce factors employed in exporting 
sectors will benefit from international migration, while scarce factors engaged in import-competing sectors will lose 
from international migration. 
  
49 
This dichotomy is easily understood, and more directly applicable to the task at hand, 
with an example from labor. A general construction laborer with no specialized training (in, say, 
electrical fittings or carpentry) can relatively fluidly transition from construction labor to another 
low- or un-skilled occupation in, for instance, agriculture, manufacturing, or custodial services. 
As a result, an increase in low- or un-skilled labor may have an adverse effect on the wages 
and/or employment status of low- or un-skilled labor, irrespective of sector of employment.  
This is increasingly untrue as skill-specificity of domestic labor increases. Indeed, 
moving across sectors is significantly more costly for a skilled worker, including master 
electricians, nurses, and architects to change sector of employment, and these costs increase with 
the degree of specialization, whether that specialization is the result of formal education, 
apprenticeship, or on-the-job training. These costs come either in the form of salary, as a highly-
skilled worker in one area will command a lower salary working outside of his or her area of 
expertise, or expenses incurred by re-specializing.  
 In the extreme, an individual with immense specialization coupled with extraordinary 
ability may simply not face a threat from immigration liberalization, even if that liberalization is 
in their exact field of expertise. While exceptionally rare, examples of individuals fitting this 
profile include professional athletes, internationally recognized performing artists, and 
distinguished scholars. As a result, an increase in high-skilled labor may have an adverse effect 
on the wages and/or employment status of high-skilled labor only if the foreign-born high-skilled 
labor has comparable and substitutable skills to domestic high-skilled labor. 
To this point, I have assumed that migrants cannot change factors and therefore cannot 
change their market impact. While this simplifying assumption is obviously untrue, it is a 
significantly more useful assumption when considering the effect of low- or un-skilled migrants 
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than that of high-skilled migrants. Acquiring skills is a costly endeavor requiring, in many cases, 
years of education or on-the-job training, oftentimes both. As a result, low- or un-skilled 
immigration should not present a market threat to high-skilled labor, at least not in the medium-
term. Not using previously-acquired skills, however, is far less costly, particularly where low- or 
un-skilled wages in the receiving state are higher than high-skilled wages in the sending state. In 
fact, where the receiving state requires high-skilled migrants to re-license, either by sitting for an 
exam or completing additional coursework or both, in order to use their skills in the receiving 
state – as is often the case with lawyers, doctors, nurses, architects, and engineers – the 
immediate costs of using previously-acquired skills may be prohibitive. The developed world is 
replete with anecdotes about physicians and architects from the developing world working in 
custodial services or as taxi drivers in the receiving state. The implications for theories of 
preferences over immigration should be clear: while low- or un-skilled foreign workers do not 
pose an immediate threat to high-skilled domestic workers, high-skilled foreign workers can and 
do pose a threat to low- or un-skilled domestic workers. 
This simple sketch of the economic effects of immigration suggests that in the capital-
abundant, labor-scarce states that constitute typical migrant destinations, there are three 
important societal groups that stand to gain or lose through migrants’ effect on the market: 
employers, high-skilled labor, and low- or un-skilled labor. On this parsimonious market-based 
logic, employers’ and low- or un-skilled labors’ positions are unambiguous, preferring 
liberalization and restriction, respectively. High-skilled labor, on the other hand, constitutes the 
“swing voter” among these interested groups, as its position is contingent and at times 
ambiguous. This model of factor group preferences over immigration based on market interests 
yields clear predictions about partisan preferences over immigration. As representatives of 
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employer’s interests, center-right parties – conservatives and Christian democratic parties in 
Western Europe and the Republican Party in the United States – should favor immigration 
liberalization, while those representing labor interests – social democratic parties in Western 
Europe and the Democratic Party in the United States – should oppose immigration 
liberalization. Again, the corollary for high-skilled labor is less precisely identifiable, as its 
interests align with labor on some issues and with employers on others. As a result, this group’s 
partisan affiliation and representation is likely to be volatile, switching at various points between 
the center-left and the center-right. In the United States, this likely means that representation of 
high-skilled labor’s market interests is best represented by moderate factions of the Democratic 
and Republican parties. Across Western Europe, this is consistent with liberal parties, whose 
stable voter base is generally small comparative to that of the center-left and the center-right, and 
consists of members of the middle-class and skilled workers (Kirchner 1988). 
While these expectations are founded on well-established tenets of market-based interest, 
they are likely to strike even the casual observer as being inconsistent with observed modern 
partisan preferences over immigration. These seemingly inconsistent observations can be 
reconciled if we consider the role of migrant rights. What effect do migrant rights have on the 
market impact of liberalized immigration? By specifying what migrants can and cannot do in the 
receiving state, the bundle of rights granted to migrants conditions the effect that migrants have 
on these domestic groups’ interests. Consider first the impact of migrants granted only the right 
to work for a particular employer in the receiving state, specifically migrants identified as guest 
workers in the previous chapter. While these migrants might be granted de jure rights and 
protections in the receiving state – such as the right to participate in collective bargaining 
arrangements, the right to a safe work environment, and the right to fair compensation – the 
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effective exercise of these rights is limited by guest workers’ inability to change employers. 
Because guest workers’ lawful admission and continued lawful presence is contingent upon 
maintaining their contract with the employer, guest workers are significantly less likely to seek 
recourse against negligent or abusive employers. Certainly for domestic employers this is a 
beneficial arrangement.  
Employers will pursue two sets of related interests with respect to labor migration 
policies: increasing the labor supply in order to decrease costs and increasing their discretion 
over labor employment decisions. There exists a certain trade-off between these two goals. 
Because of the relative demand for high-skilled labor and their higher standard of living vis-à-vis 
low- or un-skilled labor in their country of origin, employers of high-skilled labor will be less 
able to attract high-skilled foreign labor if these migrants are granted very few rights. In order to 
increase the supply of high-skilled labor, employers must be willing to temper the degree to 
which they have discretion over that labor. This suggests that, consistent with Ruhs’s (2013) 
work, employers of high-skilled labor should oppose guest worker program liberalization and 
support temporary resident program liberalization, while the opposite should be true for 
employers of low- or un-skilled labor. 
Granting migrants economic rights – the right to change employers and the right to 
participate in collective bargaining arrangements, for instance – makes immigration 
liberalization increasingly costly to employers. As a result, employers should favor the 
liberalization of immigration policies that extend few rights to migrants and oppose the 
liberalization of immigration policies that extend significant rights to migrants. This renders both 
guest worker and temporary resident programs attractive to employers and their representatives, 
as these programs give employers a significantly greater degree of control over foreign labor 
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than domestic labor. This is clearer for guest worker programs, under which foreign nationals 
lack the ability to change employers, but is also the case for temporary resident programs, where 
a foreign national’s duration of lawful stay is conditional on maintaining gainful and approved 
employment. Even where foreign nationals have the right to change employers, the employer 
still exercises significant control over the foreign national’s status. 
In so far as labor is willing to accept immigration, or perhaps treat it as inevitable, we 
should expect labor to prefer policies that grant migrants significant rights to policies that extend 
migrants few rights. Specifically, where migrants are granted an expansive bundle of rights, 
employers benefit little from hiring foreign labor over domestic labor, rendering competition 
from migrants less threatening than they it otherwise would be. Moreover, some labor groups 
have begun to view immigration as beneficial. For these groups, immigration is a method of 
increasing union membership and therefore increasing the power of labor (Haus 1995). 
Immigration is, however, only beneficial under this logic if migrants receive sufficient rights to 
participate in the collective bargaining process. This condition is only satisfied if migrants’ 
duration of lawful stay is not conditional on the maintenance of gainful employment. As the 
above discussion suggests, employers should favor guest worker and temporary resident 
liberalization and oppose permanent resident liberalization, while labor should oppose guest 
worker and temporary resident liberalization and support permanent resident liberalization. 
As this discussion should have made clear, the market-based preferences outlined in the 
beginning of this section are consistent with admissions preferences over guest workers and, to a 
lesser extent, temporary residents, but are inconsistent with preferences over permanent resident 
admissions. As a result, labor and its representatives should oppose the liberalization of migrant 
admissions for programs that grant migrants a limited bundle of rights and support the 
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liberalization of migrant admissions for programs that extend a comprehensive bundle of rights 
to migrants while employers and their representatives should prefer the opposite policy mix. 
3.2.2 Migrants and Public Expenditure 
How do interests relating to redistributive programs and public expenditure affect preferences 
over levels of immigration? Because the average migrant to the advanced industrial world is 
poorer than the average citizen of these receiving states, scholars note the significance of fiscal 
interests in shaping preferences over immigration. The traditional argument connecting fiscal 
interests to preferences over immigration posits that fiscal conservatives – typically those whose 
affluence renders them net contributors to the public purse – will oppose immigration on the 
expectation that the state will increase contributions in order to extend public services to 
newcomers (Hanson et al. 2007; Facchini and Mayda 2009). The interests of fiscal progressives 
yield more ambiguous preferences over immigration. While the potential – though far from 
empirically established – effects of increasing migrant admissions on public expenditure is 
unlikely to result in fiscal progressives’ favoring liberalized admissions, fiscal effects are less 
likely to be a salient concern for this group. Thus the typical fiscal burdens explanation would 
predict that fiscal conservatives and their representatives from the political right would oppose 
immigration liberalization and that fiscal progressives and their leftist representatives would be 
indifferent to admissions liberalization. 
Migrant rights again provide a more nuanced picture. Those who prefer a more limited 
welfare state should be less likely to oppose admissions liberalization for policies under which 
migrants lack access to redistributive services and that tie lawful duration of stay to the 
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maintenance of gainful employment, as is the case under guest worker and temporary resident 
programs, than they are to oppose immigration liberalization for policies under which migrants 
will be granted access to redistributive services and need not maintain gainful employment, as is 
the case for permanent resident programs. Here again, parties and representatives on the right 
should favor or be indifferent to the liberalization of guest worker and temporary resident 
admissions and oppose permanent resident liberalization. This more nuanced picture of the role 
of economic self-interest in preferences over immigration policy suggests that the same domestic 
groups will have opposing preferences for policies that provide migrants with different bundles 
of rights. 
3.2.3 Migrants and Society 
Do non-economic interests affect preferences over immigration? The answer to this question 
seems rather obvious, as there are clearly members of society whose primary, if not sole, 
contention against immigration lies in the cultural differences between migrants and the core of 
the receiving society. Indeed, who has not heard vitriol about the overwhelming prevalence of a 
foreign language or the erection of places of worship for adherents to a “foreign” religion? While 
less blatant than the attitudes of those who find immigration to be culturally threatening, there 
also exists a group in society for whom immigration and cultural diversity promise to enrich the 
receiving state. For these individuals the threat exists not in increasing cultural diversity, but 
rather in perpetuating a system and attitude that permits societal divisions on the basis of 
ascriptive distinctions. 
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The challenge, however, is to define these groups a priori rather than simply invoking 
their existence to mop up any remaining unexplained variance. The examples outlined above 
point to two ideal-type groups, traditionals and progressives, respectively. Traditionals are 
typical social conservatives, those who have benefitted from the prevailing social and cultural 
status quo and whose societal position would be threatened by a shift away from the status quo. 
The status quo benefits these individuals because they are a part of the societal core as members 
of the dominant19 ethnic, racial, linguistic, or religious groups. Yet membership in the core is not 
a sufficient condition to render one a traditional. Rather, traditionals are those members of the 
core for whom societal cultural diversity threatens their cultural identity. As cogently argued by 
Kriesi and his colleagues, “immigrants of ethnically distinct origins pose a potential threat to the 
collective identity of the native population.” (Kriesi et al. 2008, 6-7) The degree to which 
members of the dominant group perceive diversity as a threat, however, is conditional on 
education, which has a liberalizing effect (Lipset 1981). 
Progressives, by contrast, are generally those for whom the prevailing social and cultural 
status quo is insufficient or those for whom a change in the status quo does not threaten their 
cultural identity. In the former, as a part of the societal periphery, progressives are not members 
of the dominant social group. In the latter, prior exposure – through education – to alternative 
ideas and cultures can be viewed at minimum as non-threatening and at maximum as enriching. 
While traditionals and their representatives on the political right will almost universally oppose 
immigration liberalization, progressives and their representatives on the political left will support 
                                                 
19 “Dominant” does not necessarily equate to “largest,” but rather “most powerful.” While “dominant” group(s) is 
also often the “largest,” there are numerous examples of societal structures in which the most powerful group in 
society is a numerical minority. 
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immigration liberalization. While these expectations are likely consistent with casual 
observations of partisan immigration politics, reality is again more nuanced. 
 To what extent do migrant rights affect cultural group preference over immigration? That 
is, does the extension or restriction of migrant rights impact whether progressives continue to 
support liberalization and traditionals continue to oppose liberalization? Like economically-
based preferences, culturally-based preferences are likely to be conditional on migrant rights. 
Where economic and social rights are withheld from migrants, progressives are likely to oppose 
increasing admissions. For progressives, admitting migrants with limited rights constitutes a 
threat to the liberal democratic values of freedom and equality. This is a problem for 
progressives both on principle and strategically. On principle, progressives contend that treating 
some groups as having less value and therefore fewer rights than others is unjust. In a strategic 
sense, treating any group of individuals as less than equal provides a precedent for treating others 
as less than equal, opening the door for legal stratification. On the contrary, traditionals are more 
likely to support – or at least not expend finite resources opposing – immigration liberalization 
for guest workers, who largely remain outside of the receiving society. Because guest workers 
are excluded from the larger society, they will have minimal effects on the receiving society and 
its collective identity and, as a result, traditionals should be less opposed to admitting these 
migrants than they are to admitting migrants with greater bundles of rights. Moreover, as the 
bundle of rights granted to migrants expands, cultural interests should increase in salience. That 
is, because migrants granted extremely limited rights are largely unable to affect the receiving 
culture, there should be limited concern over their cultural impact. This is increasingly untrue as 
the bundle of rights expands and migrants become more intertwined with the receiving society.  
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3.2.4 Migrant Rights and Societal Preferences 
Above I have presented theoretical expectations about the preferences that exist in receiving 
societies with respect to immigration liberalization. In so doing, I have outlined migrants’ 
potential economic and cultural effects on the receiving society, identified domestic groups that 
benefit or lose from these potential economic and cultural effects, and argued, consistent with the 
dominant paradigm in political economy scholarship, that those who benefit from immigration 
will favor immigration liberalization and those who are hurt by immigration will oppose 
immigration liberalization. Moreover, I have demonstrated that various bundles of rights alter 
these expectations and preferences.  
Under what conditions are economic and social concerns salient for group preferences 
over immigration policy? As alluded to above, not all potential migrants are equivalent in their 
effect on the receiving society and as a result increasing admissions affect different groups in the 
receiving society in disparate ways. Indeed, the same migrant or group of migrants may have a 
divergent impact on the same individual or groups of individuals in the receiving society through 
economic and cultural channels. Consider a hypothetical employer in an advanced industrial, 
Western receiving state who also holds culturally traditional values and a hypothetical low- or 
un-skilled migrant worker whose values and norms are dissimilar to that of the receiving state. 
The employer would benefit economically from liberalizing admissions for this type of migrant, 
implying that he or she would support immigration liberalization, but he or she would also 
anticipate cultural losses from liberalizing admissions for this type of migrant, implying that he 
or she would oppose immigration liberalization. Which of these interests will win out? 
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While the above theories specify which domestic groups stand to benefit and lose 
economically and culturally from admissions of particular groups of migrants, they tell us little 
about the relative impact of groups of migrants on the economy or the social fabric of the 
receiving society. The degree to which migrants can affect the receiving society is conditional 
upon the rights that are granted to them. Where migrants are extended limited economic rights 
and no social rights, as is the case in the guest worker and temporary resident programs 
discussed above, factorally-driven economic interests will predominate. Where, by contrast, 
migrants are granted an expansive bundle of rights – including access to redistributive social 
services and a pathway to citizenship – both economic and cultural interests will be salient. That 
is, the interests associated with full economic rights will continue to play a role where migrants 
have social and political rights, but they will be considered alongside cultural interests. 
Why are economic and cultural interests salient when considering liberalizing admissions 
for migrants with different bundles of rights, but less-so where migrants are not granted social 
and political rights? Cultural interests will be salient for programs in which migrants are granted 
significant social and political rights exactly because they are being granted admission in to the 
society, not just the market. These individuals will be able to affect the receiving society through 
their membership in that society, a condition that forces existing members of the receiving 
society to consider whether or not liberalization will undermine the shared goals of the existing 
society. Based on the profiles of partisan representation presented earlier in this chapter, as 
representatives of labor, fiscal progressives, and cultural progressives, parties on the political left 
will favor the liberalization of programs that grant migrants an expansive bundle of rights and 
oppose liberalization of programs that offer migrants few rights. The opposite is true of parties 
on the political right. The second ideological dimension, which represents cultural interests that 
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crosscut traditional left-right positions, will be salient only for programs that grant migrants an 
expansive bundle of rights. Parties towards the authoritarian pole of this dimension will oppose 
immigration liberalization for such programs while parties towards the libertarian pole will 
support such liberalization. 
3.3 POLITICAL COALITIONS AND POLICY OUTCOMES 
The simple knowledge that these preferences exist cannot, taken alone, tell us whether policy 
liberalization will occur. Indeed, this knowledge is necessary for explaining immigration 
outcomes, but it is far from sufficient. How do immigration policy interests and preferences 
aggregate to determine policy outcomes? The ideological composition of governing elites and 
the groups they represent matter for policy outcomes. Policy outcomes are then relatively easy to 
predict in systems characterized by single party majority governments and high party discipline. 
In these cases, policy outcomes should be a function of the ideological composition of the party 
in power. Where parties govern in coalition, immigration policy outcomes should be a function 
of the joint ideological profiles of the parties in government. Where individual legislators have 
significant latitude in their legislative actions, immigration policy outcomes should be a function 
of the overall ideological profile of the legislative body and other important veto players. 
The expectations outlined above are indicative of which groups would need to be in 
power in order to achieve immigration policy liberalization for a particular sub-set of 
immigration policies. Specifically, where leftist parties control the key decision-making 
institutions, we are more likely to observe liberalization of permanent resident programs. Where 
  
61 
the right controls key decision-making institutions, by contrast, we are more likely to observe 
liberalization of guest worker and temporary resident programs. 
3.4 DISCUSSION 
In this chapter I have argued that migrant rights are central to understanding the immigration 
policy-making process. Throughout I have demonstrated that under differing bundles of rights, 
successful pursuit of domestic groups’ economic and cultural interests yield opposing 
preferences over immigration. Specifically, increasing migrant rights increases the market, fiscal, 
and cultural costs of immigration to the right, but decreases the market costs and generates 
political and cultural benefits to the left. As a result, the right (left) will favor (oppose) the 
admission of migrants with few rights and oppose (favor) the admission of migrants with 
expansive rights, and these interests will be reflected in immigration policy outcomes such that 
immigration reform will focus on increasing the admission of migrants with a limited (broad) set 
of rights when the right (left) is in government. 
In the next four chapters, I evaluate these claims based upon evidence from the United 
States and the European Union member states. For each case, I first examine whether the 
extension of migrant rights has the anticipated effect over immigration policy preferences, and 
then examine whether partisan representation of these societal interests has the anticipated effect 
on immigration policy outcomes. Through these cases, we will also be able to observe the extent 
to which limits on decision-maker’s ability to liberalize different migration policies has an effect 
on societal interests with respect to immigration policy and these same policy outcomes. While 
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policymakers in the United States have significant latitude on admissions levels for migrants 
with varying bundles of rights, the same is not true of policymakers in the EU member states. 
This difference in the set of policy alternatives is likely to have significant effects on the ability 
to form successful immigration policy-making coalitions.  
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4.0  IMMIGRATION POLICY CLEAVAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 
As the world’s largest immigrant receiving state, the United States is an important case for the 
study of immigration policy. Despite its storied history as a “nation of immigrants,” immigration 
is among the most contentious policy areas in the United States, with the descendants of reviled 
immigrant groups of the past, such as Irish and Italians, opposing the influx of today’s new 
arrivals. There is much that we still do not understand about the nature of Congressional 
immigration politics. Consider the puzzling coalition of Senators known as the “Gang of Eight,” 
which includes extreme liberals, such as Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Dick Durbin (D-IL), and Bob 
Menendez (D-NJ), and extreme conservatives, such as Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Jeff Flake (R-
AZ), and Marco Rubio (R-FL). This unlikely coalition not only produced a proposal for 
comprehensive immigration reform amongst their typically competing interests, but also crafted 
a bill that passed the Senate in a 68-32 roll call vote in June 2013.20 While surprising, these sorts 
of coalitions are not uncommon in immigration policy making. Why is this the case? More 
generally, what explains the political coalitions that form over immigration policies in the United 
States? 
In this chapter, I examine the role of migrant rights in shaping American preferences over 
admissions liberalization.  I make claims about the cleavages – the lines of societal conflict – 
                                                 
20 Despite these efforts being a bipartisan success story in the Senate, the same was not true in the House. 
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that arise over immigration policy; I do not, at this stage, make claims about immigration policy 
outcomes. In order to understand policy outcomes we must first understand the conflicts and 
preferences that exist over immigration, then use this knowledge to demonstrate how societal 
preferences aggregate in a particular societal and institutional context. Only once we understand 
immigration preference cleavages can we then understand the dynamics that drive immigration 
policy outcomes, a task I turn to in the next chapter. 
I begin with the United States, as opposed to Western Europe, because of the flexibility 
granted to American decision makers in the immigration policymaking process. American 
policymakers have choices over various combinations of immigration policies, which include 
expanding or restricting migrants admitted under any, or indeed all, of the three significant 
societal groups – identified by the varying bundles of rights granted to migrants – highlighted 
throughout this dissertation: guest workers, temporary residents, and permanent residents. As a 
result, it is possible to observe preferences over various types of immigration. 
4.1 IDEOLOGICAL SPACE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Once a highly contested argument, it is now relatively uncontroversial to note that the majority 
of United States’ Congressional politics – including the ideological positions of individual 
legislators and shifting Congressional coalitions – can be aligned along a single ideological 
dimension (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). In addition to this predominant ideological dimension, a 
second ideological dimension has described Congressional politics at intermittent periods in 
history and over various issues.  
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The predominant ideological dimension in the United States Congress most clearly falls 
along the classic economic left-right spectrum, with the extremes consisting of those who desire 
greater government intervention in the market (labor and fiscal progressives) on the left and 
those who desire a market entirely free of government intervention (employers and fiscal 
conservatives) on the right. That is, in the United States, the first ideological dimension is 
consistent with the issues that distinguish democrats from Republicans. Given that this first 
ideological dimension has consistently correctly accounted for in excess of 80% of roll call votes 
in the period under study (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 65), however, it seems unlikely that this 
dimension only explains legislator economic positions. Rather, many cultural and economic 
positions in the contemporary United States appear to have largely coalesced along a single 
ideological dimension, with employers, fiscal conservatives, and cultural conservatives 
populating the right-hand side of the spectrum and labor, fiscal progressives, and cultural 
progressives on the left. More concretely, in modern American politics, leftists are more likely to 
represent the interests of labor, support a robust welfare state, and favor culturally progressive 
policies. By contrast, rightists are more likely to represent business interests, oppose the welfare 
state, and favor culturally traditional policies. This, it seems, maps rather cleanly on to the 
platforms of typical contemporary Democratic and Republican legislators, respectively.  
This is not to suggest that the second dimension is unimportant. The second dimension is 
orthogonal to the first dimension, and consists of issues over which intra-party divisions exist. 
While the content and salience of this second dimension has changed over time, the consensus is 
that in the history of the current party system, which dates back to the New Deal, this second 
dimension has captured cultural issues, particularly civil rights. While Poole and Rosenthal 
demonstrate that this second dimension has captured intra-party divisions over immigration 
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policy during some Congresses (2007, 58-62), immigration does not consistently show up as a 
second dimension issue. Indeed, many scholars have consistently found partisanship to 
significantly affect legislator preferences over immigration (Fetzer 2006; Gimpel and Edwards 
1999; Gonzalez and Kamdar 2000; Leal 2009; Milner and Tingley 2008) 
This empirical regularity masks the significant intra-party divisions that have existed over 
immigration policy and, in particular, that the preponderance of successful immigration policy 
reforms has been the product of bipartisan efforts (Tichenor 2002; Wong 2006; Zolberg 1990). 
Republicans, for instance, must choose between supporting immigration policy liberalization for 
economic purposes and opposing such liberalization for cultural purposes. Similarly, Democrats 
must choose between opposing immigration because of its labor market impact and supporting 
such liberalization on cultural grounds. 
Moreover, in contrast to their Western European counterparts, legislators in the United 
States are significantly more beholden to their constituents than to their political party (Carey 
and Shugart 1995). As a result, legislators are responsive to constituency demands, favoring 
policies that would benefit their constituents and opposing those that would be detrimental. 
Because legislators pursue reelection (Mayhew 1974) and reelection is attained primarily 
through satisfying the constituency, legislators in the United States can be expected to pursue 
policies that are in the interest of their constituents.  
Given this, it seems reasonable to expect to observe intra-party divisions on immigration 
policy; such divisions emerge over a subset of immigration policy domains and are difficult to 
observe when we aggregate all immigration policies together. As demonstrated by the cursory 
overview of recent immigration policy-making coalitions below, by differentiating between 
migrant groups according to rights, it will be possible to observe which policies have promoted 
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intra-party divisions and which have yielded a unified left and a unified right. Indeed it appears 
that the parties have frequently used the flexibility of policy tools available to mitigate the 
otherwise inevitable intra-party divisions between groups with opposing preferences over 
admissions levels. 
4.2 INTERESTS, RIGHTS, AND SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION 
As noted in earlier chapters, existing theories of societal preferences over immigration make 
significant assumptions about how migrants impact the receiving state. While economic 
explanations assume that migrants primarily – or at least most saliently – affect the labor market 
or state budget and expenditure, cultural explanations assume that migrants primarily affect the 
receiving society and culture. By specifying what migrants may or may not do in the receiving 
state, rights condition the degree to which migrants affect the receiving state’s economy and 
culture.  As a result, rights impact which groups in the receiving state will gain or lose from 
increased immigration.   
Given the significant variation in migrant rights as a function of class of admission, the 
coalitions that form in favor of/against liberalizing immigration should also shift as a function of 
class of admission. The simple labor market competition model would suggest that Democrats 
(Republicans) would oppose (support) any policy that liberalizes immigration because of the 
wage-decreasing effect of an increased labor pool. Yet these expectations change when we 
consider the possible bundles of rights that we might grant to migrants. Granting migrants 
economic rights – the right to change employers and the right to participate in collective 
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bargaining arrangements, for instance – makes immigration liberalization increasingly costly to 
employers. As a result, employers and their representatives should favor the liberalization of 
immigration policies that extend few rights to migrants and oppose the liberalization of 
immigration policies that extend significant rights to migrants. This renders both guest worker 
and temporary resident programs attractive to employers and their representatives, as these 
programs give employers a significantly greater degree of control over foreign labor than 
domestic labor. This is clearer for guest worker programs, under which foreign nationals lack the 
ability to change employers, but is also the case for temporary resident programs, where a 
foreign national’s duration of lawful stay is conditional on maintaining gainful and approved 
employment. In addition, where temporary residents are covered by the doctrine of dual intent – 
the right to enter the United States on a temporary visa but with the intent to either remain 
temporarily or permanently – adjustment of status to a permanent resident visa requires employer 
sponsorship, except where the foreign national marries a citizen or permanent resident and seeks 
a permanent resident visa under a family-based program. That is, even where foreign nationals 
have the right to change employers, the employer still exercises control over the status of foreign 
nationals admitted under temporary resident programs. 
In so far as labor is willing to accept immigration, or perhaps treat it as inevitable, we 
should expect labor and their representatives to prefer policies that grant migrants significant 
rights to policies that extend migrants fewer rights. Specifically, where migrants are granted an 
expansive bundle of rights, employers benefit little from hiring foreign labor over domestic 
labor, rendering competition from migrants less threatening than it otherwise would be. 
Moreover, some labor groups – most notably the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
– have begun to view immigration as beneficial. For these groups, immigration is a method of 
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increasing union membership and therefore increasing the power of labor (Haus 1995). 
Immigration is, however, only beneficial under this logic if migrants receive sufficient rights to 
effectively – and not merely nominally – participate in the collective bargaining process. This 
condition is only satisfied if migrants’ duration of lawful stay is not conditional on the 
maintenance of gainful employment. Otherwise stated, as representatives of employer interests, 
Republicans should favor guest worker and temporary resident program liberalization and 
oppose permanent resident program liberalization, while Democrats, as representatives of labor 
interests, should oppose guest worker and temporary resident program liberalization and support 
permanent resident program liberalization. 
The typical fiscal burdens hypothesis would predict that those who are concerned about 
expanding welfare programs – fiscal conservatives and their Republicans representatives – 
would oppose admissions liberalization. Migrant rights again provide a more nuanced picture. 
Those who prefer a more limited welfare state should be more likely to support admissions 
liberalization for policies under which migrants lack access to redistributive services and that tie 
lawful duration of stay to the maintenance of gainful employment, as is the case under guest 
worker and temporary resident programs, than they are to support immigration liberalization for 
policies under which migrants will be granted access to redistributive services and need not 
maintain gainful employment, as is the case for permanent resident programs. Here again, 
Republicans, as representatives of fiscal conservatives, should be less likely to oppose guest 
worker and temporary resident liberalization by virtue of their limited fiscal impact, but should 
oppose permanent resident program expansion. On fiscal concerns alone and as representatives 
of fiscal progressives, Democrats should be more likely to oppose guest worker and temporary 
resident liberalization and more likely to support permanent resident liberalization than their 
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Republican counterparts. This more nuanced picture of the role of economic self-interest in 
preferences over immigration policy suggests that the same domestic groups will have opposing 
preferences for policies that provide migrants with different bundles of rights. 
Finally, a general nativist theory would predict that cultural traditionals would oppose 
immigration liberalization, while cultural progressives would support immigration liberalization. 
Yet migrant rights condition the degree to which a group of migrants can impact the receiving 
society. Where migrants are unable to affect the receiving society, because of limited duration of 
stay and limited social and political rights (e.g., guest worker and temporary resident programs), 
cultural concerns should not have a significant impact on preferences over immigration policy 
liberalization. Where, by contrast, migrants are granted significant social rights and the ability to 
remain indefinitely in the receiving state, as is the case in permanent resident programs, cultural 
conservatives will oppose admissions liberalization while cultural progressives will support 
admissions liberalization. Partisan expectations are less clear here. While this suggests that 
Republicans, as representatives of cultural conservatives, will oppose permanent resident 
program liberalization and that Democrats, as representatives of cultural progressives, will 
support permanent resident program liberalization, we should also observe intra-party divisions 
along the second ideological dimension such that representatives who are cultural progressive 
(traditional) on issues that divide the parties will favor (oppose) the liberalization of resident 
program admissions. 
Because temporary resident programs provide migrants with fewer rights than permanent 
resident programs, but more expansive rights than guest worker programs, temporary resident 
programs can be viewed as policies in which competing groups can find compromise over 
desired policy outcomes. As a result, the anticipated effects should be substantively smaller for 
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temporary resident programs than they are for guest worker programs. As the preceding 
discussion makes clear, varying the bundles of migrant rights provides a more nuanced theory of 
the politics of immigration, and leads to the following testable hypotheses: 
H4.1: Increasing levels of conservatism along the left-right ideological dimension will result in 
increasing support for guest worker and temporary resident program liberalization, all else held 
equal. 
H4.2: Increasing levels of conservatism along the left-right ideological dimension will result in 
decreasing support for permanent resident program liberalization, all else held equal. 
H4.3: Increasing levels of authoritarianism along the libertarian-authoritarian ideological 
dimension have no effect on support for guest worker and temporary resident program 
liberalization, all else held equal. 
H4.4: Increasing levels of authoritarianism along the libertarian-authoritarian ideological 
dimension will result in decreasing support for permanent resident program liberalization, all 
else held equal. 
4.3 IMMIGRATION POLICY-MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 
According to the theory outlined above, we should see both economic and cultural conservatives 
(progressives) supporting (opposing) guest worker and temporary resident program liberalization 
and opposing (supporting) permanent resident program liberalization. Are these expectations 
consistent with observed patterns of behavior among policy makers in the United States? Before 
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turning to the quantitative empirical analysis, I present some illustrative examples of the theory 
of rights shaping admissions policy cleavages at work in the United States. 
In the post-WWII United States, significant immigration policy reform has been 
attempted, often successfully, approximately once every ten to twenty years. As detailed by 
Gimpel and Edwards (1999) and Tichenor (2002), the primary focus of immigration reform has 
varied over time, with policymakers focusing on permanent resident policy in the 1960s, 
refugees and asylum seekers in the 1970s, illegal immigration in the 1980s, and legal 
immigration of permanent residents, temporary residents, and guest workers in the 1990s. The 
major players in the immigration reform debates during this time illustrate rather nicely how 
legislator ideology and the more fundamental interests of those they represent yields vastly 
different preferences over different types of immigration policy. Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) 
was a prototypical left-progressive Member of Congress and remained active in the immigration 
policy-making process throughout his lengthy political career. As a junior Senator, Kennedy 
worked alongside Senator Philip Hart (D-MI) and Representative Emmanuel Celler (D-NY) to 
promote the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965 (commonly referred to as “Hart-
Celler”), which replaced the existing national origins system of resident admissions.21 This set 
the tone for the remainder of his career, throughout which he pursued permanent resident 
program liberalization and stringently opposed the expansion of guest worker and temporary 
resident programs. The core of the 1990 INA, sponsored by Kennedy, was the significant 
expansion of permanent resident programs by increasing the worldwide ceiling by over 100,000. 
                                                 
21 True to its name, the national origins system was a quota system that extended admissions to would-be migrants 
as a function of their national, racial, or ethnic group. This systems strongly favored migrants from Western Europe 
and the Western Hemisphere.  
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Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) is a conservative leader in the immigration policy debate 
and former chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration. Throughout his legislative career, 
he has frequently fought against Kennedy on immigration reform. In 2006, for instance, Cornyn 
and his colleague, Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), introduced a bill to counter Kennedy’s efforts. The 
Cornyn-Kyl bill proposed an uncapped guest worker program and left resident programs 
virtually untouched. 
To further illustrate the point, consider some of the surprising coalitions of co-sponsors 
that have produced immigration reform bills in recent decades: Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and John 
McCain (R-AZ); Ted Kennedy (D-MA), Jim Kolbe (R-AZ), and Jeff Flake (R-AZ); and the so-
called “Gang of Eight” in the 113th Congress. There are many more unlikely partnerships that 
could be added to this list. The most recent effort to produce comprehensive immigration reform 
has been spearheaded by the Gang of Eight, a bipartisan group of Senators that includes Michael 
Bennet (D-CO), Richard Durbin (D-IL), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), John 
McCain (R-AZ), Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Marco Rubio (R-FL), and Chuck Schumer (D-NY). 
There exists significant variation among these Senators’ ideological positions. Such a coalition is 
only possible if each side is able to obtain some of its preferred policies, meaning that Democrats 
should be able to secure the liberalization of permanent resident programs and Republicans able 
to secure the liberalization of guest worker and temporary resident programs. The proposed 
legislation (S. 744) necessarily produced a compromise that would have simultaneously 
liberalized permanent resident, temporary resident, and guest worker program admissions. This 
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bill passed the Senate in late June 2013, but was opposed by 32 conservative senators.22 While 
this bill was a bipartisan success in the Senate, the same was not true in the Republican-majority 
House and ultimately Congress failed to pass comprehensive immigration reform in the 113th 
session. 
4.3.1 Analysis of Congressional Votes 
In order to more systematically test this argument, I analyze Senate roll call voting patterns since 
World War II. The sample includes all votes on each of the three major types of legal 
immigration control policies: permanent resident, temporary resident, and guest worker. 
Throughout the analysis, I split the sample of votes into each of these three policy types in order 
to examine how legislator preferences over migrant admissions differ across programs that grant 
varying bundles of rights to migrants.  
In order to create the dependent variable – immigration policy liberalization – I began by 
isolating immigration-related roll call votes by examining the congressional roll call codebooks 
compiled by Poole and his colleagues (Poole 2009; Poole and Lewis 2009; Poole and McCarty 
2009) and cross-checking the identified votes against Poole and Rosenthal’s (2007) issue codes 
and votes identified in Gimpel and Edwards’s (1999) study of Congressional immigration policy 
making. I then classified each according to the vote content. I defined vote content at three 
                                                 
22 These Senators are: John Barrasso (R-WY), Roy Blunt (R-MO), John Boozman (R-AR), Richard Burr (R-NC), 
Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), Daniel Coats (R-OK), Tom Coburn (R-OK), Thad Cochran (R-MS), John Cornyn (R-
TX), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Ted Cruz (R-TX), Michael Enzi (R-WY), Deb Fischer (R-NE), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), 
James Inhofe (R-OK), Johnny Isakson (R-GA), Mike Johanns (R-NE), Ron Johnson (R-WI), Mike Lee (R-UT), 
Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Jerry Moran (R-KS), Rand Paul (R-KY), Rob Portman (R-OH), James Risch (R-ID), Pat 
Roberts (R-KS), Tim Scott (R-SC), Jeff Sessions (R-AL), Richard Shelby (R-AL), John Thune (R-SD), Pat Toomey 
(R-PA), David Vitter (R-LA), and Roger Wicker (R-MS). 
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levels. The first level indicates whether the vote pertained to legal migration or illegal23 
migration. The second level defines whether an immigration-related vote covered immigration 
control (admissions) policy, immigrant policy, citizenship policy, naturalization policy, or 
refugee policy. The third level specifies the subset of policies within the second-level 
classification. In the case of votes pertaining to immigration control policy – the focus of this 
project – I classified the content of these votes as permanent resident, temporary resident, or 
guest worker. Finally, I coded each vote such that a liberalizing vote or a vote against a 
restricting measure was coded as a 1 otherwise the vote cast was coded as a 0. In order to isolate 
the content of each specific vote, I examined each vote in the Congressional Record and, where 
possible, its treatment in Gimpel and Edwards (1999). Votes that covered more than one issue 
were excluded from the analysis because it would be impossible to isolate the effect, for 
instance, of the guest worker portion of the bill vis-à-vis the permanent resident portion of the 
bill. Because the preponderance of immigration bills are necessarily compromise bills (Tichenor 
2002) that include provisions addressing more than one portion of the immigration code, the 
majority of the votes included are amendments rather than final passage.  
While consistent with the approach to roll-call vote analysis in the political economy 
literature (see for example Milner and Tingley 2008; Peters 2014), the conventional approach in 
the immigration literature is to primarily (or, at times, only) examine votes on a bill’s final 
passage  (for instance Casellas and Leal 2013; Fetzer 2006). It is well known that immigration 
bills that successfully become law are large compromise bills, which typically encompass 
reforms on legal and illegal immigration, regularization components, and enforcement 
                                                 
23 While the use of this phrase is highly contested, I use “illegal” here for the sake of simplicity and without any 
normative content 
  
76 
provisions, among others. Indeed, it is this compromise that often makes final passage possible. 
Yet it is my primary contention in this dissertation that not all of these components are alike and 
have differing effects on various societal groups. More specifically, that rights-based differences 
among these programs cause increased migrant admissions to have opposing effects on any 
given societal group and, as a result, patterns of support for liberalization will vary as a function 
of these rights.  While instructive for some purposes, the practice of examining final passage 
votes is unlikely to shed light on the underlying political cleavages. A list of votes included in 
the sample is provided in Appendix A. 
I operationalize the primary independent variable, legislator ideology, using the first 
dimension of DW-NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 2007),24 which captures the left-right 
dimension along which we observe partisan divisions in the contemporary United States. The 
scale for this variable runs from -1 to 1, and increasing values indicate greater levels of 
conservatism. I also include the second dimension of DW-NOMINATE, which captures cultural 
preferences that are orthogonal to the first dimension. Here again the scale runs from -1 to 1 and 
                                                 
24 Because DW-NOMINATE scores are estimated using a legislator’s roll call voting history there is some concern 
over using DW-NOMINATE scores as independent variables in models in which roll call votes are the dependent 
variable. This is not a significant problem here for two reasons. First, DW-NOMINATE scores are an aggregate 
measure across all roll call votes and, as such, allow us to capture a general profile of a legislator’s ideological 
position. Second, immigration-related votes constitute only a very small portion of these votes. 15 of the 55 
Congresses since 1900 included no immigration related roll call votes. Of the remaining 40 Congresses, on average 
only 2.1% of votes were related to immigration, there were only five Congresses in which immigration votes 
constituted greater than 5% of all roll call votes, and the maximum was 8.1% in the 110th Congress. In addition, 
these statistics overstate the degree to which the roll call votes in the dependent variable contribute to the DW-
NOMINATE scores that I use as independent variables. Specifically, these descriptive statistics use the most 
expansive definition of immigration related votes, which includes any vote indicated as 
“Immigration/Naturalization” by Poole and Rosenthal (2007), irrespective of whether “Immigration/Naturalization” 
is identified as issue 1 or issue 2. Put another way, these data include votes not only on immigration qua regular 
admissions, but also on immigrant policy, refugee policy, naturalization policy, appropriations for the agencies 
administering immigration and naturalization law, and bilateral treaties relating to immigration. Because I have 
varying theoretical expectations about different types of immigration policy, my analysis is restricted to immigration 
votes and does not include any of these other immigration-related issues, resulting in a significantly smaller 
proportion of votes in each Congress. 
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increasing values correspond with increasingly culturally traditional Members of Congress. As 
discussed above, this dimension only captures cultural preferences that are not subsumed in the 
first dimension. Substantively, the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE identifies a legislator’s 
ideological position along the left-right spectrum, which encompasses market, fiscal, and cultural 
interests. Increasingly negative values on this dimension indicate interests that are consistent 
with those of the Democratic Party and its constituents, while increasingly positive values on this 
dimension indicate interests that are consistent with those of the Republican Party and its 
constituents. The second dimension of DW-NOMINATE identifies a legislator’s ideological 
position on issues that divide the parties internally, with increasingly negative values indicating 
culturally progressive interests and increasingly positive values indicating culturally traditional 
interests.25  
There is, of course, some debate over whether the ideal-point estimates produced by the 
first dimension of DW-NOMINATE capture ideological positions or partisanship (see for 
example Lee 2009). While this distinction is important for some purposes, it rather trivializes the 
relationship between ideology and partisanship. If interests shape ideology and parties aggregate 
and articulate interests, then ideology and partisanship are intimately related and not merely 
correlated. There are undoubtedly times and places in which this relationship breaks down, the 
clearest example of which being parties of power that are prevalent in the developing world. In 
the developed world, however, incongruence between partisanship and ideology typically 
precipitates party realignment. Indeed, in the United States, co-partisans’ ideological positions 
have become increasingly cohesive since the moderate party realignment of the 1970s. As a 
                                                 
25 Historically, for example, negative second-dimension values have been indicative of civil rights proponents while 
positive second dimension values have been indicative of those favoring continued segregation. 
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result, party loyalty and ideological position are generally observationally equivalent during that 
period. In any event, inclusion of a partisan dummy variable in place of the first dimension of 
DW-NOMINATE has little to no effect on the models presented below, with the occasional 
exception of the loss of explanatory power. 
I also include standard control variables for various other factors in different model 
specifications. These controls include regional dummy variables, a dummy variable border 
states, foreign born as a percent of state population (U.S. Bureau of the Census various years-c 
obtained from Peters 2014), state unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014), percent 
of workforce that is salaried (U.S. Bureau of the Census various years-b obtained from Peters 
2014), percent of state income produced through agriculture (Bureau of Economic Analysis 
2012), trade openness (Peters 2014), firm mobility (Chinn and Ito 2008 obtained from Peters 
2014), and welfare expenditure per inhabitant (U.S. Bureau of the Census various years-a 
obtained from Peters 2014). I also include state and year fixed effects in some models in order to 
control for any state-specific and temporal effects not already accounted for in the model. The 
inclusion of these fixed effects results in an exceptionally conservative test of my hypotheses.  
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of probit models, estimated with robust standard errors 
clustered by Senator. Models 1 through 3 in Table 2 are the base models for permanent resident, 
temporary resident, and guest worker votes, respectively. Models 4 through 6 in Table 2 
demonstrate that the results in the first three models are robust to the inclusion of state and year 
fixed effects. Finally, Models 1 through 3 in Table 3 demonstrate that the effects of rights on 
immigration policy preferences are robust to the inclusion of standard control variables. The 
results illustrate that as anticipated the type of admission policy in question has a significant 
effect on the likelihood that Members of Congress support policies that liberalize immigration. 
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Table 2. Senate Votes on Immigration Bills and Amendments 
 
Model 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 
Sample Permanent 
Resident 
Temporary 
Resident 
Guest 
Worker 
Permanent 
Resident 
Temporary 
Resident 
Guest 
Worker 
       
DW-
NOMINATE 
1st Dimension 
  
-1.423*** 
(0.097) 
1.080*** 
(0.126) 
0.637*** 
(0.096) 
-1.322*** 
(0.131) 
1.372*** 
(0.254) 
0.417*** 
(0.116) 
DW-
NOMINATE 
2nd Dimension 
  
-0.502*** 
(0.061) 
0.014 
(0.092) 
0.009 
(0.065) 
-0.381*** 
(0.091) 
0.178 
(0.199) 
-0.150* 
(0.0756) 
Constant 0.048 
(0.029) 
0.766*** 
(0.043) 
0.005 
(0.029) 
0.581* 
(0.248) 
0.056 
(0.388) 
-0.406 
(0.270) 
       
n 3880 1158 2711 3880 1134 2711 
Pseudo R2 0.1047 0.0726 0.0257 0.1833 0.3036 0.0972 
State/Year 
Controls 
N N N Y Y Y 
Correctly 
Predicted 
65.696% 76.252% 60.015% 71.881% 84.744% 64.183% 
PRE 28.594% 0% 19.584% 41.469% 37.089% 27.967% 
Table reports probit coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by Senator in parentheses below. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed values) 
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Table 3. Senate Votes on Immigration Bills and Amendments, Additional Controls 
 
Model 3.1 3.2 3.3 
Sample Permanent 
Resident 
Temporary 
Resident 
Guest 
Worker 
    
DW-NOMINATE 1st Dimension -1.400*** 
(0.127) 
1.179*** 
(0.168) 
0.463*** 
(0.124) 
DW-NOMINATE 2nd Dimension -0.254** 
(0.082) 
0.043 
(0.130) 
-0.310*** 
(0.092) 
Percent Foreign Born 1.380* 
(0.659) 
0.260 
(0.926) 
-0.248 
(0.656) 
Unemployment -0.050** 
(0.018) 
-0.055 
(0.042) 
0.022 
(0.021) 
Percent Salaried Workers 0.170 
(0.098) 
-0.592 
(0.460) 
0.204 
(0.586) 
Agriculture as a percent of GSP -0.042 
(0.022) 
0.041 
(0.033) 
0.051** 
(0.016) 
Trade Openness -10.042 
(5.814) 
-80.538*** 
(19.055) 
-127.989*** 
(16.644) 
Firm Mobility 0.459 
(0.336) 
3.323*** 
(0.708) 
6.625*** 
(0.813) 
Welfare Expenditure per Inhabitant -0.001** 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.0002) 
Southern Border -0.123 
(0.143) 
-0.030 
(0.189) 
0.034 
(0.124) 
Region: Midwest 0.159 
(0.127) 
-0.188 
(0.176) 
-0.244* 
(0.120) 
Region: West 0.220† 
(0.123) 
-0.165 
(0.186) 
0.183 
(0.120) 
Region: South -0.053 
(0.117) 
-0.179 
(0.166) 
0.025 
(0.127) 
Constant 9.350 
(5.327) 
74.799*** 
(17.629) 
114.801*** 
(15.140) 
    
n 2967 978 1820 
Pseudo R2 0.1330 0.1139 0.0720 
State/Year Controls N N N 
Correctly Predicted 67.341% 74.438% 62.967% 
PRE 32.896% -2.457% 22.617% 
Table reports probit coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by Senator in parentheses below. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed values) 
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The central result is that the sign on legislator left-right position (1st dimension of DW-
NOMINATE) switches from negative to positive and remains significant when we move from 
permanent resident admissions (long-term migrants with access to many social rights) to 
temporary resident and guest worker admissions. This finding is robust to the inclusion of state 
and year fixed effects. Substantively, and consistent with my expectations, this suggests that 
increasing levels of conservatism increase the likelihood of voting in favor of admission 
liberalization for migrants who have limited employment rights, no recourse to social services, 
and only permitted a limited duration of stay, but decrease the likelihood of voting in favor of 
admission liberalization for migrants who will have full employment rights, access to 
redistributive services, and unlimited right to reside. This fits clearly with the ideological profile 
of rightists outlined above. Indeed, these results are consistent with the hypotheses outlined 
above: where migrants are extended social rights, as they are in permanent resident programs, 
increasing levels of conservatism yield decreasing support for immigration policy liberalization, 
and where migrants are not extended social rights, as is the case under temporary resident and 
guest worker programs, increasing levels of conservatism yield increasing support for 
immigration policy liberalization. 
While the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE captures positions on multiple issues, as 
discussed above, the second dimension accounts for position on issues that divide the parties 
internally. To the extent that the predominant left-right dimension inadequately explains 
preferences over admissions liberalization, we ought to observe the second dimension of DW-
NOMINATE as being significant and negative for permanent resident programs. As anticipated, 
I find that increasing levels of cultural conservatism along the second, orthogonal dimension 
result in decreased likelihood of voting to liberalize permanent resident admissions and that the 
  
82 
second dimension has no significant effect on preferences over temporary resident admissions. 
This is an interesting finding for the study of American politics, as the second dimension has 
been of decreasing importance since the civil rights era. Counter to expectations, however, 
legislator second dimension position has a significant and negative effect on voting to liberalize 
guest worker admissions. One plausible explanation for this unexpected result is that guest 
worker programs have frequently been considered in conjunction with legalization proposals as a 
method of regularizing the undocumented without granting these individuals permanent 
residence. Indeed, punitive approaches to law and order are routinely highlighted as a 
characteristic of authoritarian positions on the second ideological dimension across the Western 
world. In later revisions, I intend to examine the explanation by including a control for 
contemporaneous legalization proposals.  
Overall, legislator ideology is least well suited to explaining voting patterns over 
temporary resident programs, which is clear from the proportionate reduction in error statistics in 
each model. In fact, the basic model (Model 4.2) is no better at predicting legislator voting 
patterns than simply predicting the modal category. Including state and vote dummy variables 
increases the predictive power of these models significantly. This should not be surprising, as 
temporary resident programs are a compromise position between the extension of expansive 
rights and granting very limited rights and are therefore often the result of compromise between 
groups that are willing to liberalize immigration policies that grant migrants opposing bundles of 
rights. Or, similarly, can be used as a method of attracting support for packages that would 
otherwise find insufficient legislative support. 
How does the central finding – that increasing levels of conservatism decrease the 
likelihood of voting to liberalize permanent resident programs but increase the likelihood of 
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voting to liberalize temporary resident and guest worker programs – fare over time? As 
demonstrated in Table 4, the results for the permanent resident and guest worker samples remain 
remarkably stable when examined decade-by-decade. In all decades in which the Senate voted on 
permanent resident and guest worker programs, increasingly conservative Senators were less 
(more) likely to vote in favor of liberalizing permanent resident (guest worker) programs. The 
results are far less consistent for votes over temporary resident program liberalization. As noted 
above, this should be somewhat unsurprising because temporary resident programs can be used 
by either the left (right) to persuade moderates from the right (left) to support an immigration 
package that would otherwise fail to garner enough support.  
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Table 4. Senate Votes on Immigration Bills and Amendments, by Decade 
 
  1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
        
Permanent 
Resident 
DW-NOMINATE 
1st Dimension 
-1.826*** 
(0.224) 
-1.024*** 
(0.286) 
 -0.241* 
(0.103) 
-0.782*** 
(0.165) 
-3.141*** 
(0.176) 
 DW-NOMINATE 
2nd Dimension 
-0.592*** 
(0.097) 
-1.944*** 
(0.220) 
 -0.144* 
(0.062) 
-0.703*** 
(0.155) 
-0.689*** 
(0.178) 
 Constant -0.148** 
(0.057) 
0.851*** 
(0.103) 
 0.001 
(0.035) 
0.0206*** 
(0.065) 
0.062 
(0.064) 
        
 n 415 260 0 1453 495 1257 
 Pseudo R2 0.1272 0.3135  0.0038 0.0641 0.4320 
        
Temporary 
Resident 
DW-NOMINATE 
1st Dimension 
  -1.909*** 
(0.295) 
-2.379*** 
(0.233) 
3.485*** 
(0.518) 
2.587** 
(0.330) 
 DW-NOMINATE 
2nd Dimension 
  -0.181 
(0.151) 
1.237*** 
(0.202) 
-0.405* 
(0.205) 
-0.293 
(0.186) 
 Constant   0.505*** 
(0.083) 
1.417*** 
(0.097) 
0.789*** 
(0.177) 
1.286*** 
(0.126) 
        
 n 0 0 181 196 294 487 
 Pseudo R2   0.1463 0.3345 0.4962 0.2996 
        
Guest 
Worker 
DW-NOMINATE 
1st Dimension 
0.983** 
(0.360) 
1.074*** 
(0.111) 
 1.162*** 
(0.131) 
 0.366** 
(0.121) 
 DW-NOMINATE 
2nd Dimension 
-0.565*** 
(0.167) 
0.499*** 
(0.085) 
 0.308*** 
(0.080) 
 -0.692*** 
(0.117) 
 Constant -0.162 
(0.089) 
0.222*** 
(0.042) 
 -0.149*** 
(0.044) 
 0.077 
(0.045) 
        
 n 152 728 0 570 0 1261 
 Pseudo R2 0.0721 0.0710  0.0572  0.0538 
Table reports probit coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by Senator in parentheses below. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed values) 
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The results thus far suggest a significant impact of legislator ideology on support for 
different types of immigration reform.  However, the probit coefficients reported in the above 
tables do not provide an intuitive or substantive understanding about the effect of legislator 
ideology on preferences over various types of immigrant admissions policies. Table 5 presents 
the predicted probabilities of various legislator types voting to liberalize different types of 
admissions policies. These predicted probabilities were calculated using Models 2.1 to 2.3 in 
Table 226 and allow us to make meaningful interpretations about the varying effect of legislator 
ideology on support for immigration by admissions policy type. Throughout Table 7, liberals are 
identified as legislators in the 25th percentile of the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE in the 
period under study, moderates are identified as legislators in the 50th percentile, and 
conservatives are identified as legislators in the 75th percentile, and the second dimension of 
DW-NOMINATE is held at its median value. 
 
Table 5. Predicted Probabilities of Voting to Liberalize Immigration Policies by Legislator Ideology and 
Immigration Policy Type 
 
 Left Moderate Right 
Permanent Residents 0.708*** 0.559*** 0.360*** 
Temporary Residents 0.654*** 0.758*** 0.861*** 
Guest Workers 0.416*** 0.486*** 0.576*** 
2nd dimension of DW-NOMINATE held at its median value. 
 
These estimates suggest that leftists are significantly more likely to vote in favor of 
liberalizing permanent resident admission policies than their rightist counterparts (0.348 
difference in probabilities), all else held equal. Conversely, leftists are significantly less likely to 
                                                 
26 Each of these is significantly different and the results do not change if I calculate these probabilities using other 
variants of the model. 
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vote in favor of liberalizing guest worker admission policies than their rightist counterparts 
(0.161 difference in probabilities), all else held equal. Aside from considering how different 
types of legislators’ propensity for voting for the same type of policy differs, we can look at how 
a particular type of legislator’s support is likely to vary across different types of immigration 
policy. The results in Table 5 suggest that leftist Senators are significantly more likely to vote in 
favor of a permanent resident program than a guest worker program (0.292 difference). 
Conservatives, by contrast, are significantly more likely to vote in favor of a guest worker 
program than a permanent resident program (0.216 difference in probabilities). As these 
predicted probabilities make clear, the differences between the same types of legislator across 
different types of immigration policy and between different legislator types across the same type 
of immigration policy is not only statistically significant, but also substantively important. Figure 
2 demonstrates the key result graphically, showing that the probability of voting to liberalize 
permanent resident admissions decreases as a function of increasingly conservative ideology, but 
the probability of voting to liberalize temporary resident and guest worker admissions increase 
as a function of increasingly conservative ideological position. 
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Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Voting to Liberalize Various Immigration Policies at Increasing Values of 
Economic Ideology for Cultural Moderates 
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Perhaps more theoretically important for the purposes of political coalition building and 
policy-making is the behavior of moderates. As shown in Table 5, moderates are significantly 
less likely to vote in favor of permanent resident programs than are leftists, but are significantly 
more likely to do so than rightists. Moreover, moderates are significantly more likely to vote in 
favor of guest worker programs than their leftist counterparts, and significantly less likely to vote 
in favor of guest worker programs than their rightist counterparts.  
 The evidence presented in this chapter has been supportive of the theory and hypotheses 
outlined above. Not only does ideology have a significant effect on positions over immigration, 
but the sign on this significant effect varies are a function of migrant rights, with leftists voting in 
favor of permanent resident programs, which grant an expansive bundle of rights to migrants, 
and rightists voting in favor of guest worker programs, which admit migrants with few rights. 
Support for temporary resident programs was far less clear-cut, which is likely the result of these 
programs being a compromise position between the expansive rights granted to permanent 
residents and the limited rights granted to guest workers.  
4.4 DISCUSSION 
Migrant rights appear to have an important effect on political elites’ support for liberalizing 
migrant admissions in the United States. Because variations in migrant rights condition the 
market, fiscal, and cultural effects that migrants have on the receiving society, domestic group 
interests over admission levels will vary as a function of these rights. Consistent with the 
anticipated effects on their constituents’ interests, Democratic Senators are likely to support the 
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liberalization of admissions for permanent resident programs but oppose the liberalization of 
admissions for temporary resident and guest worker programs. The opposite is true for 
Republican Senators.  
 These findings provide an essential element in understanding how societal interests shape 
immigration policy outcomes in the United States. By identifying how societal interests over 
immigration vary as a function of migrant rights, it is now possible to consider how these 
interests aggregate to affect immigration policy outcomes, which is a task I undertake in the next 
chapter.   
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5.0  IMMIGRATION POLICY OUTCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the previous chapter, I presented evidence consistent with the fundamental proposition of this 
project: that migrant rights condition societal groups’ interests with respect to migrant 
admissions. I found that leftist Senators – those who represent labor interests, support a robust 
welfare state, and value cultural diversity and progress – support the liberalization of programs 
that admit migrants with a significant bundle of rights and oppose the liberalization of programs 
that admit migrants with a limited bundle of rights, while rightist Senators – those who represent 
the interests of employers, seek to limit public expenditure, and advocate for the maintenance of 
traditional cultural values – display the opposite policy preferences with respect to migrant 
admissions. In addition, I found that significant intraparty divisions exist alongside partisan 
preferences over permanent resident program liberalization.  
Yet the simple existence of rights-based preferences over immigration liberalization tells 
us little about how these preferences affect policy outcomes. In this chapter, I consider the 
political coalitions that are likely to produce more generous admissions policies for migrants 
granted various bundles of rights. That is, under what political conditions are we likely to 
observe the liberalization of permanent resident, temporary resident, and guest worker 
admissions? I argue that permanent resident program liberalization will be most likely to occur 
when the Congressional majority is both leftist and progressive and when the President is a 
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member of the Democratic Party. Liberalization of guest worker admissions, by contrast, will be 
most likely to occur when the Congressional majority is both rightist and traditional and when 
the President is a Republican. Finally, temporary resident program liberalization will be more 
likely under right-leaning Congresses than under left-leaning Congresses. Because temporary 
resident programs grant more rights than guest worker programs and fewer rights than permanent 
resident programs, however, temporary resident program liberalization is likely to occur in 
conjunction with other forms of admission liberalization.  
5.1 IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
With almost a hundred classes of migrant admission, the United States boasts an extremely 
complex immigration control system. Each class of admission is designed to admit migrants for a 
specific purpose. As we shall see, each of the societal membership groups identified in the 
second chapter is represented among these classes of admission. The broadest distinction 
between legal classes of admission in the United States is between immigrants – those admitted 
for permanent residence – and nonimmigrants – those admitted for a temporary duration of stay. 
The former, immigrants, can be treated as synonymous with the permanent resident societal 
membership group, while the latter, nonimmigrants, includes the societal membership groups 
identified as visitors, guest workers, and temporary residents. Throughout this section, I will 
examine the development of this complex admissions system, focusing on the creation and 
evolution of permanent resident, temporary resident, and guest worker programs as well as 
identifying the modern classes of admission that fit within each of these three types. 
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5.1.1 Permanent Admission to the United States 
At what point in United States’ history is it possible to talk of a unified immigration policy? 
While common rules governing naturalization were implemented in 1790, only a year after 
federation, it was not until significantly later that the United States established a unified national 
immigration policy. In 1875, the landmark Supreme Court decision in Henderson v. Mayor of the 
City of New York determined state-level immigration policies to be unconstitutional, establishing 
federal power over immigration policy.27 That same year, the Page Act became the first federal 
immigration law to restrict migrant admissions.28 It is with these two decisions – the decision to 
override state-level immigration policies and the decision to establish a federal immigration 
policy – that the United States formed a unified national immigration policy.29 Administrative 
responsibility for immigration regulation was consolidated at the federal level with the 
Immigration Act of 1891.30  
The prevailing assumption of United States immigration policy throughout this history 
has been that migrants seek to enter the United States in order to remain indefinitely and, after a 
                                                 
27 The majority opinion, written by Justice Samuel F. Miller, argues that laws regulating immigration have the effect 
of regulating international commerce, a power constitutionally granted to the federal government. While the 
Henderson decision rested on Congress’s constitutional power to regulate commerce, in the later Ekie v. United 
States (1892), the Supreme Court held that federal authority over immigration was predicated upon national 
sovereignty (Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1980, 5). 
28 The earlier Alien and Sedition Acts provided for the detainment and deportation of “enemy aliens” and increased 
the residency requirement for naturalization from five years to 14 years, but did not limit admissions. As a result, the 
Alien and Sedition Acts are better understood as immigrant policy than immigration policy. 
29 The absence of federal immigration restrictions prior to the Page Act has led to the received wisdom that the 
United States had open borders until this period, a claim that Neuman (1993) persuasively rebuts with his discussion 
of state-level immigration policies throughout the 17th Century. My decision to use 1875 as the beginning of United 
States’ immigration policy is not intended to indicate that borders were entirely open prior to this time, but rather to 
convey that immigration restrictions prior to this period were too fractured to be conceived of as a single legal 
framework governing migrant admissions. 
30 Though it is interesting to note that, despite the early establishment of national naturalization requirements, 
administrative responsibility for naturalization was not consolidated at the federal level until after the 1906 
Naturalization Act. 
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period of time, become citizens – full members of society. Indeed, the most significant barrier to 
naturalization – and thus to becoming a full member of American society – is obtaining 
permanent residence. Because admission as a permanent resident is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for naturalization, the application for permanent residence is significantly 
more arduous. This presumption of immigrant intent has been codified in section 214(b) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, which states: “Every alien […] shall be presumed to be an 
immigrant until he establishes […] that he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status.” That is, those 
seeking admission to the United States will be evaluated according to the standards set for 
admitting those who would become a full member of American society, unless they can 
demonstrate that they are only entering for temporary purposes. As a result, early efforts to 
restrict admissions, which are documented in Table 6, focused on excluding those considered to 
be unsuitable to become permanent members of American society. Early debates on admission 
thus focused on what United States’ immigration law would come to term “immigrants,” 
analogous for present purposes with the permanent resident group of migrants identified in this 
dissertation.   
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Table 6. Categorical Exclusions from Admission 
Year Legal Basis Excluded Classes 
1875 Page Act (§ 5) Criminals 
Prostitutes 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act Chinese Laborers 
Immigration Act (§ 2) Convicts 
Lunatics 
Idiots 
Those unable to support themselves without becoming a 
public charge 
1887 Contract Labor Law 
amendment31 
Contract Laborers 
1891 Immigration Act32 (§ 1) Classes excluded in earlier acts 
Insane Persons 
Paupers 
“Persons suffering from a loathsome or dangerous 
contagious disease” 
Those who have committed “crimes of moral turpitude” 33 
Polygamists 
Those “likely to become a public charge” (LPC)34 
Assisted migrants35 
1903 Immigration Act (§ 2) Classes excluded in earlier acts 
Epileptics 
Those who had been insane within the prior five years 
Those who had been insane twice irrespective of time 
Professional Beggars 
                                                 
31 The 1885 Contract Labor Law punished those who contracted foreign labor (§ 1 and § 3), punished those who 
knowingly transported contract laborers (§ 4), and rendered all such contracts null and void (§ 2). It was not until the 
1887 amendment, however, that contract laborers were added to the list of excludable aliens. 
32 This is the first statute that provides for deportation rather than simply debarment, meaning that an individual later 
discovered to have entered the United States in violation of the law could be expelled. Foreign nationals who 
became a public charge within one year of admission were deemed to have entered the United States in violation of 
the law if recourse to public services was caused by conditions predating admission. Expulsion was subject to a one-
year statute of limitations. 
33 Like the earlier 1882 Act, the 1891 Act makes exceptions for political offenders (§ 1, Proviso 1). 
34 Note the subtle semantic change from the 1882 public charge exclusion. The 1891 Act expanded exclusion from 
those who would certainly have to rely on public assistance to those who would likely have to rely on public 
assistance. This provision was strengthened under the 1903 Act, which provided for deportation of those who 
became public charges within two years of admission “for causes existing prior to their landing.” Later this two-year 
rule would be changed to five years. 
35 The Act defined assisted migrants as “any person whose ticket or passage is paid for with the money of another or 
who is assisted by others to come, unless it is affirmatively and satisfactorily shown on special inquiry that such 
persons does not belong to one of the foregoing excluded classes” (§ 1). This appears to be an attempt to strengthen 
the exclusion of contract laborers, as the Act goes on to clarify that this provision does not apply to an individual 
paying for the passage of a friend or family member. 
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Table 6 (continued). 
  Anarchists 
Those who seek to over throw the US government 
Those “who procure or attempt to bring in prostitutes or 
women for the purposes of prostitution” 
Those deported as contract laborers within the prior year 
Aliens accompanying a debarred alien 
1907 Immigration Act (§ 2) Classes excluded in earlier acts 
Imbeciles 
Feeble-Minded Persons 
Those with tuberculosis 
Those otherwise “mentally or physically defective”36 
Those “who admit their belief in the practice of polygamy” 
Unaccompanied children under 16 
1917 Immigration Act (§ 3) Classes excluded in earlier acts37 
Those who had been insane at any previous time38 
Those with “constitutional psychopathic inferiority” 
Alcoholics 
Vagrants 
Those affiliated with anarchist organizations 
Those supported by “the proceeds of prostitution” 
Stowaways 
Those from the “Asiatic Barred Zone” 
The Illiterate39 
 
  
                                                 
36 Such a determination was to be made by the examining physician upon arrival and applied specifically to cases in 
which “such mental or physical defect being of a nature which may affect the ability of such alien to earn a living.” 
37 With the 1917 Act, immigrants could be deported for becoming a public charge within five years of admission 
unless they can demonstrate that their need to access public assistance developed after admission to the United 
States. 
38 Note that this provision is more restrictive than those included in the 1903 and 1907 Acts. 
39 “aliens over sixteen years of age, physically capable of reading who cannot read the English language, or some 
other language or dialect, including Hebrew or Yiddish” 
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As demonstrated in the previous table, federal immigration restrictions ramped up in the 
decades following 1875, initially implementing categorical limitations barring specific groups 
from admission – including Chinese laborers, “imbeciles,” prostitutes, and anarchists – and 
hitting a crescendo with the 1921 Emergency Quota Act. In addition to the existing categorical 
limitations, the Emergency Quota Act introduced sweeping quantitative restrictions on 
admissions, limiting the annual admission of migrants from the Eastern Hemisphere to 3% of the 
number of their co-nationals living in the United States in 1910 – subject to an overall 350,000 
limit – and continuing the prohibition on Asian migration. This Act was extended until 1924, at 
which time the 1924 Immigration Act established the National Origins System of admission. 
Built on the foundation of the 1921 Act, the 1924 Act maintained the nation-based quotas 
established in the 1921 Act, but further limited admissions by restricting national quotas to 2% of 
1890 levels, setting the overall cap on immigrant admissions just shy of 165,000. Despite 
additional changes to the quota, the National Origins System remained the foundation of United 
States’ immigration law until 1952. 
The passage of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act) did 
not, however, entirely dismantle the national origins system. Rather, it introduced a preference 
system for admitting skilled migrants and family members of United State’s citizens to function 
alongside the national origins system. As a result, those seeking admission to permanent 
residence under the McCarran-Walter Act had to cross three significant hurdles. First, the 
applicant had to establish an affirmative case for admission based on skill or family 
reunification. Second, he or she had to demonstrate that he or she was not among the excludable 
classes deemed to be unsuited to full membership in American society. Third, the annual quota 
set for the applicant’s national group must not have been reached. 
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In 1965, a new Immigration and Nationality Act (Hart-Celler Act) finally did away with 
the race-based system that had prevailed since 1921. Under this new act, the preference system 
introduced under McCarran-Walter would become the foundation of the system of permanent 
resident admissions that prevails today. The passage of Hart-Celler thus marks the beginning of 
the modern American immigration regime. 
While the preference categories and their associated quotas have been altered in the time 
since the 1965 INA, the broad contours remain the same. Last amended significantly by the 
Immigration Act of 1990, the contemporary preference system provides for admission to 
permanent residence for four broad purposes: family reunification, employment, humanitarian 
need, and diversity.40 An annual quota of 416,000 to 675,000 exists for immigrants subject to 
numerical limitations,41 the majority of which – between 54% and 72% – are reserved for 
family-based migrants (Monger and Yankay 2014). From 2004 to 2013 there has been an 
average of over 1 million new residents admitted annually, 58% of which were already residing 
in the United States under temporary classes of admission (U.S. Office of Immigration Statistics 
2014). Among all new permanent residents, approximately 65% were admitted under family-
based programs, 15% under employment-based programs, and 14% under humanitarian 
programs. The remaining 6% were admitted under various smaller programs, including the 
diversity program. Finally, no more than 7% of admissions in a given year from a given category 
                                                 
40 Introduced in 1990, the diversity category of immigrant visas grants permanent residence to a limited number (up 
to 50,000 annually across all recipient countries) of foreign nationals from countries whose nationals have received 
fewer than 50,000 family- and employment-based immigrant visas within the preceding five years (Monger and 
Yankay 2014, 2). 
41 Immediate relatives and political asylum seekers are the only substantial groups exempt from numerical 
limitations. 
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may come from a single country, a rule that only routinely impacts nationals42 of the largest 
sending states – China, India, Mexico, and the Philippines. Table 7, below, details the categories 
of resident admission and the annual quotas assigned to each category. 
  
                                                 
42 Technically, this only applies to foreign nationals who are chargeable to these states. Chargeability is typically 
determined by country of birth as opposed to country of citizenship so as to preclude those seeking admission to the 
United States from obtaining another citizenship for the primary purpose of obtaining admission to the United 
States. Exceptions to this rule do apply, particularly in cases of “cross-chargeability,” which accounts for the country 
of birth of one’s family members and is an attempt to limit family separation. 
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Table 7. Contemporary Classes of Resident Admission in the United States 
Purpose Category Description Quota43 
Family 
Reunification 
None 
  
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens44 Unlimited 
Worldwide  226,000 to 
480,00045 
  
First Unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens 23,40046 
  
Second Spouses and unmarried children of permanent 
residents 
114,200 to 
368,20047 
  
Third Married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens 23,40048 
  
Fourth Siblings of U.S. citizens 65,00049 
    
Employment Worldwide  140,00050 
  
First Priority workers 40,04051 
  
Second Professionals with advanced degrees 40,04052 
  
Third Skilled, professionals, and unskilled workers 40,04053 
  
Fourth Special immigrants54 9,94055 
  
Fifth Investors56 9,94057 
    
Humanitarian 
Need 
Refugees  70,000 
  
Asylum 
Seekers 
  
 Unlimited 
Diversity Worldwide  50,000 
                                                 
43 Table lists the basic annual quota for each category of admission. However, the quota for any given year is a 
function of several factors. See Monger and Yankay (2014, 6). 
44 Includes spouses, parents, and minor children. 
45 Plus unused employment-based visas  (8 U.S. Code § 1151(c)(3)(C)). 
46 Plus unused visas from the family-based fourth preference category  (8 U.S. Code § 1153(a)(1)). 
47 Plus unused visas from the family-based first preference category  (8 U.S. Code § 1153(a)(2)). 
48 Plus unused visas from the family-based first and second preference categories  (8 U.S. Code § 1153(a)(3)). 
49 Plus unused visas from the family-based first, second, and third preference categories  (8 U.S. Code § 1153(a)(4)). 
50 Plus unused family-based visas  (8 U.S. Code § 1151(d)(2)(C)). 
51 Not to exceed 28.6% of the worldwide employment-based quota plus unused visas from the employment-based 
fourth and fifth preference categories (8 U.S. Code § 1153(b)(1)). 
52 Not to exceed 28.6% of the worldwide employment-based quota plus unused visas from the employment-based 
first preference category (8 U.S. Code § 1153(b)(2)). 
53 Not to exceed 28.6% of the worldwide employment-based quota plus unused visas from the employment-based 
first and second preference categories (8 U.S. Code § 1153(b)(3)). 
54 Including religious workers, members of the U.S. armed forces, and physicians, among others. 
55 Not to exceed 7.1% of the worldwide employment-based quota (8 U.S. Code § 1153(b)(4)). 
56 The so-called “millionaire visa” grants permanent residence to foreign nationals who have invested at least $1 
million in a new commercial enterprise, created ten new jobs, or preserved at least 10 jobs in a troubled business. 
57 Not to exceed 7.1% of the worldwide employment-based quota (8 U.S. Code § 1153(b)(5)). 
  
100 
 
5.1.2 Temporary Admission to the United States 
This should not imply that early American immigration laws ignored the phenomenon of 
temporary migration. As early as 1819, the Steerage Act distinguished between temporary 
visitors and permanent immigrants and required ships arriving at a port of entry to furnish the 
port’s Collector of Customs with a passenger manifest. With the 1855 Passenger Act, ships were 
required to report immigrant – or permanent – arrivals separately from temporary arrivals.58 The 
primary purpose of these Acts, however, was to ensure the health and safety of those traveling in 
steerage class as opposed to either documenting migration flows or regulating admission. It was 
not until 1906 that the distinction between temporary visitors and permanent immigrants began 
to carry enforceable legal weight. With the passage of the 1906 Naturalization Act, foreign 
nationals seeking to naturalize were required to obtain a “certificate of arrival,” which was used 
not only to establish duration of residence, but also as evidence of lawful admission as a 
permanent immigrant (Winnings 1945, 174). It is at this point that we can begin to differentiate 
between the legal categories of immigrants – those who intend to remain indefinitely in the 
United States – and nonimmigrants – those who intend to return home after a period of stay. 
The legal distinction between immigrants and nonimmigrants has only increased in 
importance since this time, and this distinction remains the foundation of foreign national 
admissions to the United States. The 1924 National Origins Act required that foreign nationals, 
                                                 
58 In these earlier laws, ships were required to report on steerage passengers, but not “cabin passengers” – those 
traveling in first or second-class cabins.  
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both immigrant and nonimmigrant, obtain a visa at their local embassy or consulate prior to 
departing for the United States. The granting of an immigrant visa would permit the foreign 
national to become a permanent resident of the United States and, after a period of five years, 
apply for naturalization. Admission under a nonimmigrant visa, by contrast, would permit the 
foreign national to live in the United States for a temporary duration of time and only insofar as 
he or she maintained his or her status.59 Until 1952, any nonimmigrant who wished to become an 
immigrant would be required to return to his or her home country, apply for an immigrant visa 
while there, and, if approved, subsequently enter the United States on that immigrant visa. 
Despite the generally restrictive nature of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-
Walter), this is the first statute that provides for conditions under which nonimmigrants may 
apply for an “adjustment of status.”60 
The Immigration Act of 1917 was the first attempt to unify United States’ immigration 
policies under a single legal framework. This Act provided the legal basis for the first American 
guest worker programs. While the 1917 Act upheld the 1885 Alien Contract Labor Laws,61 the 
Ninth Proviso of the Act permitted American employers to contract alien labor from abroad if 
                                                 
59 First appearing in the 1917 Immigration Act and continuing to be an important component of US immigration law 
today, the maintenance of status provision states that a foreign national admitted to the US for a particular purpose 
may only lawfully remain in the US while he or she continues to fulfill that purpose. For example, a foreign national 
admitted as a nonimmigrant for the purpose of representing his or her home government is only permitted to remain 
in the United States if he or she continues to be employed in such a capacity by his or her home government. The 
same is true for all categories of temporary admission. 
60 “Adjustment of status” is the legal term given to the process by which a foreign national may apply for an 
immigrant visa from within the United States after being admitted under a nonimmigrant visa. 
61 The 1885 Alien Contract Labor Laws prohibited American employers from soliciting and contracting foreign 
labor living abroad, but permitted these same employers to hire foreign labor that had already arrived in the United 
States. That is, an American employer could not advertise in Europe for labor and import that labor to the United 
States under the promise of employment, but that same employer could hire Europeans already in the United States 
to work that same job. 
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the Secretary of Labor determined that there was a domestic labor shortage.62 Workers admitted 
under the Ninth Proviso of the 1917 Act were granted very limited rights, including sectoral and 
employer limitations. Authorization to hire under the Ninth Proviso was granted to employers 
within particular sectors who were then given permission to contract labor from abroad (most 
commonly, Mexico63). Those admitted were limited to working for the sponsoring employer, 
who was subject to penalties if contract laborers broke their contracts and failed to return to 
Mexico. As a safeguard against contract laborers breaking their contract with the employer and 
absconding, employers were permitted to withhold a portion of daily wages from the laborer, 
payable upon completion of the contract and repatriation (Scruggs 1960); many contract laborers 
never received the withheld wages even once these conditions had been fulfilled. This Ninth 
Proviso authorization permitted the importation of contract labor to work on the railroads from 
1917 to 1918 and in agriculture from 1917 to 1921, with provisions for further admissions under 
specified conditions. Throughout this authorization under the Ninth Proviso, almost 80,000 
Mexican contract laborers were admitted. The Ninth Proviso clearly falls under the category of 
guest workers, as these migrants were admitted with the right to work, but lacked broader 
economic, social, and political rights. 
As the preceding discussion suggests, the use of guest worker programs in the United 
States can be traced back to 1917. As detailed in Table 8, there have been multiple other 
                                                 
62 The Ninth Proviso of the 1917 Immigration Act (§ 3) reads: “Provided further, That skilled labor, if otherwise 
admissible, may be imported if labor of like kind unemployed can not be found in this country, and the question of 
the necessity of importing such skilled labor in a particular instance may be determined by the Secretary of Labor 
upon the application of any person interested, such application to be made before such importation, and such 
determination by the Secretary of Labor to be reached after a full hearing and an investigation into the facts of the 
case.” 
63 Based upon the Dillingham Commission report (Immigration Commission 1911), Mexicans were viewed as a 
more appropriate source of contract labor than were Europeans or Asians. Because of the relative proximity to 
Mexico and the concomitant ease in returning home, Mexican migration was thought to be truly temporary.  
  
103 
significant programs through which the United States has admitted guest workers, some of which 
continue today. The most well known of these programs, the Bracero Program, ran from 1942 to 
1964 and was initially authorized under the Ninth Proviso in conjunction with a series of 
bilateral agreements with Mexico and later received Congressional approval under numerous 
different bills. Throughout the duration of the Bracero Program, approximately 4.6 million 
contracts were signed, admitting an estimated one to two million Mexican agricultural laborers.64 
Related programs also authorized under the Ninth Proviso and in conjunction with bilateral 
agreements admitted Mexican non-agricultural workers to work on the railroads from 1943 to 
1946 and agricultural workers from British Honduras, Jamaica, Barbados, and the British West 
Indies starting from 1943 (Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1980, 51). 
  
                                                 
64 Many workers came under multiple contracts during the program’s operation and, as a result, there were 
significantly more contracts signed than unique individuals admitted.  
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Table 8. Significant65 Guest Worker Programs in the United States 
Years Program Legal Basis 
1917- 
1923 
Contract Labor Program  Ninth Proviso of the Immigration Act, 1917 
1942- 
1952 
Bracero-Related Programs66 Ninth Proviso of the Immigration Act, 1917  
  
Bilateral agreements with sending states 
 
Farm Labor Supply Appropriations Acts (various) 
1952- 
1964 
Bracero Program67 Ninth Proviso of the Immigration Act, 1917  
  
Bilateral agreements with sending states 
 
Various Congressional Acts 
1952- 
1986 
H-2 Program68 Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952 
1961- 
Present 
Some J-1 Programs69 (Camp 
Counselor, Summer 
Work/Travel, Au Pair) 
DOS Authorization pursuant to J-1 Cultural 
Exchange provisions of the Mutual Educational and 
Cultural Exchange Act, 1961 
1986- 
Present 
H-2A Program 
H-2B Program 
Immigration Reform and Control Act, 1986 
  
                                                 
65 Excluded from this table are personal employees of foreign government officials (A-3 program, first authorized in 
the Fifth Proviso of the 1917 Immigration Act), personal employees of international organization officers and 
foreign government officials representing their state in international negotiations (G-5 program, first authorized 
under the International Organization Immunities Act of 1945), and personal employees of NATO officials and state 
representatives to NATO (NATO-7 program, first authorized under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement of 1951). 
Foreign nationals admitted under these programs are admitted to work for that sole employer. While the individuals 
were exempted from the contract labor laws prior to the 1917 Act, this Act included the additional requirement that 
individuals admitted under an exempt class must maintain their original status in order to remain within the United 
States. Thus, an individual admitted as a personal employee of a foreign government representative or international 
organization official who changed employers would not maintain his or her admitted status would be subject to 
deportation. These programs, however, are relatively small, with an average of approximately 1,600 and 1,400 
foreign nationals admitted annually under A-3 and G-5 visas from 2004 to 2013. 
66 The Bracero Program traditionally refers to the admission of Mexican agricultural contract laborers from 1942 to 
1964. Yet the legal basis for this program was essentially the same as those governing the admission of Mexican 
railroad workers, Canadian woodsmen, and agricultural laborers from the British West Indies. 
67 From the 1952 passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (McCarran-Walter), all operational programs 
classified as “Bracero-Related Programs” were subsumed under the Act’s H-2 program with the exception of the 
Mexican Agricultural labor program, which was governed under Public Law 78 from this point forward. 
68 With the exception of the Mexican Agricultural labor program, all guest workers admitted from 1952 onwards 
were admitted under the authority of the H-2 provisions in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. 
69 While the J-1 category was designed to admit temporary migrants for the purposes of cultural exchange and 
diplomacy, several programs authorized under this category are better understood as admitting guest workers as 
opposed to exchange visitors. See below for a more thorough discussion.  
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Because of the abuses of the earlier contract labor program, the Mexican government 
sought greater protections for its citizens contracted to work in the United States, and the terms 
of the bilateral agreement provided for such protections. In practice, however, the conditions of 
the programs initiated in the 1940s were little better than those of the earlier program. For 
instance, wages withheld until the end of the contract and repatriation were to be held in 
Mexican banks rather than American banks, but as with the earlier program, many contract 
laborers never received these wages even once these conditions had been fulfilled. More 
important for present purposes, contract laborers were tied to a particular employer for their 
duration of their contract and had little de facto recourse against employers who violated the 
terms of the bilateral agreement. Moreover, the safeguards against employer violations, which 
included inspections by Mexican and American officials, were seldom used and, as a result, 
protections for contract laborers were rarely enforced. More specifically, workers admitted under 
the contract labor programs initiated in the 1940s were granted the right to work for a particular 
employer for a limited duration of time, but were not permitted to change employers,70 access 
broader social rights, or remain in the United States beyond their contract. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter) introduced more 
comprehensive provisions allowing for the admission of temporary workers, including the H-2 
program, which was designed for unskilled laborers. Under the Immigration and Reform Act 
(IRCA) of 1986 (Simpson-Mazzoli Act), the H-2 program was split in two, providing separately 
for seasonal agricultural workers (H-2A) and seasonal nonagricultural workers (H-2B). The H-
2A and H-2B programs continue to the present day. While the de jure protections afforded to 
                                                 
70 Where the guest worker was contracted by the United States’ government, however, the guest worker could be 
moved from one employer to another without the worker’s consent. 
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migrants admitted under modern guest worker programs are significantly more robust than the 
protections granted to those admitted under earlier contract labor programs, workers admitted 
under these programs continue to be bound to a single employer and often do not report 
employer violations for fear of reprisals – such as employment termination – that would render 
their residence unlawful. 
At what point did the United States begin to make use of programs that admitted migrants 
under the societal membership category identified as temporary residents in earlier chapters? 
That is, migrants with broader economic rights but lacking most social rights. The Immigration 
Act of 1924 was the first statute that allowed for the blurring of lines between temporary and 
permanent admissions. Under this legislation, foreign students were admitted as “temporary 
immigrants” as opposed to nonimmigrants and, as a result, “it has been concluded that the law 
intended that [foreign students] should be admitted for a longer period of time than that granted 
to ordinary visitors, and while here be entitled to privileges similar to those enjoyed by aliens 
admitted for permanent residence.” (Griffin 1945, 224) Moreover, foreign students admitted 
under the 1924 Immigration Act were permitted to accept employment if they were otherwise 
unable to support themselves, under the condition that such employment did not interfere with 
their studies (Griffin 1945, 225). Despite this privileged position vis-à-vis other temporary 
migrants, foreign students were still required to depart the United States at the conclusion of their 
studies and, as a result, cannot be thought of as residents. 
From this point, the use of temporary resident programs has continued to grow. The 1952 
Act included provisions for nine categories of temporary admissions, including foreign 
government officials (A), temporary visitors (B), transit aliens (C), alien crewmembers (D), 
treaty investors and traders (E), foreign students (F), representatives of and to international 
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organizations (G and NATO), temporary workers (H), and representatives of international media 
(I). Since this time, the classification of temporary migrants has become increasingly complex, as 
categories have been added to account for increasingly diverse groups of foreign nationals and 
other categories have been refined and subdivided to account for the variety of foreign nationals 
that qualify under a given category. Among these numerous contemporary categories of 
temporary admission, many grant foreign nationals with the rights associated with the temporary 
resident class of societal membership advanced in this dissertation. Among the most important of 
these are the ability to change employers, the ability to adjust ones status to permanent residence, 
and the ability of a foreign national’s dependents to obtain employment authorization that is not 
tied to a specific employer. In 2013, in excess of four million foreign nationals were admitted 
under programs such temporary resident programs.  
5.1.3 Migrant Admission and Rights in the United States 
The legal classification of nonimmigrant identifies those who are permitted to enter the United 
States for a temporary period of time, yet there exists a great variety of societal membership 
groups that are admitted as nonimmigrants. With in excess of seventy-five specific categories of 
nonimmigrant admission, the United State’s Citizenship and Immigration Services identifies 
eight themes among these classifications: temporary visitors; temporary employees; treaty 
traders, investors, and professionals; students; foreign government, organization, or media 
representatives; aliens in transit and crewmembers; family of United State’s citizen and 
permanent residents; and witnesses, informants, and victims (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services 2006, 3). Only the right to enter the United States is common to all seventy-five-plus 
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categories, and those admitted under nonimmigrant programs may fit within the societal 
membership categories of visitor, guest worker, or temporary residents conditional on their legal 
class of admission. In fact, with some classes of admission, societal membership even varies by 
program of admission. 
While I detailed a general outline of the salient societal membership groups Chapter 2, 
the reality of any individual country case is almost invariably more complex. In order to identify 
which classes of admission fit within each of the ideal types of societal membership, it is 
necessary to consider what specific rights are consistent with the general classes of entry, work, 
economic, social, and political rights. In some cases, such as entry and political rights, this is as 
straightforward as identifying whether a migrant is legally permitted to enter the United States or 
vote in national elections, respectively. Yet the boundaries of each of the other groups are 
significantly more nuanced and even at times blurred. In the remainder of this section, I will 
classify contemporary classes of admission by societal membership group, indicating the various 
specific rights that provide migrants with the broader bundles of rights highlighted above. Table 
9 summarizes the societal membership classification of modern classes of migrant admission in 
the United States. 
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Table 9. Migrant Rights, Societal Membership, and Legal Class of Admission 
Rights Granted  Classification Class of Admission 
Entry Rights 
↓ Yes 
 
→ No Enemies Excluded 
Work Rights 
↓ Yes 
→ No Visitors Visa Waiver Program 
B-1, B-2 
C 
D 
F-3 
H-371 
I 
J-1 (secondary school 
students) 
M-3 
 
Economic Rights, includes: 
Change of Employer; or 
Dependent May Work; or 
Adjustment of Status 
↓ Yes 
→ No Guest Workers A-3 
G-5 
H-1B1 
H-2A, H-2B 
J-1 (au pair, camp counselor, 
and summer work/travel)72 
NATO-7 
O-2 
P-1S, P-2S, P-3S 
Q-173 
 
Social Rights, includes: 
Right to reside permanently; and 
Access to public assistance; and 
Permitted to naturalize 
↓ Yes 
→ No Temporary 
Residents 
A-1, A-2 
E-1, E-2, E-3 
F-174 
G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 
H-1B 
J-1 (most categories75) 
K-1, K-2, K-3, K-4 
                                                 
71 Before the INA of 1990, H-3 status would be classified as a guest worker program. However, the INA 1990 
clarified that H-3 trainee programs should “not be designed primarily to provide productive employment.” Since this 
time, H-3 work authorization is highly restricted and may only be “incidental and necessary to training.” 
72 These J-1 programs do not permit the J-1 beneficiary to bring J-2 dependents with them. J-2 dependents are 
typically permitted to obtain employment authorization. On the au pair program, see Chuang (2013) 
73 Often referred to as the “Disney visa.” See Johnson (2011) for a full discussion of the creation and 
implementation of the Q-1 class of admission. 
74 Though the right to work is limited in itself. 
75 Where J-1 dependents (J-2) are permitted to obtain employment authorization 
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Table 9 (continued). 
   L-1A, L-1B 
M-176 
NATO-1, NATO-2, NATO-
3, NATO-4, NATO-5, 
NATO-6, NATO-7 
N-8, N-9 
O-1 
P-1, P-2, P-377 
R-1 
S-5, S-6, S-7 
T-1, T-2, T-3, T-4 
TN78 
U-1, U-2, U-3, U-4 
V-1, V-2, V-3 
 
Political Rights 
↓ Yes 
Citizen 
→ No Permanent 
Residents 
Immigrant Visa 
 
  
                                                 
76 Though the right to work is limited in itself. 
77 Excluding support staff admitted as P-1S, P-2S, and P-3S. 
78 TN visas permit professional workers from Mexico and Canada to enter the United States pursuant to the NAFTA 
agreement. While TN beneficiaries are not granted “portability,” they may apply for a change of employer from 
within the United States, and the employer may request “premium processing,” which guarantees adjudication 
within 15 days of submission, requiring the foreign national to wait only a few weeks – if approved – to change 
employers. Moreover, while TN applications are approved for three years, there is no limit to the overall duration of 
stay under TN status. (H-1B, L-1A, and L-2B workers, by contrast, are limited to an overall duration of stay of six, 
seven, and five years, respectively.) 
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Visitors, the first societal membership group granted the right to enter, are not permitted 
to work while in the United States. Classes of admission included in the “visitor” group include, 
among others, tourists admitted under the visa waiver and B-2 programs and transit aliens 
admitted under C visas. Some categories of students are best understood as visitors, including 
border commuter students from Canada and Mexico pursuing academic (F-3) and vocational (M-
3) degrees and high school students admitted under J-179 cultural exchange programs. At first 
glance, some classes of admission, including visitors for business (B-1), representatives of 
foreign media (I), and alien crewmembers (D), are less obviously consistent with the “visitor” 
classification. These foreign nationals, however, are coming to the United States for work rather 
than to work. That is, they continue to be employed by the foreign entity, but must enter the 
United States temporarily in order to fulfill their responsibilities to that entity. Those admitted 
under B-1 may, for example, be international scholars attending a conference in the United States 
or representatives of foreign companies coming to the United States for business meetings. 
B-1 also includes the domestic servant or personal employee of nonimmigrants and of 
United State’s citizens who reside permanently abroad, under the conditions that the employer 
has employed the employee for a specified period of time prior to admission and the employer is 
coming to the United States for temporary purposes. To be clear, these individuals are not 
granted the right to work in the United States. They are permitted to enter the United States for a 
temporary period of time in order to meet their prior employment obligations. This rule does not 
allow for the domestic servants or personal employees of permanent residents or United States 
citizens reestablishing residence in the United States to obtain B-1 status, as the intent is 
                                                 
79 While the J-1 class of admission is intended for cultural exchange programs, a great variety of activities are 
subsumed under this class and, as a result, different categories of J-1 admissions provide fundamentally different 
rights to the beneficiaries. 
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considered permanent rather than temporary and the United States would then become the 
primary location of productive activity (U.S. Department of State 2014, 11).  
Some classes of temporary admission are consistent with the guest worker societal 
membership group, as beneficiaries of these programs are admitted to the United States in order 
to work for a particular employer, but their duration of lawful stay is conditional on their 
continued employment with that employer and they lack broader economic rights. Seasonal 
agricultural workers (H-2A) and seasonal or temporary non-agricultural workers (H-2B) are 
clear examples of guest worker programs. Less obvious, however, are classes of temporary 
admission covering the personal domestic employees (e.g., nannies and housekeepers) of 
representatives of foreign governments (A-3), international organizations (G-5), and NATO 
(NATO-7). Beneficiaries of these programs are admitted to the United States under the condition 
that they maintain employment with the representative; unlike B-1 domestic servants, however, 
personal domestic employees need not establish prior employment with the petitioner. While 
these foreign nationals are protected under some U.S. labor laws, it is hard to imagine a more 
tenuous position than one’s lawful duration of stay being tied to an employer who is not only 
covered by diplomatic immunity, but also holds a privileged position in one’s home country. 
A final group of guest workers includes J-1 cultural exchange visitors admitted under the 
au pair, camp counselor, and summer work/travel programs. The J-1 program was created by the 
1961 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (Fulbright-Hays Act) as a Cold War 
cultural diplomacy tool and was intended to foster intercultural understanding and strengthen 
relations between the United States and its allies. While these visas are ostensibly granted for the 
purposes of cultural learning and interchange, there is significant evidence that these programs 
are often used as sources of cheap and vulnerable labor (Chuang 2013; Johnson 2011; Maitra 
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2013), something that is exacerbated by the fact that as a public diplomacy tool, these programs 
are administered by the Department of State with no Department of Labor or Citizenship and 
Immigration Services oversight. The most infamous of these programs – the Summer 
Work/Travel program – was approved in 1963 and permits foreign university students to enter 
the United States over their summer break in order to travel throughout the United States. 
Understanding that many university students would be unable to afford such a luxury, the 
program permits these students to work while in the United States ostensibly to fund their travel. 
In practice, this program has become a source of vulnerable and exploitable labor, to the tune of 
approximately 100,000 annual admissions. The program has recently come under scrutiny, after 
a series of high-profile violations including 400 J-1 workers protesting working conditions at a 
Hershey factory in 2011, reports of J-1 workers working up to 25-hour shifts at McDonalds in 
2013, and even a 2011 federal indictment alleging the use of J-1 programs to staff mafia-
operated strip clubs.  
This is not the first time that the veracity of J-1 programs as a means of cultural exchange 
has been questioned. A GAO report published in response to these concerns found that several 
programs maintained under J-1 constituted “inappropriate uses of education and cultural 
exchange visas” (Conahan 1990). When the J-1 programs faced public and Congressional 
scrutiny in the late 1980s, major J-1 employers – most importantly, Disney – were concerned 
that they would lose a significant source of labor. In response to this concern, Disney lobbied 
Congress for a new cultural exchange visa, an effort that resulted in the Q visa, which is often 
referred to as the “Disney visa.” Much like their J-1 counterparts, Q visas are guest worker visas 
masquerading as cultural exchange programs (Johnson 2011). 
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The temporary resident societal membership group includes beneficiaries of classes of 
temporary admission that provide foreign nationals with wider economic rights supplementary to 
the right to work. The clearest of these economic rights is the right to change employers, which 
provides the foreign national with some leverage vis-à-vis the employer (e.g., the ability to seek 
alternative employment without violating the terms of admission). Of the classes of temporary 
admission reserved for temporary workers, only specialty occupation workers (H-1B) are granted 
“portability,” a provision that allows H-1B employees to begin working for a new employer as 
soon as that new employer files a non-trivial change of employer petition. Some classes of 
temporary admission unrelated to the beneficiary’s vocation – including certain immediate 
family members of United State’s citizens (K status) and permanent residents (V status), 
witnesses and informants (S status), and victims of human trafficking (T status) or certain crimes 
(U status) – permit the beneficiary to accept and change employment throughout their lawful 
duration of stay. Alternatively, those admitted under a temporary class of admission may have 
access to wider economic rights through their right to apply for an adjustment of status80 to 
permanent residence (for example, H-1B, L-1A, L-1B, and O-1) or through their dependents’ 
right to obtain employment authorization, which permits the dependent to accept and change 
employment throughout their lawful duration of stay (for example, A-1, A-2, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-
4, and most J-1 programs). Each of these rights permits migrants to affect the broader labor 
market either directly, where the right is bestowed upon the principal alien, or indirectly, where 
the economic rights are granted to dependents with derivative immigration status. 
                                                 
80 Adjustment of status is a process by which foreign nationals initially admitted on a nonimmigrant visa may apply 
for an immigrant visa while within the United States as opposed to leaving the country and applying from abroad. 
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Those admitted to the United States under immigrant visas are members of the permanent 
resident societal membership group. Immigrants are admitted to the United States for permanent 
residence with access to some social programs and have the right to apply for naturalization after 
five years of residence. Prior to 1996, immigrants and citizens had virtually equal access to 
social programs. With the passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), however, immigrants became ineligible to access federal 
means-tested benefits81 – including SSI, SNAP, TANF, “full-scope” Medicaid, and CHIP – for 
five years after admission as an immigrant (National Immigration Law Center 2002). Despite 
these restrictions, immigrants continue to be granted access to many state and federal social 
programs, including HUD public housing, Section Eight programs, Title XX Block Grants, and 
Social Security (National Immigration Law Center 2002). Moreover, immigrants are eligible to 
apply for naturalization after five years of residence, and recourse to public services – including 
becoming a “public charge”82 – does not affect one’s naturalization application. 
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, the United States has developed an 
exceptionally complex system of migrant admission over the course of 140 years. Over this 
period, the classes of admission, the rights associated with these classes, and the restrictiveness 
these classes have changed dramatically. Under what conditions do we observe changes in these 
various programs? Are some political coalitions more likely to liberalize guest worker 
admissions and others more likely to liberalize permanent resident admissions? Alternatively, 
                                                 
81 With the notable exception of those admitted under humanitarian immigrant categories. Humanitarian migrants 
have access to significantly more expansive benefits as a result of their uniquely vulnerable position. 
82 The “public charge” doctrine, which has been a feature of United State’s immigration law since 1882, renders 
inadmissible those who are likely to become dependent on the government for subsistence. 
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when should we expect to observe admission liberalization for each of these types of programs? I 
turn to these questions in the next section of this chapter. 
5.2 IMMIGRATION REGIMES IN THE UNITED STATES 
The decision to amend immigration policy regimes is necessarily a complex process, which 
cannot be reduced to a single explanation. Tichenor (2002), for instance, demonstrates that 
shifting political alliances, changing institutional structures, variations in professional expertise, 
and the pressures of international crises have shaped immigration policy reform in the United 
States.  
Even when the societal context and macroeconomic conditions favor the liberalization of 
particular immigration programs, liberalization requires political coalitions that support such 
reform. In the United States, where party discipline is comparatively low, we must consider the 
ideological composition of the important actors in the policy-making process: Congress and the 
President. In the United State’s system of multiple veto points, successful reform in any policy 
area is a relatively rare event.83 The low passage rate of bills that receive congressional attention 
is hardly surprising given the United State’s legislative process. Legislative proposals must pass 
through each chamber of Congress (and their distinct committee systems84) separately. If the 
proposal successfully passes through each chamber, any differences between the two passed bills 
must be reconciled and the resultant bill passed by a majority in each chamber. Once the 
                                                 
83 Since 1973, for instance, only 4.08% of all incipient legislation has become law. 
84 In order to reach the floor, a bill must first pass through the pertinent committee, giving committee chairs 
significant gatekeeping power over which legislation will be considered. 
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reconciled bill has passed through Congress, the President must choose to sign or veto the bill. If 
the President signs the bill, it becomes law. Alternatively, if the President vetoes the bill, 
Congress must decide whether to challenge the veto. In order to successfully override a 
presidential veto, the challenge must garner the support of two-thirds of the members of each 
chamber of Congress. The pertinent actors are strategic as, for example, the President is unlikely 
to veto a bill that he believes Congress can override with ease. This caricature of the American 
legislative process demonstrates that in order to understand immigration regime liberalization we 
must consider the preferences and policy-making role of two significant actors: Congress and the 
President. 
Knowing the preferences of these important actors, it is possible to predict which – if any 
– types of immigration programs are likely to be liberalized at a given point in time. If we 
consider only policy positions on the predominant left-right ideological spectrum, we should 
expect permanent resident programs to be liberalized when the left controls these important 
positions and guest worker and temporary resident program liberalization when the right is in 
power. As observed in the previous chapter, increasingly rightist members of Congress are 
decreasingly likely to vote in favor of permanent resident program liberalization and increasingly 
likely to vote in favor of temporary resident and guest worker liberalization, results that I argue 
reflect the market, fiscal, and cultural interests of representatives and their constituents.  
Extending this argument to the outcome level, we must consider the ideological 
composition of Congress. While the ideological position of an individual member of Congress 
has a probabilistic effect on his or her propensity to support permanent resident policy 
liberalization, such liberalization attempts will only be successful if the majority of members of 
Congress share that interest in permanent resident policy liberalization. By looking at the 
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ideological position of the median member of Congress, we can observe whether the 
Congressional majority is left or right, progressive or traditional. Consistent with the preferences 
observed in the previous chapter, as the median Congressional ideological position moves to the 
right, the likelihood of permanent resident regime liberalization will decrease, while the 
likelihood of temporary resident and guest worker program liberalization will increase. 
 H5.1: As Congress becomes increasingly conservative on the left-right ideological dimension, the 
likelihood of guest worker and temporary resident regime liberalization will increase, all else 
held equal.  
H5.2: As Congress becomes increasingly conservative on the left-right ideological dimension, the 
likelihood of permanent resident regime liberalization will decrease, all else held equal.  
Similarly, positions along the secondary cultural ideological dimension should have a 
distinctive effect on the likelihood of program liberalization. The previous chapter demonstrated 
that increasingly culturally conservative members of Congress are decreasingly likely to vote in 
favor of resident program liberalization. The same trend should exist at the policy outcome level: 
as the median Congressional ideological position becomes more culturally conservative, the 
likelihood of observing permanent resident regime liberalization will decrease. The results of the 
elite-level analysis were less clear about the effect of second-dimension cultural interests on 
preferences over temporary resident admissions; where cultural ideology had a significant effect 
on these outcomes, that effect was invariably negative. Because temporary resident and guest 
worker programs do not grant social rights to migrants, second-dimension cultural ideological 
position should have no independent bearing on the likelihood of observing temporary resident 
and guest worker regime liberalization. 
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H5.3: Variations in Congressional second-dimensional cultural ideology will have no 
independent effect on the likelihood of guest worker and temporary resident regime 
liberalization, all else held equal.  
H5.4: As Congress becomes increasingly culturally conservative along the secondary ideological 
dimension, the likelihood of permanent resident regime liberalization will decrease, all else held 
equal.  
Aggregate positions on the left-right and secondary ideological dimensions do not exist 
independently of each other, suggesting that there are four ideal types of Congressional 
ideological position – left progressive, left traditional, right progressive, and right traditional – 
each of which should have a distinctive set of preferences over immigration policy outcomes. 
Second-dimension positions are expected to condition the intensity of first-dimension 
preferences across these three types of immigration policies. Consider first the most intuitive 
case – programs governing permanent resident admissions. I have argued that the left will be 
more favorable towards permanent resident program liberalization than the right and that 
progressives will be more favorable towards permanent resident program liberalization than 
traditionals. Combining these expectations, a left-progressive Congress should present the most 
favorable political conditions for permanent resident program liberalization, while a right-
traditional Congress should be the least favorable. Put another way, while leftist should generally 
support permanent resident program liberalization, left progressives will be more supportive than 
left traditionals. Similarly, while rightists should generally oppose permanent resident regime 
liberalization, opposition should be stronger amongst right traditionals than right progressives. 
Simply put, increasing cultural conservatism will amplify the effects increasingly rightist 
positions. 
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For temporary resident and guest worker programs, by contrast, increasing cultural 
conservatism should attenuate the effect of increasing conservative left-right positions. While the 
right is generally expected to be more favorable towards these programs than the left, right 
progressives will be even more likely to liberalize these programs than left traditionals. 
Similarly, among the left, culturally traditional Congresses will be even less likely to support 
temporary resident and guest worker programs than their left-progressive counterparts.  
Finally, Presidential partisanship is likely to affect the decision to liberalize immigration 
regimes, in a manner that is consistent with partisan interests. As a result, permanent resident 
liberalization will be more likely under a Democratic President, while temporary resident and 
guest worker program liberalization will be more likely when the President is a Republican. 
H5.5: A Democratic President will decrease the likelihood of guest worker and temporary 
resident regime liberalization, all else held equal. 
H5.6: A Democratic President will increase the likelihood of permanent resident regime 
liberalization, all else held equal. 
5.3 IMMIGRATION REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Are the above expectations consistent with the practice of American immigration policy 
liberalization? If so, right-leaning Congresses serving alongside Republican Presidents should 
produce bills that liberalize guest worker and/or temporary resident programs, restrict permanent 
resident programs, or both. The 1921 and 1924 Acts were both produced by right-leaning 
Congresses and signed by Republican Presidents Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, 
  
121 
respectively. The 1921 Emergency Quota Act restricted permanent resident programs by 
initiating the first quantitative restrictions on permanent resident admission and left in tact the 
1917 Proviso permitting executive authorization of guest worker programs. The 1924 Act made 
permanent the quantitative limitations introduced by the 1921 Act, introduced temporary resident 
programs, and again left the 1917 Ninth Proviso unscathed. The 1952 Walter-McCarran Act 
went a step further by continuing to restrict permanent resident admission while simultaneously 
liberalizing temporary resident and guest worker admissions. A right-leaning Congress passed 
this Act over Democratic President Harry Truman’s veto. 
Left-leaning Congresses serving alongside Democratic Presidents, by contrast, should 
produce bills that restrict guest worker and/or temporary resident programs, liberalize permanent 
resident programs, or both. The 1965 Act liberalized permanent resident programs while leaving 
temporary resident and guest worker programs untouched. This Act was passed by a left-leaning 
Congress and signed by Democratic President Lyndon Johnson. Finally, the 1986 and 1990 Acts 
both liberalized permanent resident, temporary resident, and guest worker programs and were the 
products of left-leaning Congresses and Republican Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. 
Bush, respectively. Permanent resident programs were the primary focus in each of these acts, 
while the temporary resident and guest worker provisions were of secondary importance. In fact, 
the 1990 Act restricted guest worker and temporary resident programs by capping H-1B and H-
2B programs for the first time, but simultaneously liberalized these programs by creating new 
temporary resident85 and guest worker86 programs. This brief examination of the major 
                                                 
85 The 1990 Act created the O-1, P-1, P-2, P-3, and R-1 categories of temporary resident admission. 
86 The 1990 Act created the O-2, P-1S, P-2S, P-3S, and Q-1 categories of guest worker admission. 
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immigration bills from the 20th century certainly suggests that the observed pattern of 
immigration regime liberalization is consistent with the expectations outlined above. 
5.3.1 Analysis of Immigration Regime Liberalization 
In this section, I present quantitative analysis of the determinants of successful immigration 
regime liberalization in the United States. For each type of immigration program – permanent 
resident, temporary resident, and guest worker – I have coded a dependent variable that takes the 
value of one in each year in which the regime was liberalized and zero in each year in which the 
regime was either unchanged or restricted. For each series, coding begins in the first year in 
which all three types of immigration policy existed, 1924. Following Carter and Signorino 
(2010), I estimate discrete time hazard models with cubic polynomials in order to control for the 
time dependence between liberalizing events 
In order to test the effect of Congressional ideological composition on regime 
liberalization, I use the first and second dimension DW-NOMINATE scores for the median 
member of Congress. Based on my theory, I expect effect of the first dimension of DW-
NOMINATE to be negative and significant for permanent resident programs and positive and 
significant for temporary resident and guest worker programs. In addition, I expect the second 
dimension of DW-NOMINATE to be negative and significant for permanent resident programs 
and to have no significant effect on temporary resident and guest worker regime liberalization. In 
order to account for the unique preferences of each of the four ideological ideal type Congresses 
– left-progressive, left-traditional, right-progressive, and right-traditional – I include an 
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interaction of the first and second dimension scores. Finally, I include a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the President is a Democrat and zero if the President is a Republican. 
Because immigration reform often comes as a package, with two or more policy types 
being amended at the same time, I include in each model a dummy variable for each of the other 
immigration regimes that takes the value of one if that regime was liberalized in that year and 
zero if it was not. For example, the models for permanent resident program liberalization include 
independent variables identifying whether temporary resident and/or guest worker programs 
were liberalized in that same year. 
In addition to the base models, which include all of the variables listed above, I include a 
series of models with additional controls that account for factors thought to affect immigration 
policy outcomes, including the unemployment rate (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2015) and 
foreign born as a percent of population (U.S. Bureau of the Census various years-c), for which I 
have used linear interpolation to fill in missing data points. In addition, I control for major 
geopolitical events, including wars and the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States. 
Post-September 11 is a binary variable takes the value of 1 in 2001 and in each year following. 
This variable accounts for the restrictive shift in immigration preferences that followed this event 
(Branton et al. 2011). Consistent with this account, there has been no permanent resident 
program liberalization in the post-September 11 period, which is theoretically and empirically 
important, but methodologically challenging, as this causes quasi-complete separation in the 
data. In order to overcome this problem, the results for resident regime liberalization presented 
below exclude both the post-September 11 variable and the affected observations (all years from 
2001 onwards). While the exclusion of 13.5% of cases from an already small sample is not ideal, 
it is preferable to the alternatives of simply excluding the post-September 11 variable, which 
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would induce omitted variable bias, or forcing the model to run with all observation and all 
variables, which is likely to result in a type-2 error. It is important to note, however, that the 
results of these three model specifications are virtually identical, except for in the estimated 
effect of Presidential partisanship, more about which below. 
The war variables are binary variables that take the value of 1 in years in which the 
United States was engaged in a military conflict for which the draft was used. For the sample 
under study, these conflicts include World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. These 
conflicts are particularly important for guest worker programs, as these programs are frequently 
justified on the basis of domestic labor shortages resulting from wartime conscription and, as a 
result, are expected to have a positive effect on guest worker regime liberalization. In addition, 
wars may affect permanent resident regime liberalization, though the direction of that effect is 
less clear. Where armed conflict decreases the demand for admission, Congress may choose to 
relax admissions controls. Alternatively, the influx of foreign nationals who do not meet the 
definition of refugees may result in decisions to restrict regimes. As with the post-September 11 
variable, the inclusion of the WWII and Korean War variables cause quasi-complete separation in 
the temporary resident and permanent resident models, respectively. I resolved this issue 
following the strategy specified, above. The results of these tests and corresponding average 
marginal effects are presented in Tables 10 and 11, below.  
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Table 10. Determinants of Immigration Regime Liberalization 
Model 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 
Regime Permanent 
Resident 
Temporary 
Resident 
Guest 
Worker 
Permanent 
Resident 
Temporary 
Resident 
Guest 
Worker 
       
DW-NOMINATE 1 -0.140* 0.025* 0.028† -0.344*** 0.058* 0.120** 
 (0.065) (0.011) (0.015) (0.073) (0.027) (0.040) 
DW-NOMINATE 2 -0.206† -0.034 -0.020 -0.465** -0.135** -0.121† 
 (0.108) (0.026) (0.025) (0.181) (0.051) (0.0621) 
DW-NOMINATE 1* -0.013† 0.002 0.001 -0.036*** 0.007† 0.009* 
DW-NOMINATE 2 (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
Democratic  1.266** 0.258 0.258 1.823* 0.547 1.184* 
President (0.401) (0.402) (0.404) (0.875) (0.697) (0.465) 
Permanent Resident  1.078* 0.306  2.452*** 1.375† 
Liberalization  (0.482) (0.496)  (0.634) (0.798) 
Temporary Resident  1.810***  0.406 0.848  0.230 
Liberalization (0.533)  (0.423) (0.940)  (0.393) 
Guest Worker 0.665 0.657  1.570† 2.119*  
Liberalization (0.633) (0.447)  (0.847) (0.837)  
Unemployment Rate    -1.289*** -0.245* -0.137 
    (0.364) (0.120) (0.103) 
Percent Foreign Born    0.292 0.220 -1.023*** 
    (0.488) (0.181) (0.270) 
WWII    -45.50**  1.731 
    (16.48)  (1.086) 
Korean War     1.545 0.695 
     (1.054) (0.707) 
Vietnam War    0.134 2.397† -0.996 
    (1.525) (1.284) (0.850) 
Post-September 11     0.310 4.079** 
      (0.871) (1.329) 
t 0.989 3.289 -5.112* 34.05** -7.934 -1.817 
 (2.245) (3.131) (2.583) (11.91) (5.813) (2.736) 
t2 -0.849 -2.773 3.155 -41.94** 16.36* 0.826 
 (2.435) (4.141) (2.440) (15.10) (7.731) (2.599) 
t3 0.502 0.680 -0.468 13.64** -5.378* 0.0549 
 (0.654) (1.420) (0.616) (4.973) (2.423) (0.663) 
Constant -3.713** -2.389*** 0.123 -8.193** -3.863* 6.557*** 
 (1.393) (0.688) (0.462) (2.872) (1.786) (1.701) 
       
n 89 89 89 73 83 89 
Pseudo R2 0.433 0.197 0.263 0.785 0.499 0.475 
Modal Category 88.764% 84.27% 82.022% 86.301% 83.133% 82.022% 
Correctly Predicted 93.258% 86.517% 84.27% 95.89% 92.771% 91.011% 
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Table 10 (continued). 
Reduction in Error 39.996% 14.285% 12.504% 69.998% 57.141% 50% 
       
Joint Significance 
(Χ2) 
      
DW-NOMINATE 1 5.57† 6.06* 3.25 24.13*** 4.74† 8.85* 
DW-NOMINATE 2 3.71 2.90 0.73 15.01*** 7.21* 6.50* 
DW-NOMINATE 1+ 5.62 6.35† 3.36 24.31*** 8.88* 9.39* 
DW-NOMINATE 2       
Time Count 10.46* 2.09 9.83* 8.64* 34.69*** 2.87 
Geopolitical Events    13.04** 4.83 11.11* 
Table reports probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses below. 
† p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed values) 
Table 11. Average Marginal Effects of Congressional Ideology and Presidential Partisanship on Immigration 
Regime Liberalization 
 
Model 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 
Regime Permanent 
Resident 
Temporary 
Resident 
Guest 
Worker 
Permanent 
Resident 
Temporary 
Resident 
Guest 
Worker 
       
DW-NOMINATE 1 -0.010** 0.004† 0.005† -0.007** 0.006† 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
DW-NOMINATE 2 -0.017* -0.006 -0.004 -0.019** -0.013*** -0.019* 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
Democratic 
President 
0.128** 0.050 0.051 0.087† 0.068 0.172* 
 (0.041) (0.078) (0.080) (0.045) (0.083) (0.071) 
Permanent Resident  0.294† 0.065  0.441*** 0.236† 
Liberalization  (0.158) (0.110)  (0.106) (0.142) 
Temporary Resident 0.314***  0.089 0.050  0.034 
Liberalization (0.081)  (0.100) (0.063)  (0.061) 
Guest Worker 0.089 0.151  0.099 0.351**  
Liberalization (0.086) (0.118)  (0.064) (0.117)  
Time Count -0.002 0.249 -0.460* 0.830* 0.301 -0.062 
 (0.107) (0.158) (0.197) (0.340) (0.238) (0.156) 
Table reports marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses below. 
† p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed values) 
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Consistent with the expectations outlined above, the results of these tests demonstrate 
that increasingly conservative Congresses along the primary left-right ideological dimension 
decrease the likelihood of permanent resident regime liberalization but increase the likelihood of 
temporary resident and guest worker regime liberalization, and that these results remain or 
become stronger with the inclusion of standard control variables. Throughout this discussion, I 
will focus on two important types of Congresses: leftist Congresses, defined as those in which 
the median member is in the 25th percentile of median members in the sample (DW-
NOMINATE 1 score of -0.146), and rightist Congresses, defined as those in which the median 
member is in the 75th percentile of median members in the sample (DW-NOMINATE 1 score of 
0.1075). 
In each case, the effect of the ideological position of the median member of Congress is 
not only statistically significant, but also substantively important. The average probability of 
liberalizing permanent resident programs when Congress is leftist is significantly higher (an 
increase of 0.128) than the average probability of liberalization under a rightist Congress, but is 
lower for temporary resident (by 0.099) and guest worker programs (by 0.128), respectively. 
These results remain in the full controls models, for which the same change in the ideological 
position of the median member of Congress decreases the average probability of permanent 
resident regime liberalization by 0.208 and increases the average probability of temporary 
resident and guest worker regime liberalization by 0.122 and 0.368, respectively. Put another 
way, the results of these empirical tests provide strong evidence in support of the argument that 
rightist Congresses are less likely liberalize immigration regimes that grant foreign nationals 
social rights than are leftist Congresses. Rightist Congresses are, however, more likely to 
liberalize immigration regimes that limit foreign nationals’ access to social rights than are leftist 
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Congresses. The average probability of observing liberalization in each of these regimes across 
the ideological position of the median member of Congress is presented graphically in Figure 3. 
Additionally, we can examine how different types of Congresses rank these three 
different policy alternatives. Under a leftist Congress, there is a 0.304 average probability of 
observing permanent resident regime liberalization, a 0.14 average probability of observing 
temporary resident regime liberalization, and 0.079 average probability of observing guest 
worker regime liberalization. For rightist Congresses, by contrast, these average probabilities are 
0.097, 0.262, and 0.447, respectively. These results are again consistent with the argument in the 
previous chapter, in which I posited that the right would prefer immigration policies that 
increased the labor pool while providing employers with greater freedoms and powers in 
personnel management, that are unlikely to expand public expenditure, and that limit migrant 
cultural impact, while the left would prefer immigration policies that provide sufficient rights to 
remove cost-saving benefits of hiring foreign labor over domestic labor and that increases 
societal diversity. 
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Figure 3. Average Probability of Regime Liberalization across DW-NOMINATE 1 
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As expected, the results of these models also indicate that increasingly conservative 
Congresses along the secondary ideological dimension decrease the likelihood of permanent 
resident program liberalization and has no significant effect on the initial temporary resident and 
guest worker models. However, the second ideological dimension is found to have a negative 
and significant effect on the temporary resident and guest worker models with the addition of 
controls, suggesting that the secondary ideological dimension indeed affects the likelihood of 
regime liberalization across regime type.  
I argued above that cultural interests should condition the effect of left-right ideological 
position. Plotting the average marginal effect of an increase in left-right ideological position at 
various levels of the second ideological dimension, as is done in Figure 4, indicates that there is 
indeed a conditional relationship between these variables. The negative effect of increasingly 
conservative socio-economic positions on permanent resident policy liberalization is magnified 
by increasingly conservative cultural positions, while increasingly traditional cultural interests 
dampen the positive effect of increasingly conservative left-right positions on temporary resident 
and guest worker program liberalization. 
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Figure 4. Average Marginal Effects of DW-NOMINATE 1 across DW-NOMINATE 2 
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Perhaps more intuitive, consider how the probability of liberalization changes across the 
observed left-right position of the median member of Congress. We saw in Figure 3 that 
increasingly rightist Congresses are less likely than leftist Congresses to liberalize permanent 
resident programs but more likely to liberalize temporary resident and guest worker programs. 
An observable implication of a conditional relationship between the two dimensions of the 
ideological space would be distinctive probabilities of liberalization for Congresses at different 
points on the second ideological dimension but at the same point on the first dimension. This is 
exactly what we observe in Figure 5. While the probability of permanent resident regime 
liberalization decreases as Congress becomes more conservative for both progressive and 
traditional Congresses, the rate of that decline is significantly faster for traditional Congresses 
than for progressive Congresses. In fact, the probability of permanent resident program 
liberalization is 0.124 higher for right-progressive Congresses than for right-traditional 
Congresses. This difference increases to 0.205 in the full model.  
While the average probability of temporary resident and guest worker regime 
liberalization increases as Congress becomes more conservative, the rate of that increase is faster 
for traditional Congresses than for progressive Congresses. This result is driven by the difference 
between left-progressive and left-traditional Congresses, as the average probability of temporary 
resident and guest worker liberalization is 0.300 higher in the former than in the latter.  
Across all three regime types and with rare exception, there is no significant difference 
between the average probability of liberalization between left-progressive Congresses and right-
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progressive Congresses.87 By contrast, significant differences exist without exception between 
left-traditional Congresses and right-traditional Congresses such that the former are significantly 
more (less) likely than the latter to liberalize permanent resident (temporary resident and guest 
worker) programs.  
 
 
  
                                                 
87 The exceptions being the base model for permanent resident programs, in which left-progressive Congresses have 
a 0.086 higher average probability of liberalization than right-progressive Congresses, and the full model for guest 
workers, in which left-progressive Congresses have a 0.151 lower average probability of liberalization than right-
progressive Congresses. 
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Figure 5. Average Probability of Liberalization for Progressives and Traditionals across DW-NOMINATE 1 
  
  
135 
The foregoing analysis suggest that the left is unified in its support for permanent resident 
programs, while the right is divided over these same programs and that the right is unified in its 
support of temporary resident and guest worker programs, while the left is divided over these 
same programs. These results are suggestive of the Congressional coalitions that are likely to 
produce various immigration reform packages. When considering permanent resident program 
liberalization, the left may be able find support from right progressives, but not from right 
traditionals, particularly if the left is willing to provide some concessions by permitting some 
temporary resident or guest worker program on to the reform package.  Similarly, the right may 
be able to gain support for temporary resident and even guest worker programs from left 
progressive, but not from left traditionals. The left should be more likely to acquiesce on 
temporary resident programs than on guest worker programs because of the increase in economic 
rights that comes with temporary resident admissions. 
Finally, the results demonstrate that Democratic Presidents are significantly and 
positively associated with permanent resident program liberalization across model specifications. 
On average, the probability of observing permanent resident regime liberalization is 0.128 
higher88 under a Democratic President than under a Republican President. They are not, 
however, negatively associated with temporary resident and guest worker program liberalization 
and, in the most conservative test, contrary to expectations, are positively associated with guest 
worker program liberalization. While this result is somewhat surprising, it has been robust across 
numerous model specifications, and suggests that the role of the president is more complex than 
originally anticipated. Certainly, the passage of guest worker programs over a presidential veto – 
                                                 
88 0.09 in the model with full controls. 
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as happened with the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act – plays a role in these results. However, that 
single observation does not explain this finding.89 There are at least two plausible explanations 
for this result. First, like Congressional ideological position, Presidential ideological position is 
more complex than can be accounted for by simply considering partisanship. While preliminary 
tests of two-dimensional Presidential ideological position suggest that this does not account for 
the difference, I plan to explore this relationship more thoroughly as I refine this chapter. 
An alternative, and I believe more plausible, explanation lies in the nature of guest 
worker programs. The costs and benefits of guest worker programs are rather concentrated, and 
are therefore often understood as generating interest-based politics (Freeman 2006). This may 
lead Democratic presidents to acquiesce on guest worker programs that favor narrow interest 
groups, irrespective of whether this is consistent with their general immigration preferences. This 
is something that I also plan to explore further. 
Immigration reform frequently addresses multiple programs simultaneously, a 
phenomenon that is reinforced by the results presented above. The presence of temporary 
resident liberalization is positively and significantly associated with the probability of observing 
permanent resident liberalization and, unsurprisingly, vice-versa. The same, however, cannot be 
said for guest worker programs, which is, again, likely the result of the concentrated benefits and 
costs associated with these programs. 
                                                 
89 Indeed, this result holds when 1952 is removed from the sample. 
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5.4  DISCUSSION 
Throughout this chapter I have considered the ways in which migrant rights have shaped 
admission liberalization in the United States. While migrants admitted with an expansive bundle 
of rights – including work, economic, and social rights – have market, fiscal, and societal effects 
that are beneficial to the left and costly to the right, the opposite is true of migrants admitted with 
only with the right to work. The previous chapter demonstrated that, in the United States, 
partisan preferences over immigration policy liberalization vary as a function of migrant rights, 
with Democrats supporting the liberalization of programs that benefit workers and promote 
cultural pluralism, and Republicans supporting the liberalization of programs that benefit 
employers, limit fiscal expenditure, and promote the cultural status quo. In order to understand 
policy outcomes, however, we must understand how these interests aggregate in a given political 
context. 
In this chapter, I focused on the role of Congressional and Presidential partisanship not 
only because of the representational functions of these institutions, but also because of the 
important role that these actors play in the policymaking process. Consistent with the findings of 
the previous chapter, I found that right-leaning Congresses are more likely to liberalize 
temporary resident and guest worker programs, which provide market, fiscal, and cultural 
benefits to their constituents, than permanent resident programs, which are costly to these same 
constituents. The opposite appears to be true of left-leaning Congresses. The results were less 
consistent for Presidential partisanship, as Democratic Presidents are associated with both 
permanent resident and guest worker program liberalization. While the role of the President 
requires more investigation, the results regarding the effects of Congressional partisanship 
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indicate that migrant rights indeed play a significant role in the immigration policymaking 
process. In fact, Congresses of similar ideological composition produce vastly different 
immigration regimes, conditional on the bundle of rights granted to migrants. In the following 
two chapters, I repeat this analysis across Western Europe in order to understand if rights have a 
similarly significant impact on immigration policies outside of the United States.  
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6.0  IMMIGRATION POLICY CLEAVAGES IN EUROPE 
In contrast to the United States, European states are not historically migrant-receiving states. 
While the United States has been a net-recipient of migrants throughout its history, European 
states have only become net-recipients after having completed their political, economic, and 
national development (Freeman 1995).  Indeed, most of these states did not become net-
recipients of migrants until after World War II. For many of these states, the transition from net-
sending to net-receiving state has been a significant challenge, forcing belated national dialogue 
about who belongs, the rights and obligations of newcomers, and state capacity for admission. 
Yet the European states are hardly a uniform group with respect to immigration 
experience and approach to newcomers. Freeman (1995), for example, distinguishes between the 
northern and western European states that experienced a surge in migration immediately 
following World War II – including Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom – and the southern European “new countries of 
immigration” – including Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain – that only became net-recipients in 
the 1970s and 1980s.90 Yet other states, particularly the central and eastern European states that 
have joined the European Union over the past decade, have either only very recently become net-
recipients of migrants or continue to be net-sending states. 
                                                 
90 Freeman also includes a discussion of traditional countries of immigration, comprised of the Anglo settler states 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States).  
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Other scholars highlight distinctions within these groups of states. Joppke (1999), for 
instance, distinguishes between Germany and the United Kingdom. In contrast to the United 
States, both of these countries have disavowed their position as countries of immigration, but, he 
argues, their disparate understandings of who belongs – based on an ethnic understanding of 
national membership in the former and shared civil commitments in the latter – have resulted in 
divergent approaches to migrant admission and integration. 
In the United States we saw that elite preferences over immigration varied as a function 
of migrant rights. Do these same variations exist across Europe? What about between different 
European states? In this chapter, I examine the political cleavages that serve as fault lines for the 
immigration debate across Europe, focusing in particular on how group preferences vary as a 
function of migrant impact and rights. Comparison between the United States and the European 
Union member states is one of particular importance for present purposes. Since the interwar 
period, American policymakers have had the ability to liberalize or restrict the admission of 
migrants with various bundles of rights, each of which grants the beneficiary different levels 
membership in the American community. Throughout the process of European integration, 
however, the European Union member states have become increasingly constrained in their 
ability to affect both rights and admissions. Before considering the role of migrant rights in 
shaping the politics of immigration in the European Union member states, I begin with a brief 
discussion of how European integration has limited member state capacity to affect migrant 
rights and levels of admission. 
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6.1 RIGHTS, ADMISSION, AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Throughout the European Union there are different regimes governing the rights of intra-EU 
migrants and of third-country nationals (TCNs), including importantly the right to enter and 
reside. Since the founding of the European Economic Communities (EEC), member states of the 
European Union and its predecessors91 have granted the rights associated with temporary 
residence to workers from other common market states, or intra-EU migrants. That is, since the 
1957 Treaty of Rome (Article 48, specifically), citizens of then European Union member states 
have had entry/residence, work, and economic rights in all other European Union member states. 
Alongside the free movement of goods, capital, and services, intra-community labor mobility 
was provided as a part of the common market strategy. 
Initially, the right to enter and reside in another member state was tied to active labor 
market participants and their dependent family members. A series of regulations, directives, and 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions have incrementally and dramatically expanded these 
rights in the almost-sixty years since the Treaty of Rome. In most cases, expansion of rights – 
including higher-order economic rights as well as social rights – to intra-EU migrants have been 
deemed necessary in order to ensure the effective exercise of the free movement of labor. For 
instance, EEC Regulation 1612/68 specified that, with the exception of public sector 
employment, intra-EEC migrants were to be provided equal market access to nationals of the 
receiving state and that employers could not discriminate against intra-EEC applicants in favor 
of national applicants. The most significant change in intra-EU mobility in the 1993 Treaty of 
                                                 
91 Throughout its legal history, the European Union has changed names several times, and these changes in name 
have reflected changes in its level of integration. For the sake of consistency, I will generally refer to the EU and its 
previous incarnations by its contemporary name – the European Union. 
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Maastricht, which established a common EU citizenship. From this point, the rights to enter and 
reside in other European Union member states are no longer tied to active participation in the 
market. With rare and important exceptions,92 European Union member states lack the ability to 
vary either migrant rights or levels of admission for intra-EU migration.93 The end result is that 
by virtue of common EU citizenship, the rights of intra-EU migrants are consistent with those of 
permanent residents, even where these migrants have yet to become a part of thee receiving 
community. 
Member state discretion over admissions levels and rights for third country nationals in 
the EU vary by class of TCN. Member state discretion over rights and admissions is somewhat 
limited for “intra-EU mobile TCNs”,94 who are covered by Regulation 883/2004, which requires 
that these TCNs be granted equal access with EU citizens to many public services.  The rights 
and admissions of other TCNs are governed by national legal code. It is difficult to get a sense of 
the overall mix of intra-EU migrants, intra-EU mobile TCNs, and other TCNs across the EU 
member states as the available data are abysmal by virtually any standard. Across the EU 
member states, reported data differs in availability, by the definition, coverage, and 
[dis]aggregation of each of these three groups, and by the source of the data (e.g., census counts, 
admissions numbers, work-related counts, and estimates). The last of these also varies by 
migrant group in some reporting states. While these numbers are by no means comparable, a 
                                                 
92 With respect to admissions: as applied to individuals, but not groups, these exceptions are cases in which an 
individual is a threat to national security and cases in which an individual has become an unreasonable burden on the 
state. As applied to groups, the exception occurs during the transitional arrangements following accession, which are 
the subject of the next chapter.  
93 Since Directive 2004/38/EC, this includes TCNs who are immediate or dependent family members of EU citizens. 
(European Migration Network 2013, 2014) 
94 Which includes long-term residents, highly qualified workers, researchers, and students holding Schengen visas, 
posted workers, and TCNs who are immediate or dependent family members of EU citizens. (European Migration 
Network 2013, 2014) 
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regularity across these data suggests that intra-EU mobile TCNs account for a relatively small 
proportion of migrants relative to intra-EU migrants, with the former being estimated at less than 
5% of the latter. In most cases, national laws governing the rights of other TCNs grant social and 
economic rights to these migrants once they have obtained the right to reside indefinitely (Soysal 
1994; Brubaker 1989). 
6.2 IDEOLOGICAL SPACE IN WESTERN EUROPE 
In the advanced industrial democracies, there exist two common sources of political conflict. The 
first source of political conflict – class conflict – forms the basis of the classic left-right 
ideological spectrum, with the extremes consisting of those who desire greater government 
intervention in the market (labor) on the left and those who desire a market entirely free of 
government intervention (employers and capital) on the right. Class conflict has been the central 
feature of political divisions throughout Western Europe since at least the 1920s (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967; Mair 1993). The interests of groups on either side of this cleavage are familiar and 
are explicitly predicated on material interests. Labor benefits from protection against employers’ 
cost cutting measures and from redistributive social programs, while employers and capital 
benefit from freedom over employment practices and lower levels of redistribution. While 
cultural issues also align across the left-right spectrum across Western Europe, the differences 
between the center left and the center right on social and cultural issues are generally not as 
distinct are they are in the United States. While stances on moral questions such as abortion and 
gay marriage have become integral components of partisan identification in the United States, 
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the same cannot generally be said for European party systems, where center-right parties, in both 
their conservative and Christian democratic incarnations, are frequently more socially liberal 
than the Republican party. 
More recently, we have observed increasing political conflict over what appear to be non-
material or cultural interests. This conflict has garnered significant scholarly attention, 
particularly in the study of Western Europe, where this conflict has manifested in the increasing 
prominence and even success of both ecological parties and the radical right. While some have 
identified this cleavage as one of competing postmodern interests (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1990), 
others have suggested that this cultural cleavage is the articulation of the competing interests of 
those who have gained and lost from the processes of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). 
While these scholars and others disagree as to the exact fault lines of this conflict, the importance 
of this literature for present purposes is its identification of political conflict on a cultural 
dimension. Following Flanagan (1979, 1982a, 1982b), I shall refer to this as the authoritarian-
libertarian spectrum on which authoritarians promote maintenance of traditional cultural values 
and respect for traditional authority, while libertarians pursue individual freedom and cultural 
pluralism. The clearest manifestation of this conflict is the rise of extreme right-wing parties in 
Europe, which focus on national independence from the European Union, law and order, 
decreasing immigration, extreme assimilation programs, and national security. 
In a survey of advanced industrial democracies, Flanagan and Lee (2003) have found 
attitudes on the left-right spectrum to be largely orthogonal to those on the authoritarian-
libertarian spectrum. The expansion of the individual-level political space beyond the traditional 
left-right dimension has generally been accepted by scholars studying the politics of Western 
Europe (Middendorp 1991; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009), 
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yet there exists significant debate over how this change has manifested in partisan representation 
of these interests. While some suggest that parties have adjusted to individual-level preference 
cleavages by filling vacant niches in this two-dimensional policy preference space (Kriesi et al. 
2008), others contend that party politics continues to coalesce along a single, predominant 
dimension (Oppenhuis 1995; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Van der Eijk et al. 1999; Kitschelt 
2004; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). 
Because party systems across Western Europe exhibit a significantly greater degree of 
party discipline than their American counterparts,95 the party is the appropriate level of analysis 
of elite preferences over immigration policies in this context. The reasons for this difference 
between the American system and those across Western Europe are manifold, including the use 
of confidence votes in parliamentary systems that tie individual success to that of the party 
(Huber 1996), among others.96 For these reasons, examining the preferences of individual 
representative – as was done in Chapter Four – is likely to yield little more than the party line.  
6.3 INTERESTS, RIGHTS, AND SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION 
As noted above, the rights of migrants admitted to European Union member states vary as a 
function of receiving state, sending state, and class of admission. While intra-EU migrants are to 
receive equal treatment to nationals of the receiving member state and have the right to reside 
                                                 
95 Recent scholarship has demonstrated that, on a 100-point scale, party unity in recorded votes is generally in 
excess of 95 across Western Europe (Depauw and Martin 2009) but less than 80 in the United States (Carey 2007; 
Crespin et al. 2013).   
96 There are, of course, variations in party discipline across party systems within Western Europe, and even 
variations across parties within a given party system (Depauw and Martin 2009). 
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after the conclusion of transitional arrangements,97 the same is not necessarily true of third-
country nationals (TCNs). Member state policies governing TCNs’ access to the labor market 
and to social provisions differ not only across receiving states but also by migrant class of 
admission. 
With notable exceptions, the literature on partisan preferences over immigration 
throughout Western Europe has focused on the extreme right wing nationalist parties (for 
instance, Ignazi 1992, 2003; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Mudde 
2007, 2013). While these parties demonstrably play an indirect role in national immigration 
policymaking by affecting public discourse and incentivizing mainstream parties to address this 
change (Williams 2006; Minkenberg 2002; Schain 2006), their lack of broad and consistent 
appeal suggests that their study can provide limited, albeit useful, information about whether and 
how more fundamental market, fiscal, and cultural interests affect immigration preferences. Yet 
there have also been efforts to bring mainstream parties back in to the scholarly discourse over 
immigration politics (Givens and Luedtke 2005; and the subject of a JEPP special issue: Bale 
2008a; Bale 2008b; Boswell and Hough 2008; Duncan and Van Hecke 2008; Geddes 2008; 
Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008; Marthaler 2008; Schain 2008; Smith 2008; van Kersbergen 
and Krouwel 2008). Bale (2008b), for instance, argues that parties of the cultural status quo and 
interests in limiting public expenditure, center-right parties98 should be interested in the politics 
of immigration, irrespective of the presence of pressure from the radical right. Indeed, he goes on 
                                                 
97 Existing member states may withhold the free movement of labor from citizens of new member states for a period 
of up to seven years following access. These so-called “transitional arrangements” are discussed at length in the next 
chapter. 
98 Among which he includes conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties. 
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to highlight immigration-related rhetoric by leaders across Western Europe both prior to and in 
the absence of extreme right wing parties. 
The most important work in this vein for present purposes has found that the predominant 
center-left and center-right parties across Western Europe are indistinguishable – both preferring 
restrictions – with respect to migrant admissions, but differ significantly with respect to 
immigrant policy, rights (Givens and Luedtke 2005). For these scholars, national partisan 
differences over immigrant integration are likely motivated instrumentally, by center-left parties’ 
desire to increase their potential voter base, and ideologically, to the promote ends of social 
justice and cultural pluralism. Duncan and Van Hecke (2008) extend Givens and Luedtke’s 
analysis to transnational parties in the European Parliament. In addition to finding evidence in 
support of Givens and Luedtke’s results, Duncan and Van Hecke find that immigration control 
policies divide the center-right, with liberal parties preferring fewer restrictions than their 
Christian democratic and conservative counterparts. Neither, however, examines the relationship 
between migrant rights and admissions policies. 
While the chapter on societal preferences in the United States focused on how various 
bundles of migrant rights conditioned partisan group preferences over immigrant admissions, in 
this chapter I examine partisan preferences over rights more directly. In so doing, and based on 
the theoretical foundations outlined in Chapter 3, I consider the constituent interests and related 
ideological profiles of parties likely to anticipate market, fiscal, and cultural costs and benefits 
from migration. I have argued that where migrants are granted few rights, migration will benefit 
employers, engendering support from their center-right representatives, and will be costly to the 
labor, resulting in opposition from their center-left representatives. As should be clear from the 
above discussion, however, migrants throughout the European Union – both intra-EU migrants 
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and TCNs – are granted rather expansive rights, and increasingly so for TCNs following the 
early 2000’s series of migration directives. Under these conditions, left-right ideological position 
should have a positive effect on partisan preferences over labor migration. As these rights have 
increasingly been expanded to TCNs, by contrast, rightist parties should be less likely to support 
labor migration.  
H6.1: Prior to the extension of rights to certain TCNs, increasingly rightist parties will favor 
labor migration, all else held equal. 
H6.2: Following the extension of rights to certain TCNs, increasingly rightist parties will oppose 
labor migration, all else held equal. 
Because of the extensive rights granted to intra-EU migrants and, to a lesser extent, 
TCNs, rightist and authoritarian parties are likely to express concern over the cultural effects of 
migration. Finally, these same rights are likely to elicit opposition from rightist parties seeking to 
limit public expenditure. 
H6.3: Increasingly rightist parties in Western Europe will oppose migration on the basis of 
cultural effects, all else held equal. 
H6.4: Increasingly authoritarian parties in Western Europe will oppose migration on the basis of 
cultural effects, all else held equal. 
H6.5: Increasingly rightist parties in Western Europe will oppose the fiscal consequence of 
migrant, all else held equal. 
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6.4 IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKING ACROSS WESTERN EUROPE 
In order to test the above arguments, I examine European national party positions, as detailed in 
the party’s official electoral program, on various immigration-related issues since as early as 
1979. In particular, I examine the effect of party ideological position on party position over 
migrant economic impact, migrant noneconomic impact, and the extension of social rights to 
migrants. These varying issues allow me to examine how the three fundamental sets of societal 
interests identified in earlier chapters affect preferences over immigration, particularly in a case 
in which expansive rights are routinely granted to migrants. 
Unfortunately, the commonly used Comparative Manifesto Project lacks data on party 
positions with respect to immigration, instead lumping statements on immigrants in with a metric 
on “underprivileged minority groups”99 (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). This is 
clearly not suitable for present purposes. The Euromanifesto Project, however, collects a much 
finer-grained set of party positions over immigration (Schmitt and Wüst 2012; Braun et al. 
2010). Of note, this dataset includes information about the number of positive and negative 
statements contained in official party programs for three pertinent aspects of immigration: 
economic impact, non-economic impact, and the extension of social rights. 
Modeled on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), the Euromanifesto Project 
(EMP) codes the text of party electoral programs in order to obtain comparable measures of 
party emphasis and position on a given topic. For instance, the aforementioned “underprivileged 
minority group” variable in the CMP dataset can be interpreted as the percent of space in a 
                                                 
99 The specific variable is per705. 
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party’s electoral program devoted to “favorable references to underprivileged minorities who are 
defined neither in economic nor demographic terms (e.g. the handicapped, homosexuals, 
immigrants)” (Volkens et al. 2014, 18). There are three important differences between the CMP 
data and the EMP data. First, while the CMP codes the content of party programs released in 
conjunction with national elections, the EMP codes the content of party programs released in 
conjunction with European Parliament (EP) elections. The first direct elections to the European 
Parliament were held in 1979 and have occurred every five years since that time; the EMP 
includes data on party programs for each EP election from 1979 to 2009. Because the timing of 
national elections varies across countries while EP elections occur, with rare exception,100 on a 
fixed and consistent schedule, the EMP data are comparable not only across parties in a given 
member state, but also across countries for a given election, essentially controlling for the global 
geopolitical climate. Simply put, while programs written for the 2002 German and French 
elections, for instance, were drafted under roughly the same global geopolitical climate, the same 
cannot be said for the 2007 French election, which occurred prior to the global financial crisis, 
and the 2009 German election, which occurred at the height of the same crisis. Information from 
simultaneous elections provides for better cross-country comparisons. 
A second difference between the CMP and EMP data is that the EMP provides 
information on the number of statements in a given category that are directed at the national 
                                                 
100 Exceptions occur when new member states accede to the EU in the middle of a parliamentary term. These 
exceptions include: 
• Greece acceded 1981 held EP elections that same year. 
• Portugal and Spain acceded in 1986 and held EP elections in 1987. 
• Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. While Sweden held EP elections that same year, Austria 
and Finland held EP elections in 1996. 
• Bulgaria and Romania acceded and held EP elections in 2007. 
• Croatia joined the EU in 2013 and held EP elections that same year. 
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level, the European level, the global level, and for which no governmental level is specified. As a 
result, with the EMP we can, for instance, identify the percentage of the party’s total electoral 
program directed at the European level, identify the total percentage of the electoral program 
devoted to favorable mentions of human rights, irrespective of level of government, or compare 
the volume of favorable mentions of human rights directed at each level of government, among 
others.  
For present purposes, the most important difference between the CMP and EMP data lies 
in the particular issues coded. As noted above, the EMP provides data on party positions on three 
facets of immigration. For each, the EMP includes positive and negative statements 
independently of each other. Statements about migrant economic effect are those that mention 
“labor migration and/or foreign workers in economic terms.” (Braun et al. 2010, 42) Positive 
non-economic immigration statements, which are only available in the 2009 data, are those that 
note a “need to retain or increase immigration in non-economic or unspecified terms,” while the 
negative corollary, which is available across all EP elections, notes a “need to reduce 
immigration in non-economic or unspecified terms.” (Braun et al. 2010, 44) Finally, statements 
endorsing the extension of social rights to migrants are those advocating “support or assistance 
for immigrants and foreigners,” the opposite of which is only available for 2009. (Braun et al. 
2010, 45) The dependent variables in this chapter consist of the percent of party electoral 
program dedicated to positive statements on each of these issues minus the percent of party 
electoral program dedicated to negative statements on each of these issues. 
Party ideological positions along the left-right and authoritarian-libertarian dimensions 
are the primary independent variables in this chapter. There are three commonly used methods of 
identifying party interests: analysis of media coverage (for example, Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008), 
  
152 
expert surveys (Bakker et al. 2015; Benoit and Laver 2006), and measures derived from textual 
analysis of party manifestos (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Braun et al. 2010; 
Schmitt and Wüst 2012). These methods produce some overlapping results, but also retain some 
systematic differences, and have been the subject of an extensive literature (see for example: 
Benoit and Laver 2007; Klemmensen et al. 2007; Ray 2007; Volkens 2007). Among the various 
concepts measured by each of these methods, party placement along the left-right dimension is 
the most controversial. In the models presented below, I operationalize these ideological 
dimensions using the coder rating for each party from the Euromanifesto Project dataset. In the 
economic model – the only model for which data exists throughout the history European 
Parliamentary elections – I interact left-right ideological position with a dummy variable, 2004-
2009, which takes the value of 1 for the 2004 and 2009 rounds of EP elections and 0 for all other 
rounds. This interaction will demonstrate whether, as expected, the effect of left-right partisan 
ideology changes over time. In addition, I control for the unemployment rate (European 
Commission 2011), the percent of the population that is foreign born (European Commission 
2011), and include country fixed effects. Table 12 presents the results of models estimating the 
effect of ideological positions on each of these three migration-related preferences. 
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Table 12. Role of Partisan Ideology in Preferences over Migration 
Model 16.1 16.3 16.4 
 Economic 
(1979-2009) 
Non-Economic 
(2009) 
Rights 
(2009) 
    
Left-Right 0.029 -0.229*** -0.245*** 
 (0.018) (0.069) (0.047) 
2004-2009 0.632***   
 (0.185)   
Left-Right*2004-2009 -0.095*   
 (0.038)   
Libertarian-Authoritarian -0.094*** -0.142* -0.065 
 (0.027) (0.074) (0.050) 
Unemployment Rate -0.012 -0.122 0.904* 
 (0.017) (0.463) (0.424) 
Percent Foreign Born -0.018 -0.002 0.046† 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) 
Constant 1.251 2.826 -4.524 
 (0.790) (3.526) (3.283) 
    
n 434 104 104 
R2 0.136 0.309 0.420 
    
Joint Significance (F)    
Left-Right 3.51*   
2004-2009 5.97**   
Country Dummies 1.40 1.98* 2.65** 
Table reports OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses below. 
† p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed values) 
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The results of these models provide evidence consistent with the theorized relationship 
between partisan ideology and the market, fiscal, and cultural impact of migrants granted 
expansive rights. Consider first partisan positions with respect to migrant economic impact. The 
coefficient on left-right is insignificant by itself, which is to be expected when we anticipate a 
change in sign between different periods. Notice not only that the coefficient on the interaction 
time is significant, but also that the F test indicates left-right ideological position and the 
interaction term are jointly significant, indicating that party ideology on the predominant left-
right dimension has a significant effect, but one that is conditional on the period under 
consideration. Examining the linear predictions across the left-right dimension (Figure 6) tells a 
more nuanced story about the relationship between preferences over labor migration and 
ideological position as a function of time, which is a control for shifting bundles of rights. 
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Figure 6. Linear Predictions of Immigration Positions by Left-Right Ideological Position 
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As indicated in the above figure, preferences over labor migration become more 
supportive as parties shift further to the right in the earlier period, but decreasingly so in the latter 
period, where migrant rights are particularly expansive. This is not simply an artifact of the 
chosen temporal cut point. If we re-estimate the model including an interaction term between a 
continuous variable for years, the results remain. Plotting the marginal effects of increasingly 
rightist ideological position over time from that model, as is done in Figure 7, demonstrates 
nicely how the effect of left-right ideological position changes from positive in earlier EP 
elections to negative in later elections. The rights of migrants in the EU have increased over 
time, and we can pinpoint some pivotal moments in time in this figure. Notice that left-right 
ideological position becomes insignificant for the first time in 1994, the year following the 
establishment of EU citizenship, which constituted a significant expansion in the rights of intra-
EU migrants. Then in 2004, ideological position becomes significant and negative. The 
expansion of rights throughout European integration has had and important conditioning effect 
on whether partisans on both the left and the right anticipate market benefits from increased 
immigration. 
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Figure 7. Marginal Effects of Party Left-Right Ideology on Preferences over Labor Migration over Time 
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Another interesting feature of the economic model is the significant coefficient on 
libertarian-authoritarian ideological position. While Duncan and Hecke (2008) exclude cultural 
dimension from their analysis, this is consistent with their observation that the right is divided 
over migrant admissions. Consider that conservative and Christian Democratic parties are 
typically centrist, or even leaning slightly authoritarian, on the libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension, while liberal parties tend toward the libertarian pole. It seems possible that cultural 
dimension interests may augment these left-right preferences.  
Partisan ideological positions along the left-right and libertarian-authoritarian dimensions 
have a significant and negative effect on party statements with respect to migrants’ non-
economic impact. These results are consistent with my expectations about progressive and 
conservative societal groups’ preferences over the admission of migrants granted an expansive 
bundle of rights. Similarly, partisan ideological position along the left-right ideological 
dimension has a significant effect on preferences over the extension of migrant rights. This is 
consistent with the interests of fiscal conservatives and progressives, who are expected to prefer 
policies that limit public expenditure and programs that provide a robust system of social 
protections, respectively 
There are reasons to expect that the factors that encourage parties to make negative 
statements rather than positive statements with respect to immigration, and vice-versa, are 
conceptually distinct. The assertion that parties may make only positive or only negative 
statements in regards to a particular component of immigration is certainly consistent with the 
data. Of the parties that address migrant labor market impact, fewer than eleven percent make 
both positive and negative statements, this figure is less than sixteen percent and less than six 
percent for migrant non-economic impact and the extension of rights to migrants, respectively. 
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Cursory tobit models – employed because these data are left censored at zero – suggest that this 
might indeed be a part of the explanation. In my upcoming revisions, I intend to further flesh out 
these factors. 
6.5 DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I have examined the role of partisan positions in shaping preferences over 
migration where migrants are granted extensive economic and social rights. The results were 
consistent with the expectations that, where migrants are granted expansive rights, the rightist 
(leftist) partisan representation of employers (labor), fiscal conservatives (progressives), and 
cultural conservatives (progressives) will lead parties on the right (left) to oppose (support) 
migration on market, fiscal, and cultural grounds. These results are consistent with the observed 
variations in support for permanent resident program liberalization in the United States Senate 
and, taken together, these cases provide strong evidence in support of the proposition that 
variations in migrant rights play a central role in the anticipated effects of liberalized 
immigration and, as a result, shape preferences over migrant admissions. 
 In the next chapter, I extend this examination of immigration preferences across the 
European Union to immigration policy outcomes therein. I do so by considering the choices that 
European Union member states make to voluntary liberalize the admission of intra-EU migrants. 
As in this chapter, governing elites are constrained with respect to varying rights for these 
migrants and, as a result, the outcomes should provide important information about how the 
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partisan composition of government affects the likelihood of liberalization for programs 
admitting migrants under the permanent resident category of societal membership.  
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7.0  IMMIGRATION POLICY OUTCOMES IN EUROPE 
In 2004, 2007, and 2013, following several years – and in some cases a decade – of planning and 
negotiations, the European Union (EU) welcomed thirteen new member states. Having met the 
Copenhagen Criteria – achieving democratic governance and a functioning market economy, 
respect for human rights, the rule of law, and minority protection, and having adopted the total 
body of EU law (the acquis communautaire) – these Central and Eastern European states became 
a part of the world’s most integrated regional organization. With membership, these states were 
to receive open access to the common market and the four freedoms enshrined in the Single 
European Act (SEA) of 1986 intended to facilitate this market: the free movement of goods, 
services, capital, and people. Membership for these countries, however, came with a caveat: the 
free movement of labor from the new member states to the existing member states would be 
restricted for a period of up to seven years following accession. 
The case of voluntary transitional regime liberalization in the European Union provides a 
unique opportunity to examine how a fixed and comprehensive bindle of rights can shape the 
politics of migrant admissions. Indeed, there are few – if any – other cases in which policy 
makers must choose between the stark alternatives of opening admissions and granting virtually 
complete economic and social rights or maintaining admissions restrictions. As should be clear, 
in contrast to the United States, debates over intra-EU migration cannot separate the rights of 
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migrants, on the one hand, and the number to be admitted, on the other. By virtue of common 
European citizenship, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, intra-EU migrants are 
provided with an expansive bundle of rights. The result is that existing member states must 
choose to either withhold admission or extend these rights. 
Consistent with the overarching argument in this dissertation, the results from the 
previous chapter indicated that the leftist parties throughout the European Union that represent 
labor interests, favor a robust welfare state, and promote cultural pluralism are likely to support 
the admission of migrants granted an expansive bundle of rights. In this chapter, I will examine 
whether these preferences affect immigration policy outcomes. 
7.1 MEMBERSHIP AND MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN POLITY 
Before delving in to the determinants of transitional regime liberalization, it is important to 
understand the form and content of these transitional arrangements as well as whether and how 
these regimes affect both migrant rights and admission. 
7.1.1 Intra-European Union Admission 
In order to accede to the EU, prospective member states must be functioning democracies, have 
market economies, and protect human and minority rights, not to mention the ability to transpose 
in excess of 100 thousand pages of supranational law – the acquis communautaire – into national 
law. In light of these significant barriers to accession, it ought to be surprising that many in the 
  
163 
existing member states were apprehensive about extending the free movement of people regime 
to the post-2004 enlargement states. Specifically, the extension of the free movement of people 
regime to these new member states should only be as contentious as this provision is for free 
movement among the existing member states. Moreover, historical experience suggests that 
concerns over a large influx of migrants following enlargement are unfounded (Goedings 1999). 
Prior to the second (Greece) and third (Portugal and Spain) enlargements, many of the same 
concerns were raised: that poor individuals from new democracies would flood the existing 
member states’ labor markets. In response to these fears, existing member states were permitted 
to withhold the free movement of labor for six and seven years following the second and third 
enlargements, respectively (Currie 2013, 13-14). However, this flood of labor migrants never 
materialized and there was little reason to expect the realization of similar concerns following the 
post-2004 enlargements (Goedings 1999). In spite of this evidence, concerns over immigration 
from the new member states persisted. 
In order to mitigate the concerns of the existing member states and following the model 
from the second and third enlargements, the accession treaties for the post-2004 enlargement 
states included a provision whereby the existing member states could continue to impose 
migration restrictions for a period of up to seven years following accession for citizens of the 
enlargement states. With each round of enlargement, the existing member states could restrict 
labor market access to citizens of the new member states. Pursuant to the so-called “standstill 
provision,” these transitional arrangements were not permitted to be any more restrictive than the 
immigration regimes already in place. Thus, if an existing member state had a previously 
imposed quota for foreign nationals from one of the new member states at the time of accession, 
that existing member state could not further limit admissions following accession. Citizens of the 
  
164 
Cyprus and Malta were entirely exempt from transitional arrangement restrictions, and have been 
privy to the free movement of people regime throughout their membership. After liberalizing the 
transitional regimes, however, any existing member state could invoke the so-called “safeguard 
clause” at any time within the seven-year period. The safeguard clause allows an existing 
member state to reinstate transitional restrictions in the event of or threat of significant labor 
market distortion. 
While the enlargement states may not apply transitional restrictions to the existing 
member states, these states are permitted to impose reciprocal measures against restricting states. 
Under this provision, any enlargement state may restrict labor market access to citizens of 
existing member states that have applied transitional restrictions to citizens of their state. 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, for instance, all chose to impose reciprocal restrictions on labor 
market access to citizen of EU15101 states that imposed labor market restrictions to citizens from 
their own countries.  Finally, while Cyprus and Malta were exempt from transitional agreement 
restrictions and therefore could not impose reciprocal measures, Malta received the right to 
invoke the safeguard clause in the event of or threat of significant labor market distortion. 
Following the 2007 round of enlargement, the existing member states (EU25)102 could 
restrict labor market access to citizens of the accession states (Bulgaria and Romania) for a 
period of up to seven years and continued to be able to invoke the safeguard clause. In 2009, for 
example, Spain removed its transitional agreement restrictions for the 2007 enlargement states, 
but citing labor market distortions, invoked the safeguard clause and re-imposed restrictions 
                                                 
101 The EU15 consists of all pre-2004 member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
102 The EU25 consists of all pre-2007 member states: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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against Romanian citizens only. Bulgaria and Romania were granted the ability to impose 
reciprocal measures, though neither chose to do so. Acceding in 2013, Croatia elected to impose 
reciprocal measures against those states that have enacted transitional measures. Table 13 
provides an overview of the permissible transitional labor market restrictions. 
Table 13. Permitted Transitional Restrictions following Accession 
Accession 
Year 
Accession 
States 
Permitted 
Restrictions 
1973 Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom 
  
None 
1981 Greece 
  
Six years 
1986 Portugal, Spain 
  
Seven years 
1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden 
  
None 
2004 A2: Cyprus, Malta 
  
None 
 A8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
  
Seven years 
2007 Bulgaria, Romania 
  
Seven years 
2013 Croatia Seven years 
 
In practice, there has been significant variation in how these provisions have been 
implemented. First, there has been extreme variation in the restrictions imposed by EU15 
member states on the within groups of acceding states. Ireland, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, for example, enacted some of the most liberal policies by immediately waiving 
restrictions for migrants from the A8 states. By contrast, France and Germany enacted some of 
the most restrictive policies for these migrants by choosing to maintain transitional agreements 
for seven years, the longest period permitted. 
Second, there has been variation in the restrictions imposed by individual EU15 member 
states on new member states between rounds of enlargement. Finland, for example, enacted 
strong restrictions against the 2004 enlargement states, but liberalized its policies for the 2007 
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enlargement states, whereas the United Kingdom and Ireland waived restrictions for the 2004 
enlargement, but imposed heavy restrictions for citizens of 2007 enlargement states (Drew and 
Sriskandarajah 2007). 
Third, there has been variation in the imposition of reciprocal measures among the 
accession states. While Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia all chose to implement reciprocal 
restrictions, none of the other 2004 accession states chose to enact reciprocal measures. Finally, 
there has been variation in individual existing member state’s treatment of new member states 
within the same enlargement groups, as evidenced by Spain invoking the safeguard clause 
against Romania but not against Bulgaria. Clearly, EU member states exhibit a considerably 
degree of variation in their decisions to restrict labor market access to citizens of accession 
countries. If there is indeed a tradeoff between rights and admission, as Ruhs (2013) argues, and 
all EU citizens have equal rights across member states, how can we account for this variation? 
By examining the particular bundle of rights in question, we can begin to unpack the politics of 
transitional regime liberalization. 
7.1.2 Membership Rights of Intra-European Union Migrants 
The rights of intra-EU migrants vary by both economic activity (whether active or inactive) and 
duration of prior stay. Under Article 48 of the EEC Treaty, economically active persons include 
both workers and the self-employed and are defined as those who undertake “effective and 
genuine pursuit of [economic] activity.” This definition of economically active intra-EU 
migrants is rather permissive. In D.M. Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1982), the European 
Court of Justice found that neither the level of income nor the motive for seeking employment in 
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another member state were germane to the question of whether an intra-EU migrant is in fact 
economically active. Indeed, under this decision, an intra-EU migrant who earns below the 
minimum wage or who sought employment for the purpose of establishing residency is still 
defined as economically active.  
In the absence of transitional measures, all EU citizens have the right to receive equal 
labor market access to nationals throughout the European Union. That is, they are permitted to 
seek employment, to change employers, and to participate in collective wage bargaining 
arrangements, among others, and as a result have broad economic rights. Perhaps more 
importantly for present purposes, any intra-EU migrant defined as economically active, again 
whether a worker or self-employed, has the right to access social assistance, the provision of 
which is means tested and is not based on prior contributions, in addition to contributory social 
security benefits and special non-contributory benefits. (Poptcheva 2014, 5-6) More concretely, 
by virtue of being economically active and irrespective of duration of stay, intra-EU migrants 
availing themselves of the freedom of movement have access to significant social rights.  
Economically inactive intra-EU migrants also have significant rights in the member state 
of residence. Pursuant to Directive 2004/38/EC 16, economically inactive EU citizens may reside 
in another member state if they have sufficient resources to support themselves without 
becoming “a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period 
of residence, and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State.” 
(Poptcheva 2014, 6) By virtue of EU citizenship, an economically inactive person has the right to 
pursue employment in the host member state, thereby becoming economically active. Moreover, 
the right to reside increases with duration of stay such that economically inactive migrants who 
have resided in the member state for more than three months have the right to access social 
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assistance, though only to the point of becoming an unreasonable burden.103 Any intra-EU 
migrant, irrespective of his or her economic activity, has the unqualified right to access social 
assistance after five years of residence. 
Finally, if an intra-EU migrant is habitually resident in another member state, he or she 
has the right to participate in municipal and EU elections in the member state of residence, but 
are not by rule granted the right to participate in national elections. As should be clear, in the 
absence of transitional arrangements, both economically active and economically inactive intra-
EU migrants have an expansive bundle of economic and social rights. These vast rights are 
consistent with the resident category of societal membership explored throughout this 
dissertation. 
Under transitional measures, existing member states are permitted to withhold the free 
movement of workers for a limited period following accession, meaning that both economically 
inactive and self-employed citizens of new member states are permitted to migrate to the existing 
member states irrespective of the imposition of transitional arrangements. For each category of 
migrant, the rights remain the same with the important exception of national treatment for labor 
market access. Put another way, under transitional arrangements, intra-EU migrants are – subject 
to very limited conditions, including duration of stay of at least three months – granted social 
rights and even limited political rights, but not economic rights. 
                                                 
103 The unreasonable burden condition remains ill defined. Specifically, the right to reside cannot be removed simply 
on the grounds of an economically inactive intra-EU migrant requesting social assistance (Grzelczyk case cited in 
Barnard (2005)), and the determination of “unreasonable burden” must be taken on a case-by-case basis.  
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7.2 THE POLITICS OF TRANSITIONAL REGIME LIBERALIZATION 
What effect should this constellation of rights have on national political decisions to lift 
transitional restrictions? How are variations in the political context likely to affect the policy 
making process? The institutional configurations in these states differ in significant ways to that 
of the United States. The fusion of executive and legislative functions as well as the intertwining 
of executive and legislative survival yields greater party cohesion and discipline in these states. 
As a result, executive interests should dominate the policy-making process. The presence of 
collegial, multi-party executives complicates this further. While in a single party government, we 
could simply consider the governing party’s position, a coalition government necessarily requires 
that we account for not only the interests, but also the relative strength, of each coalition partner. 
Following a well-established literature, I will treat cabinet interests as the weighted average of 
the governing parties’ interests. (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 1994; Klingemann et al. 
2006; Seki and Williams 2014) While recent research demonstrates that reality is more complex 
(Alexiadou forthcoming), it seems that estimating cabinet position along two ideological 
dimensions is an area in which this simplifying assumption most closely approximates reality. 
Certainly the fixed nature of rights granted to intra-EU migrants poses a challenge to the 
center-right parties governments. Because the center-right is divided over admissions under 
programs granting an expansive bundle of rights, the left-right ideological position of the 
governing coalition should have little independent effect on the probability of transitional regime 
liberalization. This runs counter to the expectation in the US regime liberalization chapter, as the 
American right did not have to choose between competing goals, but could instead focus on 
increasing admissions with limited rights. 
  
170 
H7.1: Variations in executive left-right ideology will have no independent effect on the likelihood 
of voluntary transitional regime liberalization, all else held equal.  
 Government position on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, by contract, should have 
a significant effect on the decision to liberalize transitional regimes. Because of the extensive 
bundles of rights granted to these migrants, cultural dimension issues will be particularly salient, 
with authoritarians wishing to exclude those who would not only enter the state, but also have 
access to many membership privileges virtually upon arrival and without having integrated into 
the receiving society. This effect is likely to be exacerbated by increasingly rightist positions 
along the left-right dimension. Much like the results for permanent resident program 
liberalization in the United States chapter, transitional regime liberalization should split the right, 
with right libertarians being willing to accept the perceived cost of admission in order to obtain 
the benefits and right authoritarians balking at the costs in both economic and cultural terms. 
H7.2a: Under a left-leaning executive, variations in cultural ideology will have no independent 
effect on the likelihood of transitional regime liberalization, all else held equal. 
H7.2b: Under a right-leaning executive, increasingly authoritarian ideological positions will 
decrease the likelihood of transitional liberalization, all else held equal. 
 
7.2.1 A Quantitative Examination of Transitional Regime Liberalization 
In order to test the above arguments, I run a discrete time duration model, which tests the 
likelihood of observing voluntary transitional regime liberalization (“failure”) in a given period 
of time. I use annual receiving state-sending group data for the years in which the receiving state 
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had the right to restrict labor migration from the group of sending states, which captures the 
majority of total possible variation in labor market restrictions in the enlarged European 
Union.104 In this version, I include the provisions following the 2004, 2007, and 2013 rounds of 
enlargement, and in future iterations, I plan to extend the analysis back to the Hellenic (1981) 
and Iberian (1986) enlargements. In order to operationalize the outcome of interest – voluntary 
transitional regime liberalization – I have coded a binary variable (voluntary liberalization) that 
takes the value of 1 in years in which 1) labor market protections are still permissible pursuant to 
the accession treaties but 2) the receiving state has removed all labor market protections against 
citizens of the sending state group. This variable takes the value of 0 where the receiving state 
could choose restriction or liberalization and maintained labor market protections – in the form 
of transitional arrangements, safeguard clauses, or reciprocal measures – against citizens of the 
sending state group. 
 Restricting the dependent variable to voluntary liberalization as opposed to simply 
liberalization is important for related theoretical and methodological reasons. Theoretically, I am 
interested in the choices that states make with respect to admitting new members into their 
society. Methodologically, because each receiving state must liberalize by a specified point, a 
simple liberalization variable would result in deterministic estimates and overvalue the temporal 
effect.  
Following Carter and Signorino (2010) I include cubic polynomials in my model in order 
to generate the base hazard. This allows me to incorporate temporal dependence into the model 
in order to demonstrate how variations in the independent variables impact the hazard rate (e.g. 
                                                 
104 Alternatively, I could have examined directed-dyad year data, but because there is only one case in which a 
particular receiving state – Spain – treated states from the same enlargement in different ways, directed dyads are 
likely to over-inflate my sample while adding little additional information. 
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the likelihood of observing transitional regime liberalization across time). The inclusion of time 
as a variable is at minimum necessary to avoid omitted variable bias, as we know that all of these 
regimes must liberalize after a particular period of time meaning that by definition, increasing 
time durations result in increasing regime liberalization. Relatedly, I include a self-coded 
measure of the percent of potential receiving states that have liberalized their transitional regimes 
in prior periods, as the higher the number of substitutable destination states, the lower the 
expected costs of regime liberalization. 
As in the prior chapters, the primary independent variables account for ideological 
positions along economic and cultural dimensions as well as the interaction between these two 
ideological positions. Following Seki and Williams (2014), I operationalize cabinet ideological 
position as the average of coalition partners’ positions, weighted by the proportion government 
legislative seats controlled by that party. As in the prior chapter, however, I obtain these 
weighted averages using the Euro Manifesto Project (EMP) data (Braun et al. 2010; Schmitt and 
Wüst 2012). 
I also include additional control variables in alternative models as robustness checks. 
Among these variables I include controls for economic interests, including a measure of labor 
market concertation – specifically the level of wage-setting coordination (Visser 2011) – which 
accounts for institutionalized labor protection, the lagged unemployment rate (European 
Commission 2011), and lagged log GDP per capita (European Commission 2011). Using 
European Commission data (2011), I also control for the effect of prior migration by including a 
measure of lagged migrant flow as a percent of population  and public support for authoritarian-
learning parties by including a the percent of votes for extreme right wing parties. Finally, I 
include a set of receiving state fixed effects in order to control for any unobserved within-unit 
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factors. The results of these empirical tests are presented in Table 14, while the average marginal 
effects for relevant variables are presented in Table 15. 
 
 
  
  
174 
Table 14. Determinants of Transitional Regime Liberalization 
 14.1 14.2 14.3 
    
Left-Right 0.147 -0.108 0.606† 
 (0.144) (0.294) (0.352) 
Libertarian-Authoritarian 0.200 0.041 0.607 
 (0.255) (0.400) (0.584) 
Left-Right* Libertarian-Authoritarian -0.074 -0.021 -0.213† 
 (0.045) (0.070) (0.114) 
Percent Liberalized 1.089 8.172*** 3.564 
 (1.710) (2.381) (2.831) 
Wage-Setting Coordination   -0.354 
   (0.217) 
Migrant Flow)   0.055 
(lag, Percent of Population)   (0.358) 
Unemployment (lag)   -0.060 
   (0.078) 
GPC per Capita (ln, lag)   -1.276† 
   (0.702) 
Percent Votes for Extreme Right Wing   -0.058† 
   (0.030) 
t -0.604 -3.736** -3.031† 
 (0.851) (1.449) (1.674) 
t2 0.196 1.254* 1.144† 
 (0.300) (0.497) (0.622) 
t3 -0.024 -0.119* -0.119† 
 (0.029) (0.049) (0.066) 
Constant -0.120 -1.879 12.89** 
 (1.449) (2.781) (6.140) 
Receiving-State Fixed Effects N Y N 
n 254 155 172 
Pseudo-R2 0.117 0.323 0.415 
Modal Category 60.236% 77.419% 66.279% 
Correctly Predicted 63.78% 89.677% 86.628% 
Reduction in Error 8.913% 54.285% 60.345% 
    
Joint Significance (Χ2)    
Left-Right 3.11 3.44 3.53 
Libertarian-Authoritarian 5.51† 0.41 9.35** 
Left-Right+Libertarian-Authoritarian 5.94 4.54 9.53* 
Time Count 18.98*** 7.21† 3.90 
Receiving State  21.57†  
Table reports probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses below. 
† p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed values) 
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Table 15. Determinants of Transitional Regime Liberalization, Marginal Effects 
Model 15.1 15.2 15.3 
    
Left-Right -0.040 -0.039† -0.030 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.023) 
Libertarian-Authoritarian -0.055 -0.013 -0.081* 
 (0.034) (0.029) (0.033) 
Percent Liberalized 0.367 1.715*** 0.760 
 (0.574) (0.387) (0.608) 
Wage-Setting   -0.076† 
Coordination   (0.042) 
Migrant Flow   0.012 
(lag, Percent of Population)   (0.076) 
Unemployment (lag)   -0.013 
   (0.017) 
GPC per Capita    -0.272† 
(lag, ln)   (0.146) 
Percent Votes for    -0.012† 
Extreme Right Wing   (0.007) 
Time Count -0.072† -0.090† -0.043 
 (0.041) (0.051) (0.054) 
Table reports marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses below. 
† p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed values) 
The results of these initial tests provide some preliminary evidence in support of the 
hypotheses outlined above. Because the primary hypothesis is conditional, however, we must 
examine how the effect of libertarian-authoritarian ideological position changes at various levels 
of left-right ideological position. As demonstrated in Figure 8, government position along the 
authoritarian-libertarian dimension has no significant effect on the likelihood of transitional 
regime liberalization when there is a leftist governing party or coalition. Under a rightist 
government, by contrast, government ideological position along the authoritarian-libertarian 
dimension has a significant and negative effect on the likelihood of transitional regime 
liberalization. Moreover, Figure 9 demonstrates that left-right ideological position only plays a 
significant role at centrist ranges  
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Figure 8. Average Marginal Effects of Libertarian-Authoritarian Ideological Position across Left-Right Ideological 
Position 
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Figure 9. Average Marginal Effects of Left-Right Ideological Position across Left-Right Ideological Position 
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Substantively, a government at the 25th percentile along the libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension is approximately 19.1% more likely to liberalize transitional regimes than those at the 
75th percentile, all else held equal. However, a government at the minimum position on the left-
right ideological dimension is not significantly more or less likely to liberalize transitional 
regimes than those at the maximum position.105 Figure 10 nicely illustrates the conditional 
relationship between these two ideological dimensions. The average predicted probability of 
transitional regime liberalization increases as the government becomes increasingly 
economically conservative where the government is libertarian, but decreases under these same 
conditions where the government is authoritarian.106 While there is no significant difference in 
the probability of liberalization between left-libertarian, left-authoritarian, and right-progressive 
governments, right-progressives are approximately 70.3% more likely to liberalize transitional 
regimes than their right-traditional counterparts while left-progressives and left-traditionals are 
each approximately 50% more likely to do so. 
                                                 
105 In fact, this holds true for piecewise comparisons at each value along the left-right dimension. 
106 Here libertarian is defined as the 10th percentile along the cultural dimension while authoritarian is defined as the 
90th percentile. This result holds for narrower differences, including positions at the 25th and 75th percentiles. 
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Figure 10. Average Probability of Liberalization for Libertarians and Authoritarians across the Left-Right 
Ideological Dimension 
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7.3 DISCUSSION 
This chapter examined the decisions to liberalize migrant admissions under the conditions that 
policymakers lacked discretion over the bundle of rights granted to migrants. While the 
American parties have the opportunity to liberalize admissions under varying bundles of right in 
order to satisfy the competing interests of various constituents, European parties are not afforded 
this same latitude with respect to intra-EU migrants. As a result, liberalizing coalitions in the 
European Union are consistent with those likely to liberalize permanent resident program 
admissions in the United States and, relatedly, those least likely to voluntarily liberalize 
transitional arrangements in the European Union are ideologically consistent with those most 
likely to liberalize guest worker admissions and least likely to liberalize permanent resident 
admissions in the United States. 
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8.0  CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The fundamental argument of this dissertation has been that migrant rights are central to 
understanding the immigration policy-making process. By defining what a foreign national may 
and may not do in the receiving state, rights condition the effect that migrants have on the 
receiving society and therefore which societal groups will favor immigration liberalization. I 
have argued that much of the politics underlying immigration policy can be understood 
using a standard left-right ideological dimension along which the political left represents the 
interests of workers in the market, supports the welfare state as a means to redistribute income 
and risk, and promotes cultural diversity and change while the right represents the interests of 
employers, seeks to reduce the size and scope of the welfare state, and strives to preserve 
traditional culture. Increasing migrant rights increases the market, fiscal, and cultural costs of 
immigration to the right, but decreases the market costs and generates political and cultural 
benefits to the left. As a result, migrant rights condition preferences over immigration – such that 
the right (left) should favor (oppose) the admission of migrants with few rights and oppose 
(favor) the admission of migrants with expansive rights – and immigration policy outcomes – 
such that immigration reform will focus on increasing the admission of migrants with a limited 
(broad) set of rights when the right (left) is in government. 
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In the empirical chapters, I presented evidence consistent with this argument. Partisan 
preferences over levels of immigration in the United States and across the European Union 
member states change as a function of migrant rights. In the United States, we saw that 
Democrats, as representatives of labor, fiscal progressives, and cultural pluralists, support the 
liberalization of permanent resident programs, which grant migrants significant economic and 
social rights, and oppose guest worker programs and, to a lesser extent, temporary resident 
programs, which extend very limited rights to migrants. The opposite is true of Republicans. 
 In examining partisan preferences across the European Union member states, I presented 
a more direct test of how interests are shaped by these same factors. Consistent with the 
American case, I found that parties on the right are more likely to favor labor migration prior to 
the extension of significant migrant rights – e.g., when member states exercised greater 
discretion over immigrant policy – but oppose labor migration following the extension of 
significant migrant rights at the supranational level. Similarly, parties on the right oppose the 
cultural and fiscal effects of migrants where supranational regulations required the extension of 
significant rights to migrants. These cases indeed suggest that migrant rights condition the 
perceived effect of increased immigration on more fundamental interests, and that the partisan 
representatives of these interested groups respond to these changes in kind. 
These interests were also found to have an effect on immigration policy outcomes. 
Immigration programs admitting migrants with an expansive bundle of economic and social 
rights are more likely to be liberalized when leftist parties govern in the United States and across 
the European Union member states. Programs admitting migrants with a limited bundle of rights, 
by contrast, are more likely to be liberalized when Republicans govern in the United States. 
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8.1 SECTORAL INTERESTS AND THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION 
The theoretical claims and empirical evidence presented in this dissertation offer a clear and 
rather parsimonious model that reconciles the dominant and heretofore-competing explanations 
of immigration-related interests and policy outcomes. Migrant rights condition market, fiscal, 
and cultural interests over migrant admissions. It should be clear, however, that the account of 
whether and how migrant rights condition sectoral interests over immigration remains 
underdeveloped. More plainly, we know that particular sectors have played disproportionately 
significant roles in various immigration debates. In the United States, for instance, Disney led the 
hospitality industry in a successful 1990 bid for a new “cultural exchange” visa, agricultural 
employers were instrumental in the creation and maintenance of wartime guest worker programs, 
and Google and other Silicon Valley giants have been at the forefront of temporary worker 
debates over the past two decades. 
Can a rights-based approach account for sectoral interests? More specifically, are sectoral 
interests with respect to immigration conditioned on rights in some generalizable fashion? There 
are certainly good theoretical reasons to expect that migrant rights condition sector-based 
interests. Throughout this dissertation, I have treated factoral cleavages as the dominant mode of 
market-based conflict over immigration because migration affects the supply of labor in the 
receiving state; assuming fixed demand, an increase in the labor supply under conditions of 
limited migrant rights will benefit employers and hurt labor. A central argument in this 
dissertation has been that increasing migrant rights – employment and social rights, in particular 
– decreases the benefits and offsets the costs of migration to employers and labor, respectively. 
Variations in migrant rights are likely to change the nature of market-based cleavages from 
  
184 
factoral divisions to sectoral divisions through at least two mechanisms: limiting migrant impact 
to particular sectors and affecting employers’ ability to attract foreign talent. 
8.1.1 Limiting Rights, Limiting Effect, and the Role of Sector Tradability 
States can limit the labor market impact of migrants by limiting their employment in two 
important ways: duration of employment and ability to change employers. Together I shall refer 
to these as “employment rights,” and, as noted in the second chapter, programs that admit 
migrants without these rights fall under the category of guest worker programs. States can limit a 
foreign national’s duration of legal employment in order to offset the wage distorting effects of 
immigration liberalization while providing employers with a mechanism to survive temporary 
labor shortages. In addition, states can restrict migrants’ right to change employers in an 
additional effort to protect the labor market. Typically used in tandem and in conjunction with 
restrictions on employer discretion, including sectoral limitations and labor market tests, 
constraining migrant labor to seasonal work for a particular employer in a particular sector can 
protect some sectors from failing during peak seasons or during extraordinary periods while 
precluding spillover to the remainder of the labor market. 
Take, for example, the agricultural industry in a labor-scarce economy and assume that 
there exists no technological substitute for labor for the purposes of harvesting crops and that 
subsidies are either non-existent or insufficient. Throughout the year, the industry manages to 
compete with cheaper imports from labor-abundant states and employs a steady contingent of 
low-skilled domestic labor. As predicted above, employers continue to favor guest worker and, 
to a lesser extent, temporary resident program liberalization while low-skilled labor continues to 
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oppose such liberalization. During the harvest season, however, there is an insufficient supply of 
low-skilled labor to meet the employers’ needs; crops spoil, employers are unable to recoup their 
investment, and are faced with the possibility of bankruptcy and layoffs. This outcome is sub-
optimal for all involved. An alternative is to import low-skilled labor, but this solution will 
attract resistance from all low-skilled labor, not just that employed in the agricultural industry, 
for the reasons outlined above. By withholding employment rights from low-skilled migrant 
labor, it is possible to limit the market impact of an increase in low-skilled labor migration not 
only to the struggling industry, but also to the period of critical need. In the above example, low-
skilled labor migrants would be admitted under the conditions that they work for a particular 
farm and leave at the end of the three-month harvest season. 
In effect, these limitations to migrant rights serve the interests of employers in import-
competing sectors during particularly labor-intensive periods. Given that, ceteris paribus, 
employers are expected to favor such liberalization, it should be unsurprising that employers in 
the import-competing sector will continue to favor liberalization under restrictions to the ability 
to change employers and duration of stay.107 To what extent do these limitations to migrant 
rights impact the preferences of low-skilled labor? Because such programs are limited in both 
duration and ability to change employers, low-skilled labor as a factor group should not lose as a 
result of such liberalization. Note that this would not be true if migrants were granted either of 
these rights. If low-skilled migrants were not limited to a short-term duration of stay, it would be 
possible for them to stay on beyond the period of significant need, increasing the supply of low-
skilled labor to that particular employer (assuming the right to change employer remained 
                                                 
107 Though it is important to note that employers are likely to contest labor market tests and would prefer, all else 
held equal, to have greater latitude over contracting decisions. 
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limited), potentially causing a ripple effect – if enough employers were permitted to hire foreign 
low-skilled labor – throughout the market for low-skilled labor. Similarly, if low-skilled migrants 
are granted the right to change employer, the ability to move from one employer to another could 
force domestic low-skilled labor to seek employment in an alternative sector. Otherwise stated, 
restrictions on migrant labor’s ability to change employers and duration of stay are jointly 
necessary conditions to offset labor’s concerns over increasing guest worker admissions. 
I have made the case that withholding employment rights from low-skilled migrants will 
result in continued support for liberalization of guest worker programs from employers in labor-
intensive sectors and will offset low-skilled labor’s concerns over wage distortion, resulting in a 
situation where low-skilled labor, as a factor group, is unlikely to expend resources actively 
opposing the liberalization of such programs. What about low-skilled labor employed in the 
import-competing sector? Counterintuitively, by restricting migrants’ employment rights, low-
skilled labor in the import-competing sector is expected to favor immigration liberalization. 
Logically, the temporary and limited liberalization of low-skilled labor migration provides 
domestic low-skilled labor in that sector with increased job security, by decreasing the likelihood 
that their employer will “go under” during the labor-intensive period for lack of sufficient 
resources. Under the right conditions, then, liberalization of low-skilled labor migration can 
protect both employers and low-skilled laborers engaged in import-competing sectors in a labor-
scarce state during periods of particular economic strain.  
Do these expectations generalize to labor-intensive, non-tradable sectors? While 
employers in such sectors will continue to support the liberalization of migration programs that 
withhold employment rights, the above expectations are unlikely to generalize to labor in non-
tradable sectors. Because these sectors produce for the domestic economy and lack competitive 
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pressure from imports, labor in these sectors lacks the incentive to compromise in order to avoid 
sector failure in the domestic market. Consider, for example, the construction industry in a labor-
scarce economy and again assume that there exists no technological substitute for labor. 
Competition in the sector comes from domestic sources, as importable substitutes do not exist. 
That is, given current technology and infrastructure, it is infeasible for homes or office blocks to 
be created in a labor-abundant state – say China or India – and imported by labor-scarce states – 
such as the United States or France. Even under limited duration of stay and inability to change 
employers, migrant labor employed in building construction would only serve to decrease wages. 
As a result, low-skilled labor employed in labor-intensive, non-tradable sectors should oppose 
liberalizing sector-specific migration, even under extreme restrictions on employment rights. 
The preceding discussion thus suggests that rights will condition whether sectoral or 
factoral divisions arise over immigration. While factoral interests will predominate, limiting 
migrants’ duration of stay and right to change employers while liberalizing sector-specific 
immigration will continue to engender the support of employers in that sector and will ameliorate 
concerns of labor outside of that sector. If the sector under consideration competes on the market 
with foreign imports, domestic labor in that sector is less likely to oppose, and may even support, 
such immigration programs. If, however, the sector under consideration does not compete with 
foreign imports, the sector will be internally divided, with employers favoring liberalization and 
labor opposing liberalization. 
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8.1.2 Expanding Rights, Attracting Talent, and the Role of Factor Inputs 
To this point, I have considered the role of rights in yielding sectoral politics over immigration in 
labor-intensive sectors and highlighted the conditions under which labor will not oppose the 
liberalization of programs that grant migrants few rights. In this section, I consider the conditions 
under which employers will support the liberalization of programs that grant migrants greater 
rights. Employers will pursue two sets of related interests with respect to labor migration 
policies: increasing the labor supply in order to decrease costs and increasing their discretion 
over labor relations. There exists a certain trade-off between these two goals. Because of the 
relative demand for high-skilled labor and their higher standard of living vis-à-vis low-skilled 
labor in their country of origin, employers of high-skilled labor will be less able to attract high-
skilled foreign labor if these migrants are granted very few rights (Ruhs 2013). In order to 
increase the supply of high-skilled labor, employers must be willing to temper the degree to 
which they have discretion over that labor. This suggests that employers of high-skilled labor 
should support temporary resident and, to a lesser extent, permanent resident program 
liberalization. 
8.1.3 The Sectoral Politics of Immigration 
While there are good theoretical reasons to expect that rights condition whether and how sectoral 
interests emerge over immigration policy liberalization, the emergence of these sectoral interests 
will affect the politics of immigration. As Freeman (2006) has argued, immigration policies that 
create concentrated costs and benefits will produce interest group politics. As the size of the 
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affected groups decreases, it will become increasingly difficult to observe these sectoral effects 
at the macro-level. Yet even at this macro-level, I find evidence consistent with sectoral effects. 
In the fourth chapter, for instance, I find that increasing the percent of gross state product 
attributable to agriculture increases the likelihood that a Senator will vote in favor of guest 
worker program liberalization, but has no effect on disposition towards temporary and permanent 
resident programs.  
 Examining the positions of parties that compete nationally or Senators representing entire 
states is more likely to provide evidence of how these groups represent broad-based societal 
interests as opposed to geographically concentrated sectors. To adequately examine the effect of 
rights on sectoral interests thus requires analysis at a lower level of aggregation. In the United 
States, for instance, this could likely be achieved by examining the voting behavior of members 
of the House of Representatives. Across Europe, sectoral effects may be observable at the 
NUTS-3 level of aggregation. A complementary strategy would be to examine individual level 
data for evidence of variation by sector of employment. There is clearly much work to be done in 
order to fully understand the role of migrant rights in the politics of immigration. 
8.2 INTERESTS, MEMBERSHIP, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
While this exposition of the effect of migrant rights on societal immigration preferences and 
policy outcomes is interesting and important in its own right, the findings have significant 
implications for broader literatures in political economy and the study of immigration. The first 
of these is the role of economic and cultural interests in the study of political economy. The 
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scholarship on the politics of immigration is far from the only contemporary body of literature 
where scholars prizing economic and cultural explanations talk past each other. In fact, among 
the literatures examining the major cross border flows, immigration studies are the most likely to 
connect the two. In trade, for instance, the literatures on cultural interests, such as the protection 
of geographic indicators, are either entirely ignored by those examining economic interests, or 
attributed as protectionist interests masquerading as cultural interests. This myopathy is not 
simply one-sided. Understanding the politics governing the global economy requires that these 
competing literatures engage with one another, and that scholars take seriously the role of both 
economic and cultural interests. 
The second larger point focuses on the role of the state in the global economy. There has 
been much debate over whether the state continues to exert control over the domestic market, or 
if global economic interdependence has rendered the state impotent. While immigration controls 
have at times been viewed as one of the final bastions of complete state sovereignty, particularly 
among economic policies, the results in this project suggest that such a view must be tempered. 
This is certainly truer of states such as the United States, where decision makers have greater 
flexibility over immigration-related policies, but advanced integration of the European 
economies has limited, although not entirely rendered impotent, state capacity to act. The 
implications for the study of political economy seem clear: scholars hoping to understand 
economic preferences and policies in the contemporary era can rarely afford to consider only 
domestic or international factors. That is, in order to successfully understand the politics of 
economics, the lines between comparative and international political economy must be blurred. 
Finally, the results of this project point to a rather troubling paradox. Where 
policymakers in democratic states are given discretion over admitting migrants with varying 
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bundles of rights, as in the United States, they may choose to admit a significant number of 
migrants lacking considerable rights.  The longer such migrants remain in the receiving state, the 
less just this becomes, as with the passage of time they are likely to become a permanent societal 
underclass. Alternatively, however, restricting policymakers’ discretion over migration, as is the 
case across the European Union, limits elites’ abilities to adequately represent the interests of 
those they represent. The result is one of potentially devastating consequences. Consider the 
current dilemma faced in the United Kingdom: the politics of immigration, and European 
immigration in particular, have reached a critical point, with a not insignificant proportion of the 
population demanding greater restrictions on migrants – both in terms of rights and admissions. 
The result has been campaigns for a restrictive overhaul in the immigration system, as well as 
increasing support for independence from the European Union. The dilemma is thus one where 
state obligations to its existing members threaten its ability to provide justice to newcomers. 
The importance of migrant rights cannot be understated. Societal preferences over 
immigration and the resultant immigration control policies are conditional on these rights, as 
migrant rights affect migrant impact on the market, public expenditure, and the receiving culture. 
Yet they also affect society itself, as democratic states face the dual challenge of adequately 
representing societal interests while providing justice for newcomers. 
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APPENDIX A 
IMMIGRATION-RELATED VOTES IN THE UNITES STATES SENATE 
Table 16. Recorded Votes Coded by Congress 
Congress Years Recorded Vote Number Type Year 
79th 1945-1946    
80th 1947-1948    
81st 1949-1950 287 Resident Liberalize 
288 Resident Restrict 
82nd  1951-1952 39 Guest Worker Liberalize 
44 Guest Worker Indeterminate 
230 Resident Liberalize 
298 Resident Restrict 
83rd  1953-1954 81 Resident Liberalize 
110 Guest Worker Liberalize 
84th 1955-1956    
85th 1957-1958    
86th 1959-1960    
87th 1961-1962 94 Resident Restrict 
95 Resident Liberalize 
182 Guest Worker Indeterminate 
184 Guest Worker Liberalize 
199 Guest Worker Restrict 
200 Guest Worker Restrict 
201 Guest Worker Liberalize 
202 Guest Worker Liberalize 
88th  1963-1964 93 Guest Worker Indeterminate 
105 Guest Worker Restrict 
106 Guest Worker Restrict 
107 Guest Worker Indeterminate 
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Table 16 (continued). 
  108 Guest Worker Indeterminate 
109 Guest Worker Indeterminate 
207 Guest Worker Liberalize 
89th 1965-1966 219 Guest Worker Liberalize 
220 Guest Worker Indeterminate 
232 Resident Liberalize 
90th 1967-1968    
91st 1969-1970    
92nd 1971-1972    
93rd 1973-1974    
94th 1975-1976    
95th 1977-1978 887 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
96th 1979-1980 86 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
729 Resident Restrict 
97th 1981-1982 809 Resident Liberalize 
810 Resident Liberalize 
811 Resident Liberalize 
816 Guest Worker Restrict 
820 Guest Worker Liberalize 
825 Resident Restrict 
98th 1983-1984 89 Resident Restrict 
92 Resident Liberalize 
94 Guest Worker Liberalize 
99th 1985-1986 176 Guest Worker Restrict 
186 Guest Worker Liberalize 
188 Guest Worker Restrict 
100th 1987-1988 468 Resident Liberalize 
470 Resident Liberalize 
101st 1989-1990 104 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
106 Resident Indeterminate 
108 Resident Restrict 
109 Resident Liberalize 
110 Resident Restrict 
112 Resident Liberalize 
113 Resident Liberalize 
116 Resident Liberalize 
313 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
635 Resident Indeterminate 
102nd 1991-1992    
103rd 1993-1994 12 Resident Liberalize 
13 Resident Restrict 
104th 1995-1996 696 Resident Restrict 
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Table 16 (continued). 
  697 Resident Liberalize 
105th 1997-1998 436 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
437 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
438 Resident Liberalize 
439 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
531 Guest Worker Indeterminate 
106th 1999-2000 626 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
630 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
632 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
634 Nonimmigrant Indeterminate 
636 Nonimmigrant Indeterminate 
107th  2001-2002    
108th 2003-2004    
109th 2005-2006 97 Guest Worker Liberalize 
98 Resident Liberalize 
101 Guest Worker Liberalize 
102 Guest Worker Liberalize 
294 Nonimmigrant Restrict 
489 Guest Worker Liberalize 
490 Guest Worker Liberalize 
494 Resident Restrict 
501 Resident Liberalize 
508 Resident Restrict 
513 Resident Restrict 
514 Guest Worker Liberalize 
516 Guest Worker Restrict 
518 Resident Restrict 
110th 2007-2008 174 Guest Worker Restrict 
175 Guest Worker Restrict 
176 Resident Liberalize 
178 Guest Worker Restrict 
183 Guest Worker Restrict 
194 Resident Restrict 
195 Resident Liberalize 
196 Resident Restrict 
200 Resident Liberalize 
201 Guest Worker Restrict 
232 Resident Restrict 
233 Resident Restrict 
266 Nonimmigrant Liberalize 
280 Guest Worker Liberalize 
111th 2009-2010    
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Table 16 (continued). 
 
 
 
  
112th 2011-2012    
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